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COMBS, DEBRA A., PhD. Failed Feminisms? Inactive Rhetoric and the Ethos of 
Early Women Writers' Defenses of Women. (1995) Directed by Dr. Walter H. 
Beale. 190pp. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the ethos of deeply 
marginalized writers. The writers selected for analysis in this project, Christine 
de Pizan, Jane Anger, Rachel Speght, Ester Sowernam, and Constantia 
Munda, all implicitly engage their marginalizations in their writings. All of them 
are late medieval or early modern women who wrote defenses of women within 
their patriarchal context. Despite differences of class, country and century, 
these women resemble each other because they wrote such defenses without 
any well-known, secular precedents for their arguments. Christine de Pizan 
wrote before Jane Anger, and Anger wrote before Speght, yet the texts of the 
earlier writers were unknown to the later ones, which leaves each of them 
without direct precedent for either their arguments or their act of writing as 
women. This dissertation explores the nature of the ethos appeals these 
women used given the difficulties of their rhetorical situations. 
The methodology used in this dissertation is informed by rhetorical 
studies, feminism, and historiography. Each of these writers' texts is analyzed 
for the use of ethos appeals within the context of the writers' gender roles and 
their historical period. The study has two sections: the first delineates a 
generalization about the ethos appeals in Christine de Pizan's texts, while the 
second uses that generalization to analyze the work of the other women writers 
discussed here. The analysis primarily considers whether these ethos appeals 
are fundamentally similar given the writers' similar rhetorical situations. 
The resulting study indicates that there were such fundamental 
similarities among the ethos appeals of these writers. In particular, the study 
posits that these writers' ethos appeals represent a dynamic interplay among 
their audience's expectations of them, their personal reputations, and their style. 
Though the study does not attempt to construct a theory of ethos, the 
dissertation does call for further study into the nature and function of ethos 
appeals of other kinds of deeply marginalized writers. 
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In this dissertation I will be discussing the works of several early modern 
women writers: Christine de Pizan (1364-1430?), Jane Anger (c. 1587), Rachel 
Speght (c.1617-1621), Ester Sowernam (c.1617), and Constantia Munda 
(c.1617). My discussion would seen to affirm an argument made by Joan Kelly 
several decades ago: 
New work is now appearing that will give a fuller sense of the richness, 
coherence, and continuity of early feminist thought....I hope to 
demonstrate a solid, four-hundred-year-old tradition of women thinking 
about women and sexual politics in European society before the French 
Revolution. (Kelly 66) 
Kelly's article is a persuasive demonstration of the repeated flourishing of pro-
women thought, yet, as Gerda Lerner has recently proven, Kelly's notion of a 
continuing, recognized tradition of women's writing and thought is not 
supported by the evidence. Certainly, many early women did know of some of 
their predecessors, yet just as often women's writing was forgotten, forcing 
many women to be effectively the "first" secular woman writer. Rachel Speght, 
for instance, appears to have been completely unaware of Anger's work, and 
neither seems to have known of Christine. I choose to discuss these writers in 
part because they lack any direct, well recognized secular precedents-each 
engaged in the rhetorical situation of being "first" in a community that, in 
general, assumed that their speaking or writing indicated the contamination of 
their souls. Without a tradition of women's writings as a context for their own 
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writings, and without a rhetorical tradition which justified their speech, these 
women were extraordinarily marginalized. How they presented their voices, 
then, proves interesting and is the topic of my study. 
Little is known of the lives of these marginalized writers. Among them, 
Christine de Pizan is the most well known now, and her life is the most fully 
researched. Born in Italy, daughter of a scholar and civil servant, she and her 
family moved to France when she was only three, and she grew into a loyal 
subject of the French crown. She married, happily, and began a family. Then, 
in less than a year, she lost her father and her husband and found herself 
nearly destitute with her mother and her children to support. For many years 
she was involved in several lawsuits in her attempt to regain money owed to her 
husband's estate. Though she mentions learning to read and write from her 
father, there is no certain evidence of how she became involved in the current 
book trade. Yet between being a copyist and becoming a poet, she became 
France's first "professional" writer. My discussion of her works is limited to some 
of the prose treatises she wrote as she began to present herself as not only a 
celebrated poet, but as a scholar as well. As a poet, and as a novelty in being a 
skilled female poet, she had established for herself a reputation as an artist. 
Yet, as I will discuss in my first chapter, she still faced resistance in entering the 
no-women's-land of scholarship and criticism. 
We know much less about the lives of the other women I discuss. Jane 
Anger's work appeared in 1587 in response to a treatise that never went to 
print; other than the existence of her text, there is no evidence of who she was. 
Like Anger, we have no information on the identities of Ester Sowernam or 
Constantia Munda, other than their participation in the controversy surrounding 
Swetnam's Arraignment of... Women (1617). We do have a bit of background 
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on the first woman writer to refute Swetnam, Rachel Speght. Not yet twenty 
years old when she wrote her pamphlet, Speght was a minister's daughter 
trained in English and at least some Latin. Five years after writing the pamphlet 
which I will discuss, A Mousell for Melastomus (1617), she composed a 
religious allegory in verse, Morality's Memorandum (1621) in response to her 
mother's death. Simon Shepherd discovered records indication that Speght 
married late in the summer of 1621 to one William Procter, and began her family 
(Shepherd 58). She appears to have stopped writing to take up the duties of a 
wife and mother. There is no evidence that these women were aware of their 
predecessors, excepting Sowernam and Munda who knew Speght's work, and 
so their writings and their rhetoric provide potential insights into the histories of 
women and of rhetoric. 
Historicizing scholarship in rhetoric and in women's studies is becoming 
an academic commonplace, if not a virtual industry. The fields are, of course, 
contentious, and each includes several dominate, and less dominate, strains. 
This dissertation certainly is written within the contexts of feminism, new 
historicism, and rhetorical studies, yet in many ways I speak from, and about, 
several of those more marginalized assumptions and interests. Though my first 
section is on the changing ethos appeals in Christine de Pizan's writings, my 
interest in the Renaissance women pamphleteers, Jane Anger, Rachel Speght, 
Ester Sowernam, and Constantia Munda, can certainly be seen as delving into 
the obscure. Because my interests and my assumptions are unusual, I will 
need to justify several of my premises and explain the purpose of this 
dissertation, as well as present some background information. 
Perhaps the most contentious of my positions derives from my 
uncomfortable relationship to "feminist" studies. As Nina Baym argues in "The 
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Madwoman and Her Languages: Why I Don't Do Feminist Literary Theory," 
there are two major strains in feminism-the "pluralists" and the "legalists." 
Pluralists anticipate the unexpected, encourage diversity; legalists locate 
the correct position and marshal women within the ranks. As for recent 
literary theory, it is deeply legalist and judgmental. lnfractions--the wrong 
theory, theoretical errors, or insouciant disregard for theoretical 
implications-are crimes. (Baym 154) 
I will be committing several of those "crimes" in my argument--in particular, I will 
be rejecting outright the dominant strain of feminist historicizing of women's 
writing. In this position I am in good company; Margaret Ezell, in her study of 
feminist literary historiography, discusses several biases inherent in the 
dominant critical depiction of women's texts from before 1700: 
Essentially... the earlier periods of women's literary history have been 
caught between seemingly conflicting perceptions. On the one hand, 
there is the assumption that women were silenced, that they did not write. 
On the other, there is the assumption that because of the literary 
practices followed or the forms used, the writings that were produced 
were not a legitimate part of the 'tradition' that 'blossomed' in the golden 
age of the nineteenth-century female novelist. (Ezell 58) 
Most feminist literary histories celebrate women's writings from the 1800's until 
today as the birth of feminist literature, assumping that women's writings A) 
should be "feminist" in some fashion to be worthwhile in the canon of women's 
writings and B) should reflect a "uniform female response to life" (27). These 
assumptions result in a "tendency to judge the "feminism" of earlier generations 
as it meets our standards" (27). The dominant feminist historiography, then, is 
fundamentally ahistorical: it imposes modern notions of women's worth and 
women's writings onto other eras, which cannot, by definition, fulfill those 
expectations. This results in several problems for those who attempt to study 
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early women writers using an accurate understanding of their historical time. 
Commonly, even now, feminist scholars still express surprise that many women 
were even writing before Aphra Behn or these scholars believe that the early 
women writers were only "proto-feminists." The surprise is derived, as Ezell 
argues, from the "potent myth of Judith Shakespeare:...society, this theory 
maintains, silenced women, and where it could not, it drove them mad..." (25). 
This myth is accompanied by many other stereotypes, all of which affirms a 
linear progression of women's developing independence: 
Here we see the types of female authors emerging: the illiterate medieval 
woman, the silent, docile Renaissance woman, the modest coterie 
Cavalier female, the independent professional Restoration playwright, 
the emerging female novelist, the mad Victorian, and the culmination in 
our own time's self-conscious and self-critical pilgrim in search of female 
identity. (28-29) 
Within this linear progression, women from before Mary Wollstonecraft are 
commonly defined as "proto-feminists." Just as three of the most belittling words 
in the English language are "merely," "only," and "just," the term "proto-
feminists" condescendingly defines early women writers by what they are not 
(modern feminists) instead of by what they are (writers). 
Unfortunately, this depiction of early women writers is exacerbated by the 
major anthologies of those writers-the most significant of which is, of course, 
the Norton Anthology of Literature by Women (NALW). As Ezell notes, because 
NALW is probably the most commonly used anthology for teaching 
undergraduates, it is deeply disturbing "to both feminist literary historians and 
literary critics working in the pre-Romantic periods to discover that 'the tradition 
in English' of women's literature before 1800 occupies only 172 pages out of 
2390" (41). The anthology perpetuates the notion that, excepting a few, 
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extremely rare, women, early women either did not write, or did not write for an 
audience (41). Even the anthologies of women writers during the seventeenth 
century are little better because they "steadily maintain that women writing 
before the eighteenth century were rare and eccentric creatures, the exceptions, 
not the norm" (42). The anthologies of specifically early women writers, women 
from before 1700, undermine one stereotype, yet often these anthologies 
implicitly generate another stereotype-that only the noble woman could and did 
write: 
The lower classes are routinely assumed to have been completely 
illiterate, which has blocked any perception of writings by groups of 
women such as the early Quakers from being considered as part of the 
tradition. Such assumptions have effectively silenced a significant group 
of female voices from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. (52-53) 
By assuming that only the nobility had access to education, these anthologies 
silence the writings of middle-class women and select materials written 
primarily by noble women. The problems that Ezell has noted for feminist 
literary historiography play out in feminist rhetorical historiography, an issue that 
will be discussed at this year's Conference of College Composition and 
Communication. 
One of my "crimes" against feminism is my staunch refusal to accept the 
notion of women's progressive development from an illiterate, silenced, and 
repressed medieval woman to the post-modern feminist. Another of my crimes 
is that I will steadfastly refuse to read "pro-women" writings as "feminist" or 
"proto-feminist" ones: I reject the implicit militancy of the dominant feminist 
theory that assumes that our notions of women's worth and women's nature 
correctly reflect women's essential, universal, selves (Ezell 19 ff) and our notion 
that women's concerns are best served in democratic societies. Many feminist 
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critics have struggled, for instance, over the "problem" of Christine de Pizan's 
sincere monarchist beliefs-yet this problem is only a problem if one assumes 
that the Christine's "feminist" philosophy must conflict with her country's political 
structure. Yet by reading her works within her historical time, and allowing for a 
variety of pro-women beliefs, Christine's loyalty to the crown becomes a non-
issue. Two more of my crimes are indicated by my title-1 will not be proving that 
early women's writings were particularly successful, nor am I arguing that these 
pro-women writings were intended to change women's political, economic, or 
legal status: hence I speak of "failed" feminisms and "inactive rhetoric." Two of 
the writers I will discuss, Christine de Pizan and Rachel Speght, explicitly argue 
against political change. For many modern feminists, pro-women arguments 
are significant only in so far as the attempt, or do, change women's economic, 
political, or legal status: yet for most early women writers, feminist activism is 
simply not a relevant touchstone for assessment. 
My last crime against feminism may be something of a crime against 
rhetoric as well. Some rhetoricians see rhetoric as primarily a tool for 
persuading an audience to social and political action. This notion of rhetoric 
derives from one way of seeing the classical notion of rhetoric as public 
speaking in the forum, and this kind of rhetoric is greatly valued by many 
feminists. The women I will be studying in this dissertation employ what I am 
calling an "inactive rhetoric" which aims more at changing beliefs, but not 
necessarily at inspiring action, much like Socrates's third speech in the 
Phaedrus employs persuasion about beliefs. I may also commit another crime 
against rhetoric because I assume that these women writers are not concerned 
with the theory of rhetoric--! make no arguments that Christine was influenced 
by St. Augustine, for instance, nor do I consider the influence of Ramus on the 
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Swetnam controversy. Though I do assume that these women were exposed to 
rhetoric, as I presume that rhetoric permeates any culture, I do not expect them 
to have closely studied the then current theory. Even in my last chapter on 
Christine's work, where I argue that she outlines a "rhetoric" for women, I do not 
argue that she acknowledges or responds to the theory of rhetoric. 
My notion of ethos may be my most unusual position; from exploring the 
ethos of these women I have concluded that ethos is dynamic. I began my 
reading of these women's writings assuming that ethos was the "character of 
the speaker," and, like many modern rhetoricians, I conflated "the Ciceronian 
definition of ethos as appearance with the Aristotelian view of ethos as a choice 
made in response to particular audiences" (Johnson 113). Aristotle asserts that 
one's ethos should manifest the virtues affirmed in one's community. Yet that 
definition of ethos begs two questions concerning virtue: What sorts of speakers 
can manifest the virtues that a culture affirms, and what happens when a 
speaker is not one whom the audience expects to manifest those virtues? As 
Maureen Quilligan notes, "In order to write successfully, one needs not only the 
authority necessary to write, but also the authority necessary to be heard. One 
needs to have access to—if not to be located directly within--the center of 
dominant power" (Quilligan xiv). For all of Aristotle's description of the good 
speaker as one with "good sense, good moral character, and goodwill" (11.1, 
1378.5), he consistently assumes that his students will have the authority to 
enter the assembly, and that all rhetors are men. The virtues that these men are 
expected to enact, not surprisingly, are almost all typically gendered as male: 
the audience's stereotypes of those virtues are always already established. 
Aristotle's advise to these elite speakers fundamentally focuses on refining, and 
not truly creating, their ethos. Aristotle does not consider the possibility of a 
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speaker who is not already a member of the political and social elite, nor does 
Aristotle consider marginalized speaking-positions. I found that his definition 
could not account for the particular ethos problems exhibited in writings by 
extremely marginalized, if not nearly silenced, speakers. For such writers ethos 
can not fit the standard, Aristotelian definition. Renaissance women, for 
instance, are doubly bound within the marginalized speaking-positions that 
Aristotle fails to consider: as women speakers they were ideologically 
predefined as unacceptable public speakers within their community, and the 
womanly virtues which they were expected to enact consistently undermined 
their credibility as writers. 
Aristotle limits ethos to "what the speaker says" (25,1.2). Yet for many 
speakers, their ethos appeals are predetermined by what an audience expects 
of them: not surprising, Cicero expanded the definition "of ethos to include the 
speaker's reputation" (Connors 185). "Reputation" represents the community's 
assessment of the speaker according to the speaker's past claims and current 
social and economic standing. For instance, a modern audience will expect 
Jesse Jackson to speak on particular subjects and will find him persuasive not 
only for what he says, but for who he is. Unlike the male speakers in a male 
dominated culture for whom Aristotle wrote, Renaissance women can not take 
the audience's assumptions about their reputations for granted: to persuade 
their audiences these women had to change the reputation patriarchy imposed 
on them because of their sex. This "reputation" and these women's ethos 
begin as virtually the same thing: in effect, for early women writers, ethos and 
the cultural stereotypes about women were interlocked. As Michael Halloran 
argues, ethos is "a mode of action" which simultaneously "articulates one's own 
being" and "situates oneself in a community by articulating standards of action" 
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(86). These early women writers had to purposefully situate themselves in 
relationship with their misogynist audience before they could be heard: 
[T]he speaker (or writer) must understand ethos in order to create in his 
audience a strong and favorable impression of his own character. He 
does this in part by bringing to the rhetorical occasion a good 
reputation, but he must also manifest the proper character through the 
choices made in his speech...To have ethos \s to manifest the virtues 
most valued by the culture to and for which one speaks-in Athens: 
justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, 
gentleness, prudence, wisdom. (Halloran 60) 
Ethos is constructed as a tripartite relationship among speech, speaker, and 
community: the speaker must affirm the core beliefs of his audience through his 
choices in his speech, he must have a good personal reputation, and he must 
seem to belong to a group defined as worthy to be heard (meaning, for most 
cultures, that he must be a him). 
I use this tripartite definition of ethos throughout this dissertation, yet I 
discovered that even this breakdown of the ethos appeal is too limited, for it 
assumes that women had significant influence over their audience's 
predetermined expectations of them. As I will discuss in my chapter on 
Christine and the querelle de la Rose, the cultural stereotypes about women 
justified ignoring, or rejecting, women's speech. For women, as for many 
deeply marginalized speakers in hostile discussions, the audience's 
expectations did not only limit what they were expected to say, as in my 
example with Jesse Jackson, those expectations virtually silenced them. I 
discovered that for these women the ethos appeal dynamically connects them 
with their audience: the audience judges women by the stereotypes about them, 
yet the women attempt to construct both their personal reputations and their 
styles to present themselves as trustworthy, complex personalities, as more 
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than just stereotypes, in order to disprove those stereotypes. I will not be 
concluding that this notion of ethos can be readily or directly applied to modern 
situations, for that would be another failure to understand rhetoric within the 
confines of its historical time. Yet I do suspect that this notion of a dynamic 
ethos is potentially analogous to other ethos appeals in other situations. 
This dissertation, then, looks closely at two different, early debates 
about women in which women participated in order to delineate the function of 
ethos in such situations. I am not attempting to construct a theory of the nature 
and function of ethos, though certainly I touch on, and am influenced by, theory. 
There is no theoretically essential reason for studying these particular women's 
ethos over studying women in other rhetorical and historical contexts. Instead, I 
am looking at how ethos functioned for these Renaissance women's pro-
women writings as more a historical study than a theoretical one. Concurrently, 
I do not want my working definition of ethos to be appropriated as a theory for it 
has not been tested beyond the context of these women's writings. I am not 
looking, then, at how these women's use of rhetoric, and sometimes thoughts 
about rhetoric, illuminate the theory of rhetoric. Though such a study would be 
a reasonable sequel to this study, the purpose of this dissertation is to delve into 
the ethos of these women writers. In my first section I narrate the changes in 
Christine de Pizan's ethos and her thoughts about ethos, beginning with her 
repeated failure to control the definition of women's ethos during in the querelle 
and ending with her directionsto women for constructing a good ethos in the 
Tresor. In this section I note how Christine's works indicate an awareness of the 
three parts of ethos-stereotypes, personal reputation, and style. In the second 
section I analyze how those parts of ethos illuminate the English Renaissance 
women pamphleteers's writings, in effect testing to see if the tripartite notion of 
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ethos can lend worthwhile insight into a similar, yet still quite different, rhetorical 
situation. The structure of the dissertation is, then, admittedly a little jarring, for 
the first section is a chronological study, and so has an underlying narrative 
pulse. Yet the second section is an analysis, with each of the three chapters 
structured around one of the parts of ethos that I derive from my reading of 
Christine. My intention is to illuminate the ethos appeals available to these 
Renaissance women. 
Despite the conclusive tone of that last sentence, it is appropriate for 
me to include here some background information on Renaissance stereotypes 
about women. This information is, admittedly, biased towards explicating the 
English stereotypes, for I will be able to derive a much more specific set of 
expectations about women from the critiques Christine received during the 
querelle. Most Renaissance stereotypes of women generalized women as 
"Woman," unlike men who were defined either as individuals or according to 
some professional, social or ethnic group (Henderson and McManus 3). 
Women in the Renaissance were a "distinct group within the discourse of 
patriarchal theory," despite differences in their economic or social classes 
(Lucas ix). As Carol Thomas Neely explains, these definitions of women 
constructed the culture's expectations of women's proper gender roles. 
In theological discourse, as in medical, women, Eve's daughters all, 
are both strictly subordinated and potentially dangerous....By theology 
... and by law as well, women are defined and contained through 
their place in the marriage paradigm--as maidens, wives, or widows. 
These roles are in turn defined by the mode of sexuality appropriate to 
them: virginity for maidens, marital chastity for wives, and abstinence 
for widows...:women's economic, legal, and cultural status in 
relation to men, rest[s] on male constructions of women's sexuality and 
sexual roles. The reiterated admonitions in the prescriptive literature [is] 
that women should be chaste, modest, silent and obedient. (Neely 214) 
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Theologically and legally, "good" women are constrained by stereotypes of their 
"proper" behaviors, yet women's public speaking violates those gender roles 
and implicitly rejects their sexual roles. 
"Chastity" is constructed as a virtue in response to a Renaissance notion 
of women's "potentially disruptive sexuality" (Henderson and McManus 59), 
which was seen as "inexhaustible" (Henderson and McManus 56). The virtue of 
"chastity," unlike the same virtue in the Victorian period, was not "attributed to a 
low level of sexual desire" but was seen as a "conscious and virtuous self-
control" (Henderson and McManus 59). Breaking the gender roles of silence 
and modesty in order to speak publicly implied a dangerous rebellion against 
sexual taboos: Renaissance women's repression of their sexuality became the 
basis of their virtue. Because virtuous Renaissance women often were 
presumed to have controlled the wild energies of their passion, they were 
sometimes depicted as morally superior to men. The stereotypes of virtuous 
women extolled their "long suffering, humility, patience, compassion, and public 
charity," as well as their religious devotion (MacLean 20). These stereotypes 
were justified, in part, from theological and "medical" or scientific treatises 
(Neely 214), which Jordan further explains: 
During the first half of the sixteenth century, defenses of women 
exhibited a pervasive concern with doctrine that derived its authority 
from what was held to be divine and natural laws. Theoretically distinct-
divine law recorded in Scripture, natural law in philosophy, especially 
in that of Aristotle--the two kinds of law merged in thinking that justified 
existing social and political practices. (Jordan 65) 
Though the resulting stereotypes of women derived from these two different 
kinds of law were complimentary, the derivations were from significantly 
different sources. Because these sources did differ, they justified slightly 
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different expectations about women. In turn, the pro-women writers responded 
to the expectations differently. 
Technically, divine law depicted women as men's spiritual equals: "God 
created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and 
female created he them" (Genesis 1.27). Renaissance commentators typically 
read this verse as presenting men's and women's souls as spiritually equivalent 
(Jordan 64). In particular, both women and men were seen as having 
intelligence by the grace of God because both are created in the image of God 
(MacLean 20). But this spiritual and intellectual equivalence did not signify 
women's social or political equality. Instead women were defined as socially 
inferior to men through the dominant reading of the Jahwist creation story: 
Because woman was initially made from the side of man to be his 
helper, and afterward, in her postlapsarian state, ordered to be his 
subject, she was doubly under-privileged. The manner of her creation 
revealed her ontological inferiority, her punishment after the loss of 
paradise her political subordination in historical time. Both limitations 
are features of patriarchalism and the gross distinction between the 
worth of men-in-themsleves and women-in-themselves. (Jordan 22) 
These conflicting definitions of women's ontological status reflect a conflict 
within the period--in some circumstances women could define themselves as 
spiritually equal to men, and could, therefore, debate men about religion 
(Jordan 134). Yet, even on the occasions that women's ontological status was 
affirmed, women's political status~her status within the confines of historical 
time-was consistently defined as subordinate to men's status. Particularly, 
women were defined by English civil law according to their sexual relations to 
men-they were either married or available to be married (MacLean 75). As 
married women, they were legally bound to the authority of their husbands, who 
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could, for instance, forbid them from pressing legal suits and who could beat 
them (MacLean 76). The paradigm of marriage, of women as maid/wife/widow, 
significantly shaped both their civil status and men's expectations of women 
(MacLean 26). 
These legal and theological definitions of women shaped their gender 
roles. As Jardine notes, "the 'willingness' of the wife's acceptance...of [her] 
submission, obedience and silence, is derived from texts" throughout the Bible. 
For instance, Jardine continues, Proverbs 31.10-29 provide an "alphabet 
catalog of wifely virtues...[which was] much cited in the Renaissance" (41). The 
behaviors expected of the worthy wife in the passage mainly celebrate her 
servitude: 
Who can find a virtuous woman? for her price is far above rubies. 
They hear her husband doth safely trust in her, so that he shall have 
no need of spoil. 
She will do him good and not evil all the days of her life. 
She seekth wool, and flax, and worketh willingly with her hands. 
She is like the merchant's ships; she bringeth her food from afar.... 
She layeth her hands to the spindle, and her hands hold the distaff... 
She is not afraid of the snow for her household: for all her household 
are clothed in scarlet.... 
She looketh well to the ways of her household, and eateth not the 
bread of idleness. 
(Proverbs 31.10-29, quoted in Jardine 41, my ellipses) 
In Proverbs such a wife is called "blessed" and virtuous, but the virtue she is 
permitted is little more than submissive servitude and hard work. Her life is 
thoroughly constrained by her gender role, and her virtue does not allow space 
for an individuated self, let alone an individual ethos. Her ontological status 
derived from theology becomes not only her political status, but her matrimonial 
one as well. This status becomes the "self" she is expected to present to her 
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community, and that self is the same self as all "good" women, making 
individual women into idealized "Woman." 
The same ontological status for women was also derived from classical 
sources, especially Aristotle, who was seen as an authority on the physical 
world and was much quoted in "medical" (Neely 214) and scientific treatises on 
women (MacLean 31). Underlying these arguments was the assumption that 
the natural order was hierarchical, "... and that such a hierarchy is justified by 
virtue of the nature of the creatures it ranks-woman is generally weaker than 
men in her creaturely and temporal aspect; she is genetically imperfect in 
relation to him in her biological and political nature" (Jordan 134). To Aristotle, 
women were fundamentally "colder and moister than men and hence weaker, 
stupider, less courageous, and less complete" (Neely 213), which was caused 
"by the lack of heat in her generation" (MacLean 31). Within this hierarchy, 
women's physical nature placed her beneath men and defined her as unable to 
perform complex tasks. 1 Women were seen "radically unfit for any activity that 
was not, in essence, a response to a signal or command from a man" (Jordan 
32). Unlike the theological definitions of women's intelligence, biologically 
women, like slaves and children, were seen as intellectually subordinate to, and 
characteristically less excellent than, men. In Aristotle's formulation of women's 
deliberative faculty her intellectual ability is hampered by her lack of authority. 
For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is 
without authority, and the child has, but it is immature. So it must 
necessarily be supposed to be with the excellences of character also; 
all should partake of them, but only in such manner and degree as is 
required by each for the fulfillment of his function....The temperance of 
a man and of a woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a 
woman, are not, as Socrates maintained, the same; the courage of a 
1 Speght blatantly rejects this reading of women's biological nature, claiming that "as the 
temperature of man's body is excellent, so is woman's" (Speght 69). There was also, possibly, a 
pro-women movement in the medical field at the time, see MacLean 29 and following. 
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man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying. 
([Politics I.13;1260a1] cited in Jordan 32) 
In Aristotle's estimation, women categorically lack the virtues needed for a 
persuasive ethos. Women's inferior virtues derive from her physiological 
resemblance to other female animals according to Aristotle: 
In all genera in which the distinction of male and female is found, 
Nature makes a similar differentiation in the mental characteristics of 
the sexes. The differentiation is the most obvious in the case of human 
kind and in that of the larger animals and viviparous quadrupeds... 
The female is less spirited that the male,...softer in disposition, more 
mischievous, less simple, more impulsive, and more attentive to the 
nurture of the young....Woman is more compassionate than man, 
more easily moved to tears, at the same time more jealous, more 
querulous, more apt to scold and strike. She is, furthermore, more 
prone to despondency and less hopeful that the man, more void of 
shame or self-respect, more false of speech, more deceptive, and of 
more retentive memory. She is also more wakeful, more shrinking, 
more difficult to rouse to action, and requires a small quantity of 
nutriment. ([Historia animalium IX.i. ] quoted in Jardine 40) 
Women's inferiority is "natural" to her, and to all creatures of her sex, not only in 
deliberation but in all of her being. 
None of her characteristics above resemble the list of "virtues" Aristotle 
requires of the good speaker: justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, 
prudence, wisdom. This definition of women's nature, as Jordan explains, 
"eventually dictate[s] social functions that follow rules of decorum determined by 
character" (Jordan 32). A woman's essential character shapes, for Aristotle, the 
decorum of her social behaviors, as Jordan explains: 
A man would be thought a coward if he had no more courage than a 
courageous woman, and a woman would be thought loquacious if she 
imposed no more restraint on her conversation that the good man; and 
indeed their part in the management of the household is different, for 
the duty of the one is to acquire, and of the other to preserve. (Politics 
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3.4; 1277b1...) If these norm are not observed, and a woman 
rules a man, even within a household, she abuses political propriety 
and, ultimately, biological nature. (Jordan 32) 
These stereotypes of women's worth and behavior were not monolithic (Neely 
215), but they were extensive, shaping the laws under which women lived 
(Jordan 65, 66-67), the conduct books they read (Bornstein x-xi, for instance), 
and the expectations an audience would have about a woman rhetor. 
As Bornstein describes the Northern Mother's Blessing, this conduct 
book's implied author, a mother speaking to her daughter, presents a synthesis 
of the stereotypes of a virtuous wife's behavior: 
The ideal of behavior present in the work is one of Christian morality 
and bourgeois prudence. The mother advises her daughter regarding 
religion, morality, speech, demeanor, dress, household management, 
bringing up of children, and behavior with men. She is told to attend 
church regularly, and to pay tithes and give alms willingly. The moral 
virtues that are stressed are piety, humility, obedience, temperance, 
and prudence. Meekness and obedience are particularly emphasized 
in regard to her relationship with her husband. Her speech should be 
mild and gentle, and she should not talk too much. Laughing and 
jesting are frowned upon....(Bornstein x-xi) 
This description of women's appropriate conduct depicts women as naturally 
and essentially inferior to men, as servants of men, and as stereotypes of 
themselves as a typical, good Woman, despite differences of class, ethnicity, or 
ability. Stereotypes of women became the basis of almost all women's ethos for 
they predetermined the virtues women may emulate.2 
Yet, in both the court and the middle-class community, women's 
ontological status was constructed along the lines of her stereotypical vices as 
well as defined from her virtues. These vices were derived from medieval and 
2 One of the obvious exceptions was Queen Elizabeth, who could appeal to the notion of the 
King's two bodies to construct her ethos as a man, even though she was biologically female. 
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classical sources-Ovid and Seneca, for instance, present female "monstrosity" 
(Jardine 93), and the medieval clerical misogyny included "the old 
commonplaces, that women were proud, lecherous, and domineering, vain of 
appearance and empty of head; [that women were] foolish virgins, shrewish 
wives, and lustful widows..." (Clark 177). Of these vices, as Howard Bloch has 
noted, one of the "cornerstones" is "the link of the feminine to the seductions 
and the ruses of speech" (Bloch 14). This "topos of the garrulous female," which 
is undoubtedly "intended to silence women," stereotypes women's voices as 
especially unworthy (Bloch 15-17). Unlike the notion of the good woman--who 
all shared the same virtues-evil women came in several forms. As temptresses, 
as shrews, and as other types, all of these evil women were stereotyped 
according to their faults: 
Female faults and vices fit into several categories, those resulting from 
pride, from lechery, or from the desire to emulate men, and a general 
group created by the traditional spirit of misogyny that had prevailed in 
popular literature since medieval times. This last group consists of 
faults rather than vices, traits such as obstinacy, contrariousness, 
inconstancy, spite, ill-temper, cunning, deceit, love of gossip, and 
inability to keep secrets....Most real vices were associated with pride or 
lechery; in particular, pride accounted for over-delicacy and the sinful 
desire to ape women of higher social status, while lechery lead to 
dissimulation, the use of cosmetics, and the love of fine clothes. 
(Clark 177-178) 
The primary vices-vanity, garrulousness, and lust (see also Lucas 10 and 
Jordan 137)-were, as Clark points out, connected: each sin was perceived as 
causing or leading to the other sins. As MacLean argues 
When this condemnation of mala mulier (sometimes meretrix) is 
combined with praise of the bona mulier, there seems to be a suggestion 
that in the case of woman there is no moderation or middle ground of 
vice and virtue. (MacLean 16) 
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The polarity of women's virtues and vices was derived from patriarchal 
constructions of her sexuality.3 As the good woman was depicted as being in 
chaste control of her sexual desire, the evil woman was perceived as sexually 
aware, which branded her as an "Eve/Magdalene as opposed to Mary" (Jardine 
77) even if a woman never acted on that desire. Eventually all women were 
expected to fall into the trap of their own sexual desires despite the virtues of 
any individual woman: the patriarchal constructions of women "reduced her to 
an exclusively sexual being, existing solely to fulfill [her sexual] functions" 
(Rogers 22). 
Though Renaissance stereotypes of early women constrained their 
behaviors, modern stereotypes about these "docile" women have limited our 
readings of their rhetoric-particularly the use of the humility topos. Modern 
feminists have, with reason, argued that the humility topos was caused by 
women's fear of breaking the rules of gender decorum and their fear of being 
attacked as immodest women. Yet, like the clerkly apologia, the Renaissance 
woman's use of the humility topos functioned more as an attempt to construct a 
personal reputation than a fearful reaction to criticism. A woman's reputation, 
as Shepherd argues, was constructed for her by her community as much as it 
was shaped by her own behaviors and style of speaking. A woman's self-
esteem and her marriage prospects-which usually limited her economic and 
social status-were regularly effected, even defined, by her reputation. As 
Shepherd explains: 
Not only was she socially and economically controlled, she was trapped 
by language, a victim of talk: imprisoned by patriarchal discourse. What 
follows from this is that a woman's style of life and her sense of herself 
31 am not as convinced as MacLean is that the stereotypes were truly bipolar. I will discuss the 
"virago" stereotype in the second section. I do accept that the stereotype connotes bipolar 
expectations of most women within their feminine gender roles. 
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could be altered whenever what was said about her changed....In 
grasping this, we go some way towards exploring seventeenth-century 
women's attacks on slander and slanderers. To invent scandal about 
woman, or to falsely accuse them may be a male joke but it destroys the 
life of the woman.... Our pamphleteers are answering back as women. 
They are stepping, very consciously, into a risky and dangerous world. 
(Shepherd 12) 
Pro-women attacks on male railers against women actively attempt to control 
the "talk" that delineated a woman's reputation and shaped her lifestyle and 
self-esteem. Concurrently, the "humility topos" represented women's subtle 
attempt to regain control over their own reputation: sometimes the humility topos 
is even used to reconstruct the stereotypes that are applied to women. By 
highlighting their modesty, the woman using the humility topos speaks of, and 
makes, her own reputation by calling herself modest. Such women writers seem 
to passively accept the stereotypical expectation that a good woman is (virtually 
always) a silent one while they justify their own breaches of decorum. When 
successful, the woman writers's reputations are derived primarily not from 
stereotypes about them based on their sex, but from the women's personal 
reputations as exhibited in their style. When unsuccessful, as in Christine's 
letters in the querelle, the humility topos can be read as admission of guilt for 
having unjustly broached the gender decorum of modest silence. As I will 
discuss in the first chapter, Christine's failure to construct her own ethos, 
especially her failure to define her own personal reputation, permitted the 
Cols's condescending and sometimes cruelly dismissive attacks on her 
character. 
In the first chapter I discuss Christine's failure to delineate her own voice 
in order to open up the problem of constructing an appropriate ethos. In the 
next two chapters I discuss how in the Cite des dames and the Tresor de la cite 
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des dames she reconstructs women's ontological status and guides women in 
appropriating that new ontological status in order to persuade. Together, the 
two books promote women's use of persuasion-first by creating cultural spaces 
for their speech and then by establishing a rhetoric for that speech. In these 
texts, I believe, Christine responds to her experiences in the querelle and 
attempts to correct women's problematical ethos position. These three 
defenses of women--the defense of women against literary misogyny in the 
querelle, the recreation and defense of worthy women's ontological status in the 
Cite, and the defense of, and instructions in, women's speech in the Tresor-a\\ 
indicate that women's ethos appeals are constructed in tandem with her 
community. This discussion particularlyleads me to see ethos as tripartited--as 
the audience's expectations, as the speaker's personal reputation, and as the 
style with which the rhetor expresses herself--and I appropriate these parts in 
order to discuss the Renaissance Englishwomen who were, like Christine, 
extraordinarily marginalized. In my fourth chapter I discuss the audience's likely 
expectations of the pamphleteers and I assess the stereotypes that their 
discourse community held about women generally. From that context, I derive 
the audience's likely expectations of these female writer's ethos. In the fifth 
chapter I discuss the pamphleteers's use of the reputation of the pamphlet form, 
in conjunction with the stereotypes of the shrew and the virile woman, to 
analyze the personal reputations these women attempt to construct. In the sixth 
chapter, I discuss the style with which they present their voices in order to show 
their characters as more than merely the audience's stereotypes about them. 
As such, this study presumes that there is no direct relationship among these 
groups of women, but instead it looks at similar dynamics of their constructions 
in their ethos. 
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CHAPTER II 
FAILED ETHOS: CHRISTINE DE PIZAN AND THE QUERELLE DE LA ROSE 
Christine's participation in the querelle de la Rose represented yet 
another change in her complicated life.1 She had already suffered deep 
emotional and financial loss following the deaths of her husband and father, 
and had spent several years attempting to regain money owed her and to 
establish herself as a poet. Her entrance into the debate marked not only her 
first major polemical writing in prose, but also a shifting of her reputation from a 
court poet, and a court novelty because she was a woman poet, to a scholar. 
The querelle de la Rose is about Jean de Meun's section of the Roman de la 
Rose, and, as such, it is a literary, aesthetic and moral debate about this text's 
beneficial or detrimental effects on women. Meun's text itself is not, despite 
Joan Kelly's suggestions to the contrary, primarily about women. Yet the 
debate about the Roman de la Rose hashes out how women's ontological 
status is shaped in, and by, a masterpiece of medieval France's literary canon. 
In the debate, the participants were arguing, in often the most heated sense of 
the word, both the status of women and the legitimacy of a woman's 
participation in the debate. The querelle, then, engages not only issues of 
women's worth, but of rhetoric as a masculinized mode of expression. 
1 I need to make a note about Christine de Pizan's name, which has caused some debate: critics 
refer to her as Christine, as Christine de Pisan, as Pisan, and as Pizan. The "Pisan" spelling 
derives from an attempt to "correct" the spelling of her name; this correction assumed that "Pizan" 
was a reference to the Pisa area of Italy, which it is not. This correction became common decades 
ago, and has been adopted by the Library of Congress. Yet the original "Pizan" spelling has since 
been recognized as the more accurate, and so I use it in my citations. Another correction has 
been to refer to Christine by her last name, like other major authors. This correction, however, has 
not become common in Christine studies, so in the text of my work I will refer to her by her first 
name. 
24 
Christine's participation in the debate, her "feminist" literary analysis of 
the Rose and her status as a woman were intertwined: she repeatedly defends 
both her beliefs and her act of expressing those beliefs: 
And do not believe or let anyone else think, dear Sir, that I have written 
this defense, out of feminine bias, merely because I am a woman. For, 
assuredly, my motive is simply to uphold the pure truth, since I know by 
experience that the truth is completely contrary to those things I am 
denying. And it is precisely because I am a woman that I can speak better 
in this matter than one who has not had the experience, since he speaks 
only by conjecture and by chance. 
(Christine de Pizan, quoted in Baird and Kane, 532) 
Christine bases her ethos on her experience as a woman, instead of basing it 
on arguments from various religious, intellectual, historical or political 
authorities, though she does use those authorities as welt. In this debate she 
uses her own gender to redefine the ontological status of women: by trying to 
show that she is more than the typical woman, she attempts to undermine the 
accuracy of the stereotypes about women. 
While Christine's arguments invite discussion about her "feminism," 
Christine's "feminism" also invites questions about her rhetoric. Christine's 
motive, as she repeatedly asserts, is to express the "truth" as she has 
experienced it as a woman. Concurrently, she repeatedly asserts that her 
gendered, lived experience is more persuasive than her male, often celibate, 
opponents's assumed authority, which bases her ethos on her sex. Mostly, the 
clerks based their ethos on their reliable readings of ancient, well-recognized 
authorities, especially the Church Fathers. Modern thinkers regard experiences 
as more reliable than ancient authorities, but, in a medieval context, well 
recognized authorities were often seen as more reliable than an individual's 
2 All quotes from the works of the quarrel of the Rose are from Baird and Kane's translation and 
anthology. 
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experiences and observations. Christine's assertion that her observations and 
personal experiences as a woman can function as a basis of her ethos fails to 
recognize that the stereotypes of her sex undermined the very validity of her 
observations because those stereotypes defined her as unable to perceive the 
world rationally. Simultaneously, her failure to unquestioningly accept the 
authority of the Church Fathers, and the male clerks who represented them, 
undermined her ethos because she seems to affirm the stereotype that women, 
as Eve's daughters, are prone to sinful disobedience. So to consider 
Christine's rhetoric circles back to questions about her "feminist" notions as they 
relate to her historical context and her sex. 
Much work has already been done on Christine's "feminism," including, 
as Sheila Delany has put it, a minor "querelle de Christine" concerning her 
inclusion in the canon of "feminist" writers. Much less work has been done on 
Christine's rhetoric, and some of that work has been limited to assessments of 
Christine's style. Despite Christine's occasional comments on her gendered 
ethos, very little work has been done on the tangle that exists among Christine's 
own ethos, her status as a woman, and her pro-woman writings. Beginning with 
Joan Kelly, it currently has become commonplace to celebrate Christine's 
"feminism," or, at least, her "proto-feminism," in Christine's lengthy works on 
women and women's concerns. Yet, as Delany asserts and several Christine 
scholars have discussed, most of Christine's social and political beliefs can not 
be characterized as "feminist" or even "modern." Christine is a loyal subject of 
the French crown; she believes that political and domestic power structures 
should be, in part, determined by a hierarchy of gender; she is uninterested in 
changing "society," in the modern feminist sense of changing women's legal 
and political status, though she is deeply concerned with changing beliefs, 
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aesthetics and behaviors; and she is nostalgic for a chivalric, earlier society, 
which she likely knew never existed (see Altman 20, Hicks 12-13, and Huot 
361-362). Nevertheless, as Sylvia Huot reminds her readers, scholars cannot 
judge medieval writing according to modern and post-modernist standards 
(Huot 362). Christine's pro-women arguments are neither less sophisticated 
than post-modern feminism, or merely a precursor to current feminism; they are 
a fully formed set of assumptions and ideas about women's worth within the 
intellectual paradigm of medieval culture. Though I am not here setting out 
Christine's pro-women beliefs, those pro-women arguments that impinge on her 
rhetoric and on her audience's reception of her will be discussed here. 
In the querelle, her most significant use of rhetoric may be her failure to 
successfully present her ethos. Her opponents argued, for instance, that she 
could not comprehend the Rose because of her gender's stereotypical inability 
to read beyond the literal. So her opponents's see her as failing to understand 
the aesthetic qualities of the text because she primarily reads the explicit 
language as immoral instead of affirming it as aesthetically successful. 
Christine's response to this argument is to assert that women, including herself, 
can comprehend the Rose's aesthetic achievement and can also assess the 
text according to moral standards. Her opposition responds by, in effect, calling 
her a prude. Christine then argues for women's "virtue of shame" (133), and 
she speaks unequivocally of women's inherent goodness: 
[L]et everyone judge rightly according to the truth. If he does judge rightly, 
he will find that the greatest apparent evil may do little harm. Women kill 
no one, wound no one, torture no one; they are not treacherous; they set 
no fires, disinherent no one, poison no one, take neither gold nor silver, 
cheat no one out of his wealth or inheritance, make no false contracts, 
nor bring any harm to kingdom, duchies, or empires. (Pizan 38) 
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Christine's justification of her aesthetic sense, even her ability to read, becomes 
a justification of women's virtue: as Christine depicts women, they verge on the 
angelic. Such a depiction of women, as angels in the house, may be offensive 
to modern feminists after the difficulties women tolerated in the Victorian period 
caused by that construction of them. Yet this depiction markedly improves the 
still all too common medieval construction of women, as defined by the Church 
Fathers and the clerical tradition, as evil tempters of virtuous men (Adam, 
Samson, David): disobedient wives who deserved to be whipped, as mentioned 
in contemporary conduct books: and, as St. Paul presumes, sexual and 
reproductive creatures best avoided (Altman 7-15). Medieval and early 
Renaissance clerkly tradition assumed that women were primarily evil or 
whores-Meun's section of the Rose affirms that assumption far more than it 
creates it. Not surprisingly, Christine responds to the clerkly construction of 
women's ontological status by acknowledging that women seem to be the 
"greatest apparent evil." Yet her list, above, of the evils women are not 
responsible for reconstructs women as passive, gentle beings who do not 
threaten men, which implies that all these evils, if not carried out by women, 
must be the fault of men. What began as a defense of Christine's abilities as a 
sophisticated reader, which seems a ludicrous attack given her established 
reputation as a poet, quickly mutates to a defense of women's virtue and to an 
attempt to repudiate the misogynist stereotypes prevalent in the clerkly tradition. 
This shifting of the issue, from attacking and defending the Rose to attacking 
and defending women, is repeated throughout the querelle. 
Among her attempts at a positive depiction of women are Christine's 
various rejections of both the slanders she herself endures and the general 
belittling of all women, both of which are attacks based on the audience's 
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expectations of women. In one of the most condescending of these arguments, 
her one of opponents evokes the ethos of a priest. Gontier Col's second letter 
to Christine condemns her for not only attacking Jean de Meun, but for being a 
disobedient, and hence implicitly sinful, woman: 
Therefore, since I love you sincerely for your virtues and merits, I have 
first by my letter (which I sent to you day before yesterday) exhorted, 
advised, and begged you to correct and amend your manifest error, folly, 
and excessive willfulness which has risen in you, a woman impassioned 
in this matter, out of presumption or arrogance-may it not displease you 
if I speak the truth. Thus following the holy commandment and having 
compassion for you by charitable love, I pray, counsel, and require you a 
second time by this little note of mine please to correct, retract, and 
amend your aforementioned error with all with regard to that very 
excellent and irreproachable doctor of holy divine Scripture, high 
philosopher, and most learned clerk in all the seven liberal arts. It is 
astonishing that you have dared and presumed to correct and criticize 
him detrimentally....Confess your error, and we will have pity on you, will 
grant mercy to you, and will give you salutary penance. And concerning 
this matter, in your reply to my other letter kindly let me know at your 
convenience what your wishes are, before I take the trouble to oppose 
the false (saving your reverence) judgments which you have seen fit to 
write against him. (G. Col 60) 
Gontier Col is, as Christine recognized, offensive in this letter. He assumes, 
without arguing for his own position, that he can, or even should, give her 
penance for disagreeing with him; he states that he requires her to capitulate to 
him, or face his written repudiation (which Christine recognizes as a threat); and 
he asserts that all her speech derives from the "presumption" or "arrogance" of a 
"woman impassioned in this matter." He belittles Christine's argument by 
constructing it as merely a woman's work, and so appropriates women's inferior 
gender roles to reconstruct Christine's personal reputation. Christine, however, 
is not, and cannot be, a priest or theologian to challenge his penance. As a 
woman, her gender role is to capitulate to men, which Col assumes in his 
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attack. Also, as a woman, she is presumed to have a tendency to commit evil 
acts and to be often inspired by evil motives, like arrogance. Col's attack on 
Christine differs markedly from Jean de Montreuil's similar argument to a, now 
unknown, man who held views similar to Christine's: 
Reconcile yourself, therefore, with the same learned one and most 
beloved teacher (de Meun), and do not fear because you spoke rashly. 
For immediately upon seeking our grace, you will receive it, as long as 
we have no reservation concerning the sincerity of your professed 
repentance. (Montreuil 44) 
Both Col and Montreuil depict Meun as a great teacher, assert that their 
opponent speaks rashly, and presume that they can give absolution to any who 
seek it in this matter. Yet they differ radically in their rhetoric and ornate style, 
and so in the rhetorical force with which they make these assertions. Col's 
ornate style and insulting tone extends his condemnation past Christine's 
written arguments to her self, and he validates his personal attack only on her 
status as a woman, easily ignoring her established reputation as a poet. 
As Col's insults show, Christine's gender blinds her audience to her 
arguments about art and morality. Not surprisingly, Christine responds to Col's 
construction of her ethos by attempting to redefine women's ontological status: 
And if you despise my reasons so much because of the inadequacy of 
my faculties, which you criticize by your words, "a woman impassioned," 
etc., rest assured that I do not feel any sting in such criticism, thanks to 
the comfort I find in the knowledge that there are, and have been, vast 
numbers of excellent, praise worthy women, schooled in all the virtues--
whom would rather resemble than to be enriched with all the goods of 
fortune. (Pizan 63) 
Her reference to the worthy women justifies women's ontological status, and her 
own reputation, as "good," by briefly rewriting the history of women. This 
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argument, which is fundamental to the rhetoric of her later, encyclopedic work, 
the Cite des dames, here relies heavily on her audience already knowing which 
women she means and on her audience's acceptance of that history as 
evidence of women's inherent decency. Her assertion recognizes, too late, that 
she must construct her ethos as not only learned, but as more than the 
stereotypical woman. 
Christine made a rhetorical "mistake" in the letters by failing to recognize 
the way that her culture shaped her ethos was based, first and foremost, on her 
sex, and she does not fully reconstruct her gender role in the debate. Most 
notably, she does not use the womanly version of the humility topos, nor does 
she attempt to win her audience's trust early in the debate. By not establishing 
a viable ethos near the beginning of the debate, she fails to prevent attacks on 
her as "only" a woman. Yet, as Maureen Quilligan has noted, her activity in the 
querelle is deeply concerned with presenting herself as a competent woman: 
"Her attack on the Rose-indeed her engagement in the 'querelle de la Rose'...-
-seems to have been quite self-consciously aimed at establishing the specific 
possibility of female authority" (Quilligan, "Name," 214). Christine attempts, as 
Kevin Brownlee accurately notes, to create for herself the persona of a clerk 
(Brownlee 234 ff); nevertheless, the rhetorical devices she appropriates from 
that persona backfire on her precisely because she is a woman. The most 
notable of these backfires occurs when she attempts to use the conventions of 
clerkly apologia. 
The clerkly apologia is both quite similar to, yet fundamentally different 
from, the humility topos typically found in women's writings. The clerkly version 
has its own set of conventions, like repeating respectful clauses as parenthesis. 
for example, both the Cols and Christine often couch critiques of each other with 
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statements like "saving your reverence." More importantly, the clerkly apologia 
includes denigrating one's own scholarship and praising the learning of one's 
opposition. In particular, the clerks claim that they are unworthy of defending 
Meun. Pierre Col depicts his ethos as both weak in intellect and unskillful in 
speech: "For I am unequal to the task not only on account of the dullness of my 
intellect, the heaviness of my understanding, my weak memory, and my poorly 
ordered language, but more especially on account of the vast abundance of 
good things which are in that work impossible to express" (P. Col 93). Col's use 
of the apologia asserts his inability in rhetoric and thought in order to obscure 
his rhetorical skill. This use of humility differs fundamentally from many women's 
use of the humility topos-where women would claim to be a "worthy" (modest, 
obedient, silent, and submissive) woman and so worthy of the unusual act of 
writing or speaking. Col's use of humility is not to affirm his right to speak, but to 
both praise Meun's skill in comparison to his own and to depict his own 
arguments as relatively simple and, so, obvious and correct. Col also uses this 
construction of own his ethos as a means for attacking Christine: 
Rather, I simply desire to be... the least among the disciples of the 
aforesaid Meun. And since your argument against him is so weak that 
there is no need of a greater, I do not speak for the most advanced 
disciples of the aforesaid Meun, but rather for the middle or for those near 
the bottom, where your argument belongs. I am confident also of the 
complete Tightness of the cause I wish to defend; indeed it could stand 
on its own merits. (P. Col 93) 
Col depicts himself as a disciple of Meun, which continues the praise of Meun 
by presenting him as one worthy of having disciples. Yet, rhetorically, his point 
is not to praise Meun, or to speak humbly of his own skills, but to belittle 
Christine for making her critiques. He constructs Christine's ethos as the words 
32 
a petty, foolish woman, who cannot see the obvious and whose arguments are 
readily answered by the least learned of students. 
Because the arguments in the querelle are seldom consistent, it is 
interesting, and ironic, that Pierre Col's brother, Gontier, in his letter in the 
debate humbly contrasts his writing against Christine's skill. 
To the worthy, honored, and wise damoiselle Christine: Woman of high 
and exalted understanding, worthy of honor and great esteem, I have 
heard say from many notable clerks that among your other studies and 
virtuous and praiseworthy works, as I understand by their remarks, you 
have recently written a kind of invective against the book of the Rose 
composed by my master, teacher, and friend the lamented Master Jean 
de Meun, true Catholic, worthy master, and, in his time, doctor of holy 
theology, a most profound and excellent philosopher, knowing all that to 
human understanding is knowable, whose glory and fame lives and will 
live in the ages to come among understanding men, elevated by his 
merits, by the grace of God, and by the work of nature. (G. Col 57) 
Gontier Col hyperbolically praises Meun, praises Christine a good bit less, and 
speaks humbly of himself, yet he affirms Christine's skills as both a writer and 
reader. Significantly, this praise occurs in the letter's salutation, where, 
according to the ars dictaminis, the writer addresses the reader according to his 
or her personal knowledge of the reader and according to their relationship 
within the social hierarchy (Perelman 102-113). The medieval ars dictaminis is 
primarily limited to the rhetoric of official letters, either of the secular or 
ecclesiastical governments. Though the letters of the debate certainly were not 
official, most of the participants in the debate were secular or ecclesiastical 
officials, excluding Christine. Also, the ars dictaminis generally included some 
instruction on other modes of letter writing. This art emphasized more the 
appropriate address made by the writer to the reader than it highlighted the 
writer's requests of the reader. The salutation's function, then, was significant in 
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medieval and early Renaissance letters because it affirmed those personal and 
social relationships. So when Gontier Col indicates that Christine is worthy of 
his respect by praising her knowledge in his salutation, he establishes the 
relationship between them as being between equals or near equals, even 
though, later in his own short note, he condescends to her.3 Pierre Col does 
not so indicate respect for Christine, failing to have any salutation at all in one of 
his letters, though Christine consistently praises her opponents in her 
salutations to them. The result of this disparity is that Christine seems to be 
Pierre Col's social inferior because she is not praised by him, and she seems to 
be over-stepping her social place by inappropriately critiquing well-respected 
and powerful men against whom she could not, and should not, win. 
She continues to praise her opposition, but that praise becomes more 
and more ironic as she constructs their rhetoric and "subtlety" as not artistically 
sophisticated, but as intentionally manipulative. For instance, there is a minor 
battle of the compliments: 
O wise clerk, whose keen feeling and facility in expressing your opinions 
are impeded by no ignorance, I wish to inform you that, although your 
reasons are well laid out for your purpose, they are contrary to my belief. 
For despite your beautiful rhetoric, you do not move my heart at all or 
make me wish to change what I have previously written. (Pizan 116) 
In this compliment to Pierre Col, she undermines his argument that the issues 
she raises belong only to school boys (Col 93) and his claim that his position is 
obvious and his writingunornamented. Christine constructs "subtlety," either of 
poetic skill or rhetorical eloquence, as morally questionable throughout her 
letters: her repeated use of the term "eloquence" verges on sarcasm. For 
3 There is no consistency in the tone of the letters, and the reasoned arguments in one part of 
many of the letters is often contradicted by ranting that occurs in other parts of the same letter. 
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instance, when Christine gathered the letters of the debate and presented 
copies to both the Queen and to Guilliaume de Tignonville, she states that she 
is distressed that her opposition has targeted her for attack with their 
sophisticated eloquence against her blunt truth. Her letter to Tignonville makes 
clear her disgust with ornamentation: 
Therefore, I ask, most wise man, that, out of compassion for my feminine 
ignorance, you see fit to add your sound views to my writing, so that your 
wisdom may be strength, aid, defense, and support for me against such 
notable and elevated masters. Their subtle reasons would otherwise 
quickly overwhelm my own just cause, on account of my own inability to 
sustain it....It is right that I follow the style of my assailants, although my 
small learning be a poor match for their beautiful eloquence. (Pizan 68) 
She repeats her argument that eloquence is potentially deceitful much later in 
the debate in response to Pierre Col: 
And although I am otherwise engaged and did not intend to write more 
on the subject, I will nevertheless answer you, bluntly and directly 
according to my custom, and speak the truth without any glossing over. 
And since I did not know how to emulate your good style, may you take 
into consideration my lack of skill. (Pizan 116-117) 
Whether she refers to rhetorical ornament as subtlety or eloquence, she sees its 
use in these letters as deceitful, and in much the same way that she sees the 
Rose as deceitful: to her mind, both the eloquence of the clerks and of the Rose 
is not art, but is an obfuscation of the morally questionable ideas presented by 
the authors. 
Like her clerkly opponents, Christine speaks humbly and often of her 
own small learning, attempting to use the clerkly apologia as her opponents use 
it. After complimenting Pierre Col, she states:"... you consider it easy to 
repudiate my reasoning on account of my ignorance, because, apparently, you 
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are confident of your own good sense and subtlety" (Pizan 119). Her own use 
of this convention of clerkly humility about one's style is itself deceitful; her style 
as a poet is still generating worthwhile thought. Yet in the dedication to 
Tignonville she defends her use of the apology by asserting that she finds prose 
style difficult. A position she repeats in her salutation to Jean de Montreuil: 
To the very competent and wise person, Master John, Secretary to the 
King our Lord and Provost of Lisle. Reverence, honor, and due respect to 
you, Lord Provost of Lisle, esteemed Master, sage in morals, lover of 
knowledge, steeped in learning, and expert in rhetoric; from me, 
Christine de Pizan, a woman weak in understanding and inadequate in 
learning--for which things may your sagacity not hold in scorn the 
smallness of my reasons; rather may it take into account my feminine 
weakness. It has pleased you out of your goodness (for which I say 
thanks) to send me a small treatise expressed in fine language and true 
seeming reasons. (Pizan 46) 
Though Christine seems aware of the gender roles that contextualize her words 
with her mention of her "feminine" weakness, her emulation of the clerkly 
apologia backfires badly on her. It opens a space for Gontier Col's later 
"priestly" and condescending demand that she repudiate her criticism of Meun: 
in that letter he equates her disobedience with a sin against God. Her humility 
also seems to justify Pierre Col's comments that her position is obviously wrong. 
In the last of her letters in this debate, and near the very end of it, she again 
affirms her status as a legitimate student, attempting, too late to be effective, to 
establish a persuasive ethos: "there is nothing more to be said, save that I can 
confess, in truth, that I love study and the solitary life so much that by cultivating 
them I may perhaps have gathered some lowly little flowers from the garden of 
delights" (Pizan 143). Again, with "lowly" she leaves herself open to repudiation, 
but this conclusion depicts herself as a clerk, despite being a women. 
Christine's humility about her learning backfires because of her sex. No one 
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seriously questioned the Cols's learning from their comments about inelegant 
style and small wit, but, as a woman, Christine's ability to even think was 
assumed to be readily debatable. Gontier Col speculates that the opinions she 
expresses in her letters are not truly her own, and he asserts instead that her 
hangers-on goaded her to critique Meun. Christine responds: "I say again and 
repeat and repeat again as many times as you wish my condemnation of the 
work entitled the Roman de la Rose" (Pizan 63). Christine repeatedly states that 
her arguments are inspired by reason, not emotion; that they are her own, not 
others; and that she is a competent reader. She repudiates, many times, the 
stereotypical weaknesses of women's wit, yet her interlocutors reject her 
arguments in condescending and off hand remarks. She also often responds to 
assertions that she is incapable of writing reasonably and reading well. These 
depictions of her, which construct her reputation for her, rely primarily on the 
men's expectations of her based on their stereotypes of women generally. 
Christine's failure to establish her ethos as a legitimate scholar, and as 
more than the stereotype of "Woman," necessitates her repeated defenses of 
her ability to read. When she responds to Jean de Montreuil's letter, she affirms 
her knowledge: 
Having read and considered your letter and having understood it, within 
the limits of my ability, I disagreed with your remarks and shared the 
opinion of the learned man to whom your letter was addressed. Thereof, 
although your letter was not addressed to me and did not require a reply, 
nevertheless I wish to say, to divulge, and to maintain openly that (saving 
your grace) you are in grave error to give such lavish and unjustified 
praise to Meun's book-one which could better be called idleness than 
useful work, in my judgment. (Pizan 47) 
She begins her self-defense here by humbly depicting her ability to read before 
she asserts her position. The question of Christine's ability to read above the 
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literal level was much debated in the querelle, and is still debated by scholars 
who, in general, argue that Christine's moral reading of the Rose is blind to the 
appropriateness of the characters's speech. However, when this issue is 
addressed as a question of rhetoric, the concern is no longer whether she 
actually could read beyond a literal level, but if she could convince her 
audience that she could read skillfully. To convince her audience, she uses 
repetition, affirming her abilities in almost all of the letters. Also, her attacks 
against her opponent's rhetoric, especially their ornamentation, indicates her 
sensitivity to the style in the works she reads. For instance, while asserting to 
Jean de Montreuil that she can read, she satirizes "subtle" language by saying: 
Yet may my daring to repudiate and find fault with an author so worthy 
and so subtle not seem presumption in me. Rather, take heed of the firm 
conviction which has moved me to oppose some opinions contained in 
your letter. In truth, a mere assertion not justified by law can be reargued 
without prejudice. I am not, I confess, learned nor schooled in the subtle 
language, which would make my arguments dazzling, a language which 
you indeed can display with a fine array of carefully polished words. 
Nevertheless, I will not hesitate to express my opinion bluntly in the 
vernacular, although I may not be able to express myself elegantly. 
(Pizan 43) 
Her distaste for ornamentation in prose leaves her open to critical commentary 
concerning her understanding of a sophisticated style and to complaints that 
she is envious of a style that she is unable to emulate. Pierre Col asserts that 
Christine is motivated by pure envy of Meun's success and skill. Though in the 
process he acknowledges, finally, that she can read and understand 
sophisticated prose style, he depicts her as vile, instead of as merely stupid, 
which uses the more negative stereotype of women to undermine her credibility. 
Christine hotly contests his argument and his depiction of her, which 
acknowledges the potency of the stereotype to shape her audience's 
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perception of her character: 
Since you concede that it was not from ignorance, you may be sure that 
it was not envy which led that good man to blame the book, for I am 
convinced that the height of his elevated life precludes envy. Despite my 
own admitted ignorance, I assure you I feel no envy....Yet I assure you 
that I love beautiful, wise, and well-written books. I seek them out and 
read them eagerly (within the limits of my understanding), and if I do not 
love that book of the Rose, it is simply because the work teaches an evil 
and dishonorable lesson, and sows far more evil than good. (Pizan 142) 
Christine ends her participation in these debates by reasserting, again, her 
ability to read. 
As her response to Col indicates, when she was not defending her ability 
to read, she is responding to attacks on her ability to reason clearly, instead of 
reacting emotionally. The querelle was far from civil: the attacks on her 
"impassioned" tone are justified, though she is no more shrill than the men. 
When Christine's ire is released, it is both extensive and heated, making her 
sound far from a rational scholar: 
Further, let us consider the subject matter of choice of words, which many 
people find reprehensible. Dear Lord! What horrible stuff! What an affront 
to honor! What reprehensible teachings recorded in the chapter about 
the Old Woman! In God's name, what can one find there but sophistical 
exhortations filled with ugliness and things horrible to recall? Ha!...Then, 
in the chapter about Jealousy, my God, what great good can be observed 
there! What need to record the dishonorable things and shameful words, 
which are common enough in the mouths of the unfortunate people 
impassioned by this sickness!...And the wickedness which is there 
recorded of women! Many people attempt to excuse him by saying that it 
is the jealous Man who speaks and that in truth Meun does no more than 
God himself did when He spoke through the mouth of Jeremiah! But 
whatever lying additions he may have made, he certainly could not have 
rendered worse or abased the condition of women more! Ha! When I 
remember the deceits, the hypocrisies, and the conduct dissembled 
within marriage and outside it, which one can find in this book--certainly, 
I consider these to be beautiful and edifying tales for one to hear! 
(Pizan 49-50) 
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Enough, there are pages of her sarcasm and anger. Her anger, though it 
resembles various negative stereotypes of women--the nag, the shrew, the 
scold, and such--actually emulates the behavior of her clerkly opponents for her 
tone is no more irrational than the clerks's, as in Pierre Col's attack on her: 
[A]s if you wish to say that you condemn him in this particular place, and 
therefore set yourself up as a judge although you have spoken out of 
prejudice and outrageous presumption. Oh excessively foolish pride! Oh 
opinion uttered too quickly and thoughtlessly by the mouth of a woman! a 
woman who condemns a man of high understanding and dedicated 
study, a man who, by great labor and deliberation, has made the very 
noble book of the Rose, which surpasses all others that ever were written 
in French. When you have read this book a hundred times, provided you 
have understood the greater part of it, you will discover that you could 
never have put your time and intellect to better use. (P. Col 103) 
Enough, there are pages of the men's sarcasm and anger as well. Like 
Christine's attempt to emulate the clerkly tone of humility, she attempts to 
emulate their tone of justified anger. Her anger fails to persuade her audeince 
for the same reason and in the same way as her use of the humility topos failed 
for her: she does not consider how her clerkly behavior is constrained by her 
opponents's expectations of her according to their clerkly and Catholic 
stereotypes of Eve's daughters within the context of 1400's France. 
Nevertheless, because of her harsh tone and her gender, her opponents 
regularly question whether Christine is rational. Her response was generally 
twofold. She implicitly trusted the strength of her arguments to persuade despite 
any concerns about her gender, and she tells her audience that these are not 
the ravings of one single mad woman, for she was not alone in her position: 
I am far from alone in the true, just, and reasonable opinion which I hold 
against the work of the Rose on account of its most reprehensible 
lessons, although there may well be some good in it. (Pizan 119) 
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Generally, she seldom even acknowledges the connection between her gender 
and her opponents's attacks on her supposed incompetence, and she does not 
to constrain the gendered stereotypes about herself as a woman before she 
engages in this debate. By not reconstructing her audience's expectations 
about her, she implicitly accepts the stereotypes about women as constructed 
by her culture, which preestablished her ethos as unreliable, overly emotional, 
and potentially very sinful. This rhetorical "mistake" necessitates her repeated 
insistence on her ability to reason, just as it necessitates her repeated defense 
of her ability to read, though she never convinced the Cols of either. On the rare 
occasions when she does acknowledge the connections between her sex and 
her oppositions's perceptions of her, she does not undermine the Cols's 
assumptions: 
Whereupon, after you had read and thoroughly scrutinized my letter, 
wherein your error was punctured by truth, you wrote in a fit of impatience 
your second, more offensive letter, reproaching my feminine sex, which 
you describe as impassioned by nature. Thus you accuse me, a woman, 
of folly and presumption in daring to correct and reproach a teacher as 
exalted, well qualified, and worthy as you claim the author of that book to 
be. (Pizan 62-63) 
Christine recognizes that her difficulty in convincing them derives from her 
ontological status as constructed by her culture, yet she does not undermine 
that stereotype of women in order to allow her own reputation as a poet to 
function as her ethos. Later in the same letter, she fleetingly attempts to affirm 
her ethos as a woman by briefly referring to the history of excellent women--a 
history she would later write in full as the Cite des dames. Unfortunately, the 
reference in this letter to these competent women is just that, a glancing 
reference, unsupported by either well-respected authorities or by a listing of 
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those women's actions. Without that evidence, her defense of her gender is 
weak: it is not surprising, then, that the Cols'ss attack continue to reappear in 
the querelle. Such repetition also occurs in her attempts to use the humility 
topos as the men do, which does little more than allow her opponent's to use 
her humble statements to question her abilities to reason, to read, and to think 
independently. 
Christine's opponents see her as not sophisticated, not literate, and not 
rational-when they are not expecting her to be vile and sinful-despite their 
shallow praises of her. By failing to control her ethos, especially by failing to 
undermine the stereotypes that her clerkly audience uses in constructing their 
expectations of her, Christine allows her enemies to define her. I have 
unpacked the fundamental differences in the nature of a woman's humility 
compared to the male clerk's as an example of Christine's seeming blindness 
during the querelle to the nature of her ontological status as a woman, and I will 
in the next two chapters discuss how the Cite des dames and the Tresor de la 
cite des dames may respond to, and reconstruct, women's ontological status in 
order to guide women in appropriating that new ontological status as the bases 
of their ethos. 
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CHAPTER III 
CREATING ETHOS: CHRISTINE DE PIZAN'S CITE PES DAMES 
When Christine de Pizan wrote the Cite des dames she had recently 
completed the drawn-out querelle about the ethics of literary misogyny in Jean 
de Meun's section of the Roman de la rose. Maureen Quilligan, connecting the 
Cite to this debate, focuses on the literary significance of Christine's polemic: 
Christine's choice to write works defending women was a self conscious 
literary move,...especially in the attack on the authority of the Roman de 
la rose. The Cite des dames is a continuation of her anti-misogynist 
arguments against the Rose and a further exfoliation of her uniquely 
female authority. (Quilligan 2) 
Quilligan's argument contextualizes the Cite within the literary conventions of 
various allegorical debates, like theConsolation of Philosophy. I, however, look 
at it as polemical history. Christine's pro-women tales in the Cite des dames 
retells history, to borrow the pun, as her-story-both as Christine's written 
reconstruction of women's stories and as a comprehensive redefinition of her 
sex and her gender. By reconstructing women's history, she undermines the 
established "history" of women, which was one of the more significant supports 
of late medieval and early modern literary and clerkly misogynistic constructions 
of women. From Christine's history women could no longer be seen as 
traditionally corrupt in behavior and vile in themselves. McLeod's discussion of 
Christine's history presents the Cite as an ethical reaction to the conventions of 
misogyny. 
When Christine de Pizan responded to literary misogyny by structuring 
the Livre de la Cite des Dames as a universal history, she had a more 
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profound moral and artistic purpose than has previously been suggested. 
Literary misogyny had, after all, consistently relegated women to minor 
genres (in medieval literature those lacking immediate ethical utility). In 
rejecting this relegation with her choice of genre, Christine rejected much 
of the misogynist argument. Her alternative, an important moral and 
artistic synthesis, also reflects the ethical cast of late medieval 
literature....Christine remembers history and fixes it forever by 
constructing a city of ladies. In short, the city represents not just the text 
but the mental process that creates the text--the integration of personal 
memory (identity) into social memory (history). By the end of the defense, 
then, the city represents not just the female gender and universal history 
but the participation of both in the narrator's self-identification. 
(McLeod 37, 44) 
McLeod's essay argues that Christine constructs women's history in ways 
similar to her emotional/cognitive constructions of her "self." Like McLeod, I 
believe the Cite is as much an ethical as it is an artistic response to literary 
misogyny, yet I see it as distinctly polemical as well. Where McLeod found it 
fruitful to consider the identity of a "real" Christine, I consider the authorizing self 
that "Christine" implies, and the rhetoric of her self presentation. 
Christine's near 130 stories portray women as virtuous and as 
authorities: she presents women's speech as more believable, or at least more 
truthful, than many of their interlocutors's arguments. Interestingly, Christine 
portrays women as virtuous by retelling stories of some of the most infamous, as 
well as the most famous, women in history and mythology. The result, as 
Stecopoulos has argued, is that 
By highlighting the various deeds of these women of ill repute-virtues 
that had been either ignored or unfavorably construed by male 
authorities-Christine shows (indeed proves) that these women have 
been improperly slandered by post -Romance of the Rose historiography, 
and she articulates new functions for their experiences within her own, 
restorative history. (Stecopoulos 51) 
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By salvaging the personal reputations of these particular women, Christine 
establishes proof of women's worth within the most slanderous of tales told, 
which undermines the notion that women are, by inclination, corrupt while 
proving that women are, by nature, good. Women who appropriate these new 
tales, as McLeod argues, can gain "control over self-definition" which, in that 
historical context, "offers women...their surest defense" (McLeod 45). More 
specifically, these stories attempt to change the stereotypes held about women 
and the audience's expectations of them, in order to reconstruct women's ethos. 
In this chapter, I will argue that the Cite des dames constructs the possible 
range of ethos positions for women by redefining their perceived nature. The 
women of the Cite represent models for real women's speech and action and 
for a real audience's positive expectations of them. In the next chapter, I will 
discuss how the sequel, the Tresor de la cite des dames, develops methods by 
which women readers can appropriate those models for their own speech. 
Together, the two books promote women's use of persuasion-first by creating 
cultural spaces for women's speech and then by establishing a rhetoric for that 
speech. These efforts, I believe, respond to Christine's experience in the 
querelle and attempt to correct women's problematical ethos position, as 
exhibited by the Cols's easy dismissal of her arguments as merely the words of 
a woman. 
Despite having presented her personal reputation as a poet and as an 
able cierc in the querelle, Christine still begins the Cite with an elaborate 
justification of her own writing and of her ethos. Modern critics, including many 
who judge Christine quite differently, like Delany (84) and Quilligan (1), 
consistently see the opening of the Cite as a sincere, even autobiographical, 
response to a medieval woman's marginalization. Yet Christine is not the 
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passive, isolated woman reader she presents in the opening gambit of the Cite: 
by the time she wrote the Cite she was firmly established at court as a poet and 
wasdeveloping a reputation as a scholar. In the opening narration, she begins 
her tale with herself, in her study, doing some "light" reading after many long 
hours of "devoting" herself to the "weighty opinions of various authors" (3): she 
begins her text by locating herself physically and intellectually. In that context of 
isolation and passivity she comes across Matheolus's misogynistic little treatise. 
I called this opening a "gambit" because it rhetorically situates the reader 
with the Christine of the narrative. Readers are likely to sympathize with this 
Christine because of the seeming "honesty" and "sincerity" of this voice. But this 
Christine is a straw woman: a representative of an intellectual woman's likely 
responses to the misogyny she will encounter in reading writers like Matheolus. 
Matheolus is himself a straw man, a writer of "no authority" who repeats the 
misogyny of the philosophers, poets, and orators who come before him (Cite 3). 
The "Christine" of the narrative believes "Matheolus." She repeats his beliefs-
effectively speaking in his voice-in her prayer of lamentation for being female 
(Cite 5). Christine's prayer is a rhetorical maneuver, as McLeod notes; it 
highlights an ethical reaction to the experience of reading, constructing a 
writer's words as significant not only in aesthetic, but in ethical, registers 
(McLeod 40). As Brabant and Brint, among others, have noted, this moment 
announces one of Christine's dominant themes in the text: "Drawing the very 
sentiment of her existence from how she is regarded by men, she depicts the 
loss of her self-identity" (207). Directly after that prayer, the Three Ladies-
Reason, Rectitude and Justice-appear. As the Three Ladies pursue their 
argument, and as the Christine of the narrative is slowly persuaded by them, 
they come to represent the ethical voice of the implied author. This shifting of 
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the location of Christine's voice, from the seemingly "real life" Christine of the 
opening narrative, to the Three Ladies, is primarily an ethos appeal. By 
speaking in the voice of the Three Ladies~by setting the arguments against 
misogyny in their mouths-Christine can speak with their authority, instead of 
her own, recently debated, authority as clerk, scholar, and able reader. She 
creates for herself a female voice which is unquestionable: her ethos becomes 
the ethical positions of Reason, Rectitude, and Justice. 
Christine highlights her "self" and her voice in the text. As if she were in a 
dialogue with an earlier self-which, in many ways, she likely was-she 
repeatedly identifies the questioning voice of the Christine of the narrative as 
"Je, Christine" while placing her reflections into the wiser mouths of the 
allegorical ladies. Quilligan discusses Christine's use of the "Je"-and-name 
formula and its unusual significances in the Cite: 
While the appearance of the formula "Je, Christine" is not entirely 
anomalous in medieval literary practice, its repetition throughout 
Christine's oeuvre-especiaily in that the Livre de la cite des dames-
makes its idiosyncratic frequency a signal mark of Christine's authority, a 
"signature" in more ways than one. It invites us to examine the lessons, 
in Christine's own experience, in the historical condition then obtaining, 
and in the potentialities of the literary system, which taught her to 
establish her authorial self by such a naming, and specifically by a 
signature seen as a gendered term. (Quilligan, Allegory, 12) 
Christine repeats her signature as her gendered identity as writer/interlocutor in 
the dialogue by appropriating a clerkly convention from the prologues of 
chronicles (Quilligan, "Name," 204). The chroniclers's signatures would identify 
them by their names and either cities or class: Christine, however, gives only 
her gendered first name, ieaving out the indications of her place in the social 
and class structure other than her status as a woman. Though Quilligan sees 
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this self-naming as especially modem, for it indicates a possible post-Romantic 
notion of the self, I suspect instead that it highlights the female interlocutors 
presented and the (debated) validity of questions asked, and answered, by 
women. 
This signature directly engages the stereotypes about women; 
Christine's intellectual community of the court, clerks, and Church expected 
women to be "full of every vice" (Cite 4). The community's moral and ethical 
"standards" in which Christine attempts to situate herself automatically placed 
her outside of that community. As she indicates, Christine is doubly 
constrained; her actions are full of vices and her words full of deception: 
Judging from the treatises of all philosophers and poets and from all 
orators...it seems that they all speak from one and the same mouth. They 
all concur in one conclusion: that the behavior of women is inclined to 
and full of every vice. (Cite 3-4) 
Christine seems to believe this depiction of her sex, temporarily: Reason quickly 
compares her to a fool who believed he was a woman because he was wearing 
women's clothes (Cite 6). This comparison, between Christine and the fool, 
seems to "trouble," in Judith Butler's sense of the term, the sex and gender 
constructions which typically contextualized women; the biological 
determination of women's gender roles appears to be rejected. Because the 
fool could see himself as gendered female from the clothing he wears, gender 
becomes, like the clothing, artificial, arbitrary, and variable. However, Reason's 
comparison of Christine to this fool ridicules Christine's delusion by ridiculing 
the fool's confusion between the variability of gender roles and the stability of 
biological sex. The fool's true "self," as male, remains readily rediscoverable 
from his own lived experience. Despite the implication that gender is malleable, 
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Christine constructs women's biological selves as stable and implicitly assumes 
an essentializing relationship between biological sex and gender. 
Nevertheless, she admits to a flexibility within gender roles and presents a 
range of "feminine" expressions of self which often impinge on male roles as 
potentially female. 
Lady Reason responds to the clerkly and literary stereotypes of women 
by arguing that women should trust their own lived experiences more than the 
rhetorical force of patriarchal authority of writers like Matheolus: 
...we have come to bring you out of ignorance which so blinds your own 
intellect that you shun what you know for a certainty and believe what 
you do not know or see or recognize except by virtue of many strange 
opinions. (Cite 6) 
Christine's "ignorance" is depicted not as a lack of knowledge: she starts this 
allegory reading in her study. Instead, her ignorance presents her blind 
acceptance of the "strange opinions" of an authoritative clerc and a devolution 
of her reasoning into her passively perceiving women through Matheolus's 
eyes instead of trusting what she usee[s]" and "recognize[s]." Christine is taught 
by Lady Reason, by her own reason, to trust her lived, personal experiences as 
more authoritative than the patriarchs's arguments. Both Delany and 
Stecopoulos have noted this reconstruction of "epistemology," which asserts 
that experience is "a source of genuine knowledge" and which encourages the 
"use of personal experience against misogyny" (Delany 84-85). Stecopoulos 
observes that Christine's method for discovering knowledge affirms women's 
arguments from experience: 
Christine laments her folly in listening to the harangues of male clerkly 
authorities regarding women-she paid heed to these harangues despite 
her own experience, her personal and lived encounters as a "natural 
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woman" (femme naturelle) with the virtues of other women from all social 
classes.... (Stecopoulos 48) 
Christine's own observations, from across the social and economic classes, 
provides the logical "backing," in Toulmin's terms, for her descriptions of women 
in the Cite. This backing is, of course, liberating for women~for though women 
were usually prevented from learning to read and write, they could not be utterly 
sheltered from life. Christine, through this argument for an epistemology based 
on experience, redefines a fundamental assumption in much of medieval 
rhetoric. She rejects the ethos of well-recognized auctores as a deeply 
trustworthy appeal, and shifts the basis of persuasive speech from the authority 
of the rhetor to the experiences of the audience. This shift, from ethos appeals to 
the reasoning applied by an actively listening/reading audience, infuses much 
of Christine's own ethos, making her seem both reasonable and cooperative 
with her readers. 
With this series of reconstructions of the apparently true to the actually 
true-from the seeming locale of her voice in the character of "Christine" to her 
implied voice in the allegorical Ladies, from her seeming authority as a well 
recognized poet and clerc to her real authority as an experienced, well-read, 
and analytical woman, and from the assumed authority of trusted auctores to the 
reasoning abilities of an audience-she relieves "Christine's" passive 
despondency and opens the Cite des dames. This opening indicates that 
Christine is doing more than merely justifying good women, or reconstructing 
the culture's basis for perceiving women-she is also redefining what constitutes 
a rhetor's "authority" and "believability" by eliminating the expectation that 
authority lies in traditional, well-recognized, male auctores and by asserting the 
position of authority in thinking/listening people, male of female. A rhetor, then, 
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appeals to the thinking of the audience, and works with their thinking, in order to 
persuade them. In this construction of rhetoric, only by already agreeing, to 
some extent, with the evidence in the Cite will an audience be persuaded by it. 
Though one consequence of this shift would be a democratization of authority, 
which the monarchist Christine would likely have opposed, another 
consequence is the expectation that women could possibly speakers and 
writers, whose arguments are validated by experience instead of silenced by 
the male auctores and the misogynistic traditions. 
Even before Joan Kelly said that "Christine had created a space for 
women to oppose [the] onslaught of vilification and contempt, and [that] the 
example of her citadel served them for centuries" (Kelly 73), scholars have 
recognized Christine's contribution to "feminist" thought. Stecopoulos asserts 
that Christine's "feminism" derives both from defining women's nature and from 
reversing literary stereotypes (Stecopoulos 50): Christine celebrates women as 
naturally more pure than, and often morally superior to, men. Christine, through 
Lady Reason, repeatedly asserts that the stories she collects are intended as 
evidence. They are not collected primarily for the readers's pleasure, but are 
presented as culturally significant statements which change the "reality" of 
women. For instance, when asked by "Christine" whether women could rule, 
Lady Reason says "...in case anyone says that women do not have a natural 
sense for politics and government, I will give you examples of several stories of 
women who are able to lead armies, govern, and comprehend politics" (Cite 
32). Reason remakes the presumed "reality" of women's ability to govern by 
showing the reality of women who have governed. Christine's history, then, is 
an unabashedly rhetorical act--she uses it to persuade the reader of women's 
"true" nature, attempting to use rhetoric to change belief. Compared to the 
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common orthodox, and particularly the virulent clerkly misogyny, the proof that 
women are, by nature, "good" does vastly improve women's cultural status, 
even though Christine argues against changing women's political status. 
Christine's own ethos, and the success of her history of women as a 
basis for ethical and persuasive speech, relies not only on making her own 
case for women's worth, but on refuting those assumptions in the patriarchal 
tradition. Many of her retellings take the traditional depictions of women to task: 
one method she uses is reading mythological tales as actual women's lives. 
Though such examples of goddesses and enchantresses as historically real 
women may seem spurious to modern ears, Christine's personal context did not 
differentiate among myths, magic, and valid science as much as we do. Her 
father was a court astrologer and astronomer, and she presents "enchantments" 
as an "art" in her examples. 
In order to achieve her objective, she places all her characters within a 
continuum that, quite purposefully, does not distinguish between ancient 
and contemporary, "real" and fictious. The decontextualization allows 
Christine to turn many so-called "mythic" women (who otherwise might 
not be considered viable examples of historical female achievement) to 
her advantage; she utilizes them as her coworkers in an ongoing 
feminine endeavor-the construction of what she calls 'The City of 
Ladies.' (Stecopoulos 48) 
By decontextualizing the mythic women, Christine appropriates the classical 
stories upon which medieval clerkly and literary stereotypes of women were 
founded. In effect, she takes both the most damning and the most celebratory of 
classical tales of pagan women to construct the range of gender roles women 
can adopt by their nature as women. She will, in the martyrology, depict the 
gender roles granted to women by grace. Between these two sources of tales, 
the classical and the Christian, she argues that women are "good" by nature 
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and by grace, refuting the stereotypes of them in the clerkly and literary 
traditions. 
To prove women's virtuous nature, Christine includes, for instance, a 
series of examples on women's intelligence as shown through the lives of 
ancient women. Christine separates her comments on women's intelligence 
into two overarching sections-women's ability to comprehend and their ability 
to create. Christine asks Reason to 
enlighten me again, whether it has ever pleased God, who has bestowed 
so many favors on women, to honor the feminine sex with the privilege of 
the virtue of high understanding and great learning, and whether women 
ever had a clever enough mind for this. I wish very much to know of this 
because men maintain that the mind of women can learn only a little. 
{Cite 63) 
Reason answers her by saying that she will give "proof through examples" of 
women's ability to learn and so tells of Sempronia. Christine then argues that 
women can create knowledge: Reason explains that 
You can...clearly see how God, who does nothing without reason, wished 
to show that He does not despise the feminine sex,...because it so 
pleased Him to place such great understanding in women's brains that 
they are intelligent enough not only to learn and retain the science but 
also to discover new science themselves, indeed sciences of such great 
utility and profit for the world that nothing has been more necessary. 
(Cite 78) 
Christine supplies many tales of women discovering particular branches of 
scientific and intellectual study, showing that they can function as clerks, 
intellectuals, and literati. Her examples include Cornificia for her poetry (Cite 
64); Proba for her mastery of the liberal arts, her poetry, and her compilations of 
topoi from the ancients to retell the Bible (Cite 65): Sappho for inventing several 
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genres of lyric, short narrative, and lament (Cite 68); Leontium for her 
philosophy (Cite 68): Manto for divinations (Cite 69V Medea for knowledge of 
medicinal and magical herbs and Circe for her art of enchantment (Cite 69-70): 
Nicostrata for her scholarship, her development of Roman law, and her 
invention of the Latin alphabet and language (Cite 70-71): Minerva for her 
development of a Greek shorthand, shortcuts for adding, wool cloth-making, 
extraction of vegetable oil, designing of carts and wagons, flutes, fifes and all 
wind instruments, and particularly for arms and armor and the skills to use that 
armor (Cite 72-74): Ceres for agriculture and the city-state (Cite 75-76): Isis for a 
shorthand of Egyptian script and for teaching agriculture and justice (Cite 76-
77); Arachne for dyeing wool, tapestry-making, making nets and snares, and 
cultivating flax and hemp (Cite 81-82): Pamphile for cultivating silk (Cite 83): 
Thamaris, Irene and Marcia for painting (Cite 84): and Sempronia for eloquence 
(Cite 86).1 Though Christine mentions other learned women later in the text, 
these comprise her primary examples of the range and depth of women's 
intellectual abilities. When Christine, speaking through Reason, depicts 
educated women in particular, she is undermining men's near monopoly of 
clerkly training (Cite 78). Women's primary intellectual contributions comprised 
more practical discoveries than theoretical work. Nevertheless, women's 
mastery of knowledge is secured through the evidence of these lives. If one 
believes the accuracy of the tales, then her presentation of them is persuasive 
because the audience observes, through the histories, the fact of women's 
cognitive abilities. 
Christine's argument is, actually, an a priori one, for if women can create 
1 I cannot not mention that she starts her list with a poet and ends with a rhetor-if bracketing is a 
significant structural devise for her, the autobiographical nature of women's intellectual work as 
bracketed between art and persuasion is intriguing, if irrelevant here. 
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knowledge they can certainly master knowledge. A priori arguments succeed 
because of the nature of categories: if a category contains an object, then a 
larger category which contains the first category must also contain the object. 
Here, if women have "the strength of emotion and ... the subtly of mind" (Cite 70) 
to have "discovered any new arts and sciences which are necessary, good and 
profitable" (Cite 70), then women must also have the potential ability to master 
the known arts and sciences. As Christine explains, "...it is not such a great feat 
of mastery to study and learn some field of knowledge already discovered by 
someone else as it is to discover by oneself some new and unknown thing." 
(Cite 70). By using an a priori argument she effectively kicks the ladder out from 
under her: she asserts that women have potentially always already been 
intelligent, and simply not recognized as such. The a priori argument is, of 
course, twofold--for if women by nature can discover knowledge, then Christine, 
as a woman, is defined as a possible discoverer of knowledge. The way in 
which she categorizes women has two significant results. They are pro-women 
arguments, specifically showing the kinds of intelligence one can discover in 
women. Yet they also construct the range of an intellectual woman's ethos 
positions that an audience can expect of them, including Christine's own ethos 
as a studious woman. These intellectual women are shown as teachers, 
scientists, artists, and more. 
The structure and allegory of the text functions to delineate the various 
possible qualities of the ethos of a good woman speaking well. Though it is an 
academic commonplace to comment on the connections between the Cite's 
allegory and its structure, the criticism, interestingly, is not consistent in its 
presentations of those connections. Quilligan, who looks most closely at the 
allegory in the Cite, considers the text's linear presentation as a series of 
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individual tales, and discusses, for instance, the significance and authority of 
the "mother." For all of her very close reading, she does not delve too deeply 
into the significance of the text's three books. Mostly, critics attempt to depict the 
books as thematically structured. Brabant and Brint argue that the three books 
challenge convention, gather new information, and reconstruct knowledge, 
respectively (210). Altman argues that the three books show the City as "built 
by Reason, peopled by Integrity, and defended by Justice" (17). She reads the 
sections's themes as arguing "for women's natural capabilities," as educating 
"women by means of examples of righteousness," and as presenting "a history 
of famous women and their contributions to society" (18). Unlike Brabant and 
Brint and Altman, who read the Cite's themes according to societal notions 
about knowledge or women, McLeod reads the books as referring to the 
narrator's personal "identity formation" (43). For McLeod, "Reason's mirror 
shows a being's true nature (reasonable reflection). Rectitude's ruler measures 
that nature in action (evaluation). Justice's measuring cup apportions a 
judgment (decision).,." (43). McLeod's reading of the structure also draws 
connections between Reason's ethical arguments and the parts of an oration. 
For all the similar ethics suggested by these readings, I find Brownlee's reading 
to be the most compelling for he sees the unity between books one and two in 
which Christine relies primarily on classical and historical examples to show 
women's nature. 
The third and final part of Christine de Pizan's Livre de la cite des 
dames (1404-1405) is the culmination of the book's basic rhetorical and 
ideological strategy: an explicit and systematic defense of women 
against the standard charges of the misogynist tradition, effected by 
adducing specific female examples of superlative achievement in 
virtually every area of human endeavor. In part 1 of the Cite des dames 
the allegorical character Raison initiates this process with a series of 
female exemp/a--drawn largely from he classical world--in politics, law, 
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war, arid the arts and sciences. In part 2, the allegorical character 
Droitture (Rectitude) continues the process with an extensive list of 
women who were exemplary embodiments of moral virtue. In part 3, the 
allegorical character Justice completes the project by narrating the 
stories of women who are exemplary in the spiritual realm, that is, in 
terms of the highest Christian values. (Brownlee 115) 
I find the smaller divergence between Reason's and Rectitude's arguments, as 
depicted by Brownlee, significant when compared to the difference between 
their arguments and Justice's martyrology. I also find that Christine implicitly 
minimizes the differences among the books. Before she elaborates on 
intellectual women, who are the group Reason discusses most, she presents a 
few examples of, first, "just" women who were judges and advocates and, 
second, a group of chivalrous, right-thinking women warriors and rulers. The 
"justice" of the first women discussed is allegorically represented by the speaker 
of the last book, Lady Justice. Internal to that bracket is the right-thinking 
women/Rectitude (book 2) bracket. Further into the text is the reasoning 
women/Reason (book 1) group. All three brackets are framed by "Christine's" 
voice and her prayers at the beginning and very end of the Cite. The effect is to 
internalize the virtues into the frame/ethos of "Christine"'s voice and to 
hierarchize those virtues-Justice being closest to Christine and Reason furthest 
away which emphasizes ethical thought and action over logic. This bracketing 
resolves a problem I have had with the allegory and structure of the text. I could 
not understand why Justice presents the martyrology, or why the third section of 
this text is smaller than the other two sections when ethical action is clearly 
important to Christine's thought. I now suspect she is highlighting the virtue of 
Justice by making that voice closet to her own. Also the bracketing across the 
books removes the seeming distinctions between the books, making the Cite 
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cohere more fully in voice and theme. 
Books two and three continue Christine's redefinitions of women's 
gender roles: book two shows women as ethical, and book three shows them 
as, by grace, holy. For instance, Rectitude, whose theme is integrity (cf. Altman), 
tells of a young wife's devoted love for her husband, an old philosopher. 
Rectitude asserts that "this noble lady's only thought [was] to serve him and 
preserve his peace as one who loved him most loyally and dearly" (Cite 131). 
Also, Rectitude presents pagan women as wise: for example, she introduces 
her book with the "sovereign dignity" of the "sibyls, most filled with wisdom" (Cite 
99) who were wise enough to prophesied Christ's birth (Cite 100V Justice, in 
the last book, speaks of women's potential when blessed by God. She speaks 
of Saint Catherine, describing her as "beautiful, noble, and authoritative" who 
"so successfully overwhelmed [her audience] that they were confounded and 
unable to answer her questions" (Cite 220), which presents a religious, moral 
woman as a rhetor. Particularly interesting in the martyrology is the self-
authorization involved in Christine's retelling of Saint Christine's life, as 
Brownlee has argued. 
By the end of the Cite des dames's Saint Christine story, Christine de 
Pizan as author has--in a striking gesture of self-authorization-
incorporated the authority both of the clerkly hagiographer-the witness to 
the saint's martyrdom--and of the female martyr herself. The female 
voice of Christine-at/ctor is thus doubly guaranteed. (Brownlee 132) 
Quilligan concurs with Brownlee that the Saint Christine story, and the 
feminized version of Christ's name in the "Christine" name, infuses Christine de 
Pizan with special authority (Quilligan, "Name," 221). Brownlee argues that the 
Saint Christine story emphasizes the persuasiveness of the Saint's voice. From 
these two characteristics of the Saint's life, Brownlee argues that this tale 
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significantly authorizes Christine. Yet I have difficulties agreeing with 
Brownlee's assertion that this tale is her primary ethos appeal in the Cite. Not 
only have I noted several other ethos appeals in the text, most rhetors attempt to 
win the audience's trust early on in a text in order to keep their audiences's 
reading or listening. Certainly, this story does affirm Christine's voice, but I 
doubt that it is as significant as Brownlee argues. Generally, these histories of 
women redefine the gender roles available to women: the new stereotypes of 
women, as reasonable, honorable, wise and devout, permit women to function, 
at need, as rhetors and rulers. Not surprising, Christine tells of a contemporary 
woman who defended her husband's estate while he was a prisoner of war and 
of another woman who taught in her father's place when he was too ill. 
Nevertheless, Christine does not argue that women should appropriate 
men's roles, especially not men's public roles, except cases of dire need. Early 
in the Cite Reason states: 
Now, as to this particular question, dear friend, one could just as well ask 
why God did not ordain that men fulfill the offices of women, and women 
the offices of men. So I must answer this question by saying that just as a 
wise and well ordered lord organizes his domain so that one servant 
accomplishes one task and another servant another task, and that what 
the one does the other does not do, God has similarly ordained man and 
woman to serve Him in different offices....(Cite31) 
Christine avoids a direct challenge to the culturally accepted division of labor 
and the incumbent prestige and financial rewards granted to much of men's 
labor. Instead she limits women to more domestic work and explicitly rejects the 
idea of challenging the societal norms of who does what work. Though 
Christine proves her skill as a professional as well as intellectual, as in her use 
of legal-judicial rhetoric (Curnow 151), she only argues that women can 
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surpass men in skills and knowledge (Curnow 157), not that women should 
appropriate male roles or behaviors. Instead, Christine accepts the 
domestication of women: claiming, for instance, that women can understand law 
but should remain out of the courts, which is the domain of men (Cite 31). Her 
acceptance of women's domestic roles, excepting unusual circumstances, 
remains an unquestioned limitation on women's behavior and speech. As 
Altman argues: 
Christine's "feminism" is grounded in medieval philosophy: women are 
different from men. Each sex has its task and performs its duties 
according to its nature and its inclination as well as according to custom. 
She believes that because men are more powerful than women, they 
alone have the strength to execute the laws. Since by custom women 
cannot appear in public except discretely, women have no role in 
government nor in public life; both custom and nature forbid it. Even so, 
Christine acknowledges that the work of men and women is not always 
distinguishable and goes so far as to praise women who do men's work 
better than men do. (Altman 18-19) 
When women must behave as men, and do men's work, it must be because the 
man is unavailable-either dead, as in Christine's own case, or ill, or off to one 
of the many wars. 
Again, Christine's acceptance of men's and women's separate social 
spheres does not extend to her notions of their natures; for instance, she does 
not see all women, or all men, as wise. Rectitude says that"... you must know 
that all women are not wise--nor all men, for that matter" ICite 134). For 
Christine, women generally should remain in their roles, and men should 
succeed at theirs. Yet Christine is not caught in a duality of gender roles; she 
recognizes exceptions and limitations, and so is not behaving incongruously in 
her defense of women and in her attacks on men. She simply assumes, as a 
premise of her argument, that she is herself an exception to the general 
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expectations of male/female gender roles. She redefines woman as virtuous 
and capable, but not necessarily as public, despite being very public herself. 2 
Even so, in her construction of women, it remains possible to define a 
virtuous woman as one best silent, as many of Christine's sources did. Refuting 
the common assumption that women's speech too often causes harm, Reason 
tells Christine that 
...God has demonstrated that He has truly placed language in women's 
mouths so that He might be thereby served. They should not be blamed 
for that from which issues so much good and so little evil, for one rarely 
observes that great harm comes from their language. (Cite 30) 
Not surprisingly, the Three Ladies repeatedly present good women as also 
good orators: we hear of Dido and Sempronia, Esther and blessed Catherine. 
Christine clenches her point when, speaking through Reason, she describes a 
time when Christ said to a woman "O most wise woman, who taught you to 
speak this way? You have won your cause through your prudent language 
which stems from your good will" (Cite 29). Christine employs here another a 
priori argument, implying that if Christ can be persuaded by a wise woman 
using prudent language and having good will, then certainly any mere mortal 
man should listen to such a woman. The sex of the speaker remains relevant to 
Christine, but it is no longer damning of women speakers. Instead, "good" 
women are shown as persuasive, and Christine refers to some of her 
contemporaries to prove it. 
By using tales of pagan women for many of her examples in books one 
and two, Christine implies that women are virtuous by nature, and she 
2 I am giving Christine the benefit of the doubt here: she could be seen as hypocritically agreeing 
to the domestication of women so as to curry favor with the patriarchal, intellectual establishment. 
Yet after the vicious slanders she contended with from respected members of that very 
establishment, I seriously doubt that she would attempt to shallowly flatter them later. 
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appropriates male auctores to do so. By using the auctores to define women's 
nature, as Stecopoulos argues, she "traps" those auctores and the writers who 
rely on them: 
By citing misogynist "authorities," Christine works within the vary tradition 
that these men of learning claim to represent. She follows this practice 
first in order to expose their inaccuracy and unjustified bias; she then 
molds their methods to her own moral and historical purpose. She 
thereby traps them at their own game. Moreover, "remolding" is exactly 
what Christine aims to accomplish in the Livre de la Cite des Dames. 
This history of the world according to Christine reflects a particularly, and 
indispensably noteworthy, feminine cast: her narrative consequently 
gives voice to participants increasingly ignored, even maligned....It 
mimics the techniques and indeed the very tales of the misogynist 
authorities (auctores)--e\jen while undermining their unfavorable 
depiction of women--in order to authorize its rectification of women's 
position in society. (Stecopoulos 48-49) 
In the martyrology, she similarly appropriates well known tales and the well 
trusted conventions of Saints's lives to depict holy women's behavior. By 
arguing about women's nature using the same evidence and the same 
techniques as her authoritative opposition, she hedges her trust in her 
reasoning audience. 
Justice, when welcoming the Virgin into the completed Cite, states the 
thesis of the book: 
My Lady, what man is so brazen to dare think or say that the feminine sex 
is vile in beholding your dignity? For if all other women were bad, the 
light of your goodness so surpasses and transcends them that any 
remaining evil would vanish. Since God chose His spouse from among 
women, most excellent Lady, because of your honor, not only should 
men refrain from reproaching women but should also hold them in great 
reverence. (Cite 218. italics mine) 
The Cite is about the honor of the female sex. This argument for women's worth 
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is two-fold. The first is the apparent argument that all women should be honored 
for being of the same sex as the Virgin. The second is the implicit point that 
Mary's inherent "honor," the virtue she already had as a naturally good person, 
is recognized by God in his choice of her as his spouse. Women, then, can not 
be inherently, or naturally, vile, for God to so honor a member of the sex. 
Christine, in effect, again kicks the ladder out from under her--having shown that 
women are by nature and by grace good, she argues that women never should 
have needed a defense. These portraits of women change women's ontological 
status-constructing them as already good, and seen only as evil by "brazen" 
men. These women are "good" not by status, or ahistorical reputation, but 
instead, as Stecopoulos argues, because: "they are rendered noble through 




TEACHING ETHOS: CHRISTINE DE PIZAN'S 
TRESOR DE LA CITE PES DAMES 
Many upper division undergraduate and graduate students have been 
introduced to the history of rhetoric using Bizzell and Herzberg's Rhetorical 
Tradition. Yet I find the text's selections from the Tresor de la cite des dames to 
be potentially biased--the editors have included selections that subtly affirm a 
"proto-feminist" reading of Christine while they present her as deeply 
constrained by patriarchal society. I wish to briefly discuss this works's 
presentation of the Tresor to indicate the assumptions generally held about this 
conduct book for women's speech. 
Bizzell and Herzberg depict Christine as an "exception," using that word 
twice, and focus on presenting her life and her politics. Their biographical 
sketch emphasizes the unique nature of her voice given the patriarchal culture 
that surrounded her. This presentation constructs her as a "feminist" exception 
to late medieval and early modern misogyny. Yet the editors's also present her 
as fundamentally capitulating to that patriarchy, which removes her from the 
ranks of feminist thinkers-she becomes merely a "proto-feminist." More 
disturbing still is that they did not discuss her characteristics as a rhetor or her 
thought as a rhetorician, which is odd because this text is intened for teaching 
the history of rhetoric. Finally, they attempt to affirm the "proto-feminist" reading 
of Christine by simply failing to include selections that would undermine the 
dominant, feminist stereotypes of early women writers. The editors include four 
selections from the Tresor. one from the first book, the other three from the 
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second book. The first book focuses on the proper conduct of a "princess"--any 
woman who is married to a politically powerful man--where the second book 
discusses, among other topics, the conduct of upper-class servants. The first 
selection is titled "How the good and wise princess will make every effort to 
restore peace between the prince and the barons if there is any discord" (488), 
and it presents wise princesses as their husbands's humble servants who 
speak only in private and only to their husbands. The editors's second selection 
discusses women's slanders of their mistresses, which implicitly affirms the 
medieval stereotype of the garrulous female. The third selection argues for 
silence from servants if they are prone to slander and gossip, which implicitly 
affirms the modern stereotype of medieval and early modern women as 
thoroughly silenced by their society. The last selection delineates women's 
appropriate decorum for restricting slanderous speech. The four selections 
present Christine's Tresor as silencing, restrictive, and heavily domesticating of 
women's voices. By taking these particular quotes out of their context, the 
editors's inaccurately depict the text's discussion of women's use of speech, 
which, I believe, is an inaccurate presentation ofher work, especialy as an 
introduction of her work for students. In my discussion of Tresor. I will consider 
Christine's use of rhetoric and her thoughts about rhetoric, which will implicitly 
show that their selections does a disservice to the text by presenting it more as 
repressive than as affirming of women's speech. 
Liliane Dulac, in an article published a few years after the Rhetorical 
Tradition, discusses the Tresor almost as a rhetoric. In particular, she sees it as 
conduct book which focuses on appropriate models for feminine discourse 
(Dulac 130). The text discusses the decorum of women's speech and the 
conduct required for establishing and maintaining a "good" reputation. 
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Christine, according to Dulac, is particularly concerned with women's individual 
reputations. For instance, Christine critiques ostentatious clothing no less than 
four times, and, of course, she includes the de rigeur warnings against violating 
sexual taboos. Dulac only discusses the first book of the Tresor. which is 
directed to noble ladies and the governesses of young noble ladies. For Dulac, 
the conduct expected of such women focuses on consistently improving one's 
reputation, which includes speaking well in private (Dulac 17), at court and in 
council (Dulac 17-18), and to women of higher authority (Dulac 18 ff). Dulac 
discusses particularly the instructions given to the governess of a noble lady, 
and presents fine, close readings of the rhetorical situations such a woman may 
expect and the rhetorical techniques she may employ. In Reno's translation of 
Dulac's article, the term "rhetoric" never appears. Yet Dulac speaks of feminine 
rhetoric as one of the primary themes of the text, saying that this theme is "the 
social importance and multiple resources of feminine speech," and arguing that 
the Tresor depicts "the art of persuasive language" (Dulac 21). Though the term 
"rhetoric" is appropriate to a reading of the Tresor. Reno's and Dulac's failure to 
use it indicates Dulac's perspective in her discussion: she claims that her 
reading is limited to the "fictive" world depicted in the book's many examples, 
and she asserts that the discussion of persuasion is not relevant to Christine's 
audience's actual use of language. I disagree with this limitation on her 
otherwise excellent reading: Christine repeatedly addresses her actual 
audience, ranging from the highest to the lowest classes. Despite Dulac's 
awareness of the connections Christine makes between an individual's 
reputation and her discourse, Dulac reads Christine's notion of speech as 
primarily a tool for improving reputation and social standing. She does not 
discuss this relationship from the other direction-the use of reputation to shape 
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a women's ethos given the stereotypes which predefine the audience's 
expectations of women rhetors. This chapter will look at Christine's Tresor from 
that other direction; I will especially look at Christine's advise for developing 
character and for using rhetorical techniques. 
Christine's text is unusual, not only for being a rhetoric for women, but 
simply as a conduct book written by a woman for women. As Altman describes, 
the conduct books were commonly written by men for their wives and 
daughters, and these books focus on correcting disobedience instead of 
recommending successful behaviors: 
Two well-known examples, contemporary with Christine, are the book of 
advise to his young wife by the Menagerie de Paris (c. 1329-94) and the 
book of advice to his three daughters by Geoffrey de la Tour-Landry 
(1371). Both works emphasize obedience to her spouse as the chief 
wifely virtue. The Knight of Tour-Landry heartily recommends wife-
beating as a cure for disobedience: in order to teach his daughters the 
importance of obedience, he tells two stories of women who were 
permanently disfigured by broken noses inflicted by justly annoyed 
husbands. Both authors assume that women are weaker than men and 
that they must be protected, even if protection entails force. Because of 
their moral weakness women should be sheltered from the corrupting 
influence of commerce with the world; because of their intellectual 
weakness they must also be kept ignorant to preserve their innocence. 
(Altman 15) 
Women, as presented in the conduct books, verge on beasts who cannot be 
persuaded by reason, but only by force, which justifies wife beating. 
Simultaneously, women are depicted as inherently prone to sin, which justifies 
a virtual imprisonment of women in order to protect them. Christine, in a 
disturbingly telling chapter, excuses women from implementing the conduct she 
recommends if they are so confined and abused. Christine's text, though, 
presents women's lives as more pleasant and as less repressed than the men's 
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conduct books present women's lives, and she includes the lives of lower class 
women in her depiction. In contrast to these conduct books, which justified 
violence to silence disobedient women, Christine says, writing to a baroness of 
a country estate: "She must be a good speaker, proud when pride is needed; 
circumspect with the scornful, surly, or rebellious; and charitably gentle and 
humble toward her good, obedient subjects" ITresor 169). Christine expects 
such women to speak, and they are expected to present themselves as more 
than merely humble, silent, and obedient. More striking still is Christine's 
unspoken assumption that these women can assess their rhetorical situations 
accurately, though she does discuss the appropriate tone to take in those 
situations. Christine assumes that her women readers primarily need guidance 
in learning and using rhetorical techniques, not in recognizing the need for 
persuasion, especially those techniques that build the necessary reputation for 
inspiring trust in an audience. 
Christine indicates that women, herself included, can and should 
appropriate several kinds of ethos positions given different rhetorical situations 
and different audiences. Her text discusses several kinds of ethos, but total 
silence and total humility are simply not among them. Her own speaking 
position, speaking again through the thin veil of the allegorical ladies Reason, 
Rectitude and Justice, and sometimes another character called Worldly 
Prudence, differs little from the ethos she establishes for herself for the Cite-
except that she is more a teacher in this text than in the former. She also 
expends much less effort in establishing her ethos, establishing it in one long 
passage: 
After I built the City of Ladies with the aid and instruction of the three lady 
Virtues: Reason, Rectitude, and Justice,... I was worn out by the 
strenuous labor. My body was exhausted by such long and sustained 
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effort, and I was resting, idly, when suddenly the three radiant creatures 
appeared to men once more, saying: "Studious daughter! have you 
spurned and silenced the instrument of your intellect? Have you let your 
pen and ink dry out? Have you given up the labor of your hand which 
usually delights you? Are you willing to listen to the seductive song which 
Idleness sings to you? Surely you will hear it if you are willing to listen: 
'You have done enough; you have earned your time of rest.' But 
remember what Seneca says: 'Although the wise one's intellect deserves 
repose after great effort, still a good mind should not neglect further good 
work.' Do not be distracted in the middle of your long journey! Shame on 
the knight who leaves the battle before victory! Only those who persist 
deserve the laurel crown. Now up, up! Lend a hand! Get ready! Stop 
crouching on this dust heap of fatigue! Obey our words, and your works 
will prosper....So may our preceding work, The City of Ladies, which is 
fine and useful, not only be blessed and praised throughout the world--
but now may it grow further. Just as the wise birdman prepared his cage 
before trying to catch birds, we have prepared the bower for ladies. Now, 
with your help, we will devise and fabricate benevolent snares tied with 
knots of love to cover the ground where honored ladies and all sorts of 
women will walk. Even the shy and unwilling will be caught in our nets. 
None will be able to resist or escape, and all will be taken within the 
beneficent boundaries of our glorious city." (Tresor 69-70) 
Although I have included almost the entire introduction of the Tresor. it is far less 
complex or lengthy then the beginning of the Cite. Christine relies on the ethos 
she established in and through their earlier work to carry over to this one: she is 
scholar, teacher, and woman. Hence she praises her own work, calling 
attention to it and her established ethos as an auctor. Also, she uses the 
introduction to present some of this text's major themes, including the attack on 
idleness and the irresistibility of her teachings. She announces her intention to 
teach the virtues so women can enter the allegorical City and indicates that the 
"ground" (subjects) these women will traverse include much on discourse. 
Christine also uses the structure of her text to establish her ethos. For instance, 
she politely follows proper decorum by speaking first to the highest class of 
women and moving down the social hierarchy. 
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The Tresor differs markedly from the Cite, which does not separate 
women into classes: the Cite sets out Christine's, and all women's, "class" as 
only their sex. This difference highlights the different perspectives of the two 
texts, for the Cite deals with stereotypes and the ontological status of women in 
the culture that fuels those stereotypes, where the Tresor deals with developing 
personal, individual reputations and speaking in appropriate styles. The 
allegorical ladies emphasize Christine's focus on her audience of "real" women 
who are directed to conduct their manners and speech according to Christine's 
guidelines: 
As we have repeatedly stated, whatever we have said regarding virtues 
and the proper manner of life can pertain to any woman, whatever her 
estate. On these subjects, what is specifically suitable for some may also 
be suitable for others. Each can take from our teachings whatever she 
finds useful. (Tresor 185) 
Christine's presentation of the lower class of women indicates her focus on real 
people, for she ranges beyond those women generally considered her 
appropriate audience to include all kinds of women. She also assumes, as she 
implicitly did in the Cite, that her audience can think for itself, and that women, of 
high or low class, can decide the degree to which they can apply her advice. 
From these depictions of her own good reputation and her respectful 
presentation of her material, she presents her own ethos as reasonable, 
respectful, and, like any good teacher, persuasive. 
When speaking of good women's use of rhetoric, Christine first discusses 
the necessity for being virtuous in order to have a good reputation. She asserts 
that: 
Good reputation is the greatest treasure a princess or noble lady can 
acquire.... Like the odor of sanctity, good repute is sweet fragrance form 
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the body wafting across the world so that everyone is aware of it. The 
fragrance of good repute thus goes forth from a worthy person so that 
everyone else may sense her good example. (Tresor 91) 
A princess will discover that "...if she does not lead a life of reputation and 
praise through doing good, she lacks honor regardless of the blandishments of 
her entourage to suggest that she has it. True honor must be above reproach" 
(Tresor 90). A "good" reputation reflects the sincerely held ethical beliefs of a 
truly noble lady as perceived by her potential audience. Though Dulac rightly 
notes that Christine acknowledges that a good woman's reputation may derived 
from "seeming" good to others (Dulac 17), Christine does not problematize the 
possible relationships between seeming and being. The structure of Christine's 
text indicates that, for her, only truly good women can seem to be good. She 
begins her text with a series of lessons on virtue, asserting that the other 
lessons on discourse ̂ nd reputation rely on first being truly virtuous. Though 
Christine even posits the notion of a "just hypocrisy" as possibly necessary for 
developing a good reputation, she consistently assumes that a good reputation 
only comes from good works, not unwarranted deception, ostentation, or pride. 
The princess is hypocritical only in her need to have her good works, including 
her association with virtuous citizens, noted not only by God but by her people. 
Yet only performing good works will not, to Christine's mind, establish a 
woman's reputation. As Dulac mentions, Christine argues that the truly noble 
princess must behave appropriately, exhibiting both Christian and social 
virtues. Christine privileges Christian virtues, asserting that the noble princess 
must be humbly and devoutly Christian: "Women of high estate, please do not 
be ashamed to humble yourselves by taking lowly seats to hear our lesson; for, 
according to God's word, the humble shall be exalted" (Tresor 71V Christine 
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also expects these women to thoroughly examine their motives and to chastise 
themselves harshly when motivated by temptation: 
What will the good princess do when she finds herself so tempted? Love 
and fear of Our Lord will sing [to] her [this] lesson: "Foolish idler? What 
are you thinking of? Have you forgotten what you know about yourself? 
Don't you remember that you are only a wretched, frail creature, subject 
to idleness, maladies, passions, and pains inherent in all mortal bodies? 
What advantage do you have over another human being? A ball of clay 
covered with rich cloth is worth little more than a ball of clay under rags. 
Inclined to sin and every possible vice, you, wretched creature, deceive 
yourself into forgetting that your feeble vessel, yearning after honor and 
ease, will decline and die. Soon it will be food for worms, decaying in the 
dust as readily as any indigent woman's body. The released soul will 
carry away only the good or evil works that the feeble body has done on 
earth....You foolish, simple, ridiculous little woman! You have no force, 
power, or authority other than what is given to you by someone else, 
namely the Lord. Nevertheless, seeing yourself surrounded by luxury 
and honors you think you can trample on the world and dominate it 
according to your will." (Tresor73. 77) 
I have elided over several pages of these corrections spoken by the good 
princess to herself in response to temptation: she critiques most harshly people 
who fall prey to pride, but she includes attacks on the other six deadly sins. This 
princess concludes her reflections with the realization that she must "love and 
fear" God, and she recognizes that, despite any virtues she does have, "she 
must consider herself the least worthy" of human beings (Tresor82V This 
humility, as a response to the sin of pride, does not resemble the humility topos-
-which functions as an apologia for breaching gender decorum surrounding 
women's speech. Instead this humility is simply the common notion of Christian 
humility, and Christine's discussion of this humility merely affirms the role. The 
good princess, Christine notes, is precariously placed because pride can easily 
tempt her: 
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The most significant in the eyes of God is not the most honored on earth, 
but whoever is most just on earth will be exalted in Heaven. Since the 
good princess knows that honors generally inflate pride yet befit her 
husband's status and her own authority, she will direct her heart toward 
humility, protecting it from damage by arrogance and puffery by pride. 
(Tresor 83) 
Christine also excuses the good princess's wealth, so long as that wealth is 
handled ethically: "When God says that it is impossible for the rich to be saved, 
he means the rich without virtue: those who do not distribute their wealth in 
alms: those whose only pleasure is in their possessions" (Tresor 82). The 
primary Christian virtues recommended for the good princess are humility and 
generosity, without which the princess will be neither virtuous nor persuasive. 
Reason, Rectitude and Justice, who present the Christian virtues, are 
joined by Worldly Prudence, who teaches social ethics and the creation of 
reputation, or "honor" (Tresor 90). Along with honor, Christine posits that other 
secular virtues are necessary for noble women: 
This noble lady's great constancy, courage, and force of character will 
not heed the darts of the envious. If she learns of frivolous slander 
against her, as happens every day to the best of people no matter how 
great they are, she will not be troubled nor take offense but will pardon 
readily....[T]his humble lady will question whether she could have 
offended in any manner.... [T]he princess contemplating all this will 
be so merciful toward everyone that she will suffer for them as for herself. 
(Tresor 84) 
As a constant, courageous, merciful, humble and thoughtful woman, this 
princess accepts the human foibles of slander and envy without anger, and 
contemplates the possible truth of any gossip. Her resulting ethos is of an even-
tempered and compassionate woman who reasonably reflects on the problems 
she faces. This woman will be helpful, financially and physically, to those in 
73 
need (Tresor 84), will teach her ladies-in-waiting good habits, will read conduct 
and devotional books, will listen to sermons by virtuous clerics (Tresor 93), and 
will work to make her marriage happy, including having her husband's 
confessor correct her husband instead of correcting him herself (Tresor 97-100). 
Lower class woman are directed to apply these virtues where appropriate and 
affordable. Christine specifically advises ladies-in-waiting against slander and 
insists on their loyalty to their mistress (Tresor 162.167), and she advises 
religious women to practice seven particular virtues: "...first is obedience, the 
foundations of all others; second, humility; third, sobriety; fourth, patience; fifth, 
solicitude; sixth, chastity; seventh, benevolence and concord" (Tresor 180V 
Unlike most conduct books common at the time, which typically stressed 
women's thorough domestication, Christine presents secular virtues which 
stress a woman's interactions with her community. Though occasionally 
repressive, silencing, and domesticating, this text generally emphasizes the 
public display of virtuous behaviors which will inspire trust, affection, good will, 
and a good reputation. These virtues are, in the main, flexible: they are not rigid 
rules designed to strictly limit behaviors. A woman is not told, for instance, that 
she must be always silent, nor is she told to be virginal, but simply chaste. Even 
the virtue of obedience recommended for nuns is only rigid to an extent-such a 
woman is expected to be obedient depends on her vows and her continuing 
acceptance of them. These virtues, especially the ones discussed for the 
princess, permit a variety of characteristics for a woman's ethos given her 
rhetorical situation and her personality. 
Having delineated the necessary virtues for a good woman, Christine 
discusses the variety of reputations available to her. Christine highlights the 
relationship between the princess's personality and potential reputation during 
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her presentation of the good woman's internal debate about leading a 
contemplative or active life. Given Christine's proclivity for study, she 
celebrates the contemplative life as the better of the two: 
The contemplative life is a manner and a state of serving God wherein 
one loves Our Lord so greatly and so ardently that she totally forgets 
father, mother, children, everyone, even herself, because of the great, 
consuming thought she devotes to her Creator. She never thinks of other 
things; nothing else is important to her. No poverty, tribulation, nor 
suffering (which, indeed, might damage another) hinders her heart, the 
heart of the true contemplative. Her manner of life completely disdains 
everything in the world and all its fleeting joys. She remains solitary, 
apart from others, knees to the ground, joined hands pointing 
heavenward, heart raised up in such elevated thought that in her 
contemplations she ascends to the presence of God. Through divine 
inspiration she sees the Holy Trinity, and the Court of Heaven and all its 
joys—[T]his is the way, above all others, manifestly agreeable to God. 
(Tresor 79) 
Her celebration of the contemplative life continues for a few more paragraphs; 
nevertheless, she presents the active life as equally devoted to God: 
The active life is the other way of serving God. The one following this 
way is so charitable that if she could, she would serve all for the love of 
God. So she serves in hospitals, visiting the sick and the poor, aiding 
with her own wealth and her own efforts, generously, for the love of 
God....She seeks her neighbor's good as if it were her own; and since 
she always is striving to do good, she never is idle. Such a woman bears 
all trials and tribulations patiently for the love of Our Lord. (Tresor80) 
Such discussions of the active and contemplative lifestyles were typical in 
medieval thought. Vet Christine rejects the polarity often attributed to the two; 
she constructs a middling lifestyle appropriate to the good princess's 
personality and responsibilities: 
You must then decide which of these two ways you will followf, s]o the 
good princess inspired by God speaks to herself. Discretion truly is 
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called the mother of Virtue. Why the mother? Because she conducts and 
leads, and the one who fails to follow her finds that enterprises without 
her come to nothing and are worthless. Therefore, I must work discreetly. 
Why discretion? Before I undertake anything, I must consider first of all 
the strength or weakness of my own body and my fragility. Then I weigh 
the demands I must balance in this human state to which God has 
committed me.... I could not leave husband, children, my worldly state, 
and all earthly preoccupations with he intention of serving God 
completely in the contemplative life, as the most perfect human beings 
have done. I must not try to do what I know I would be inadequate 
for....Therefore, since I conclude that I am not strong enough to follow 
either of these paths, at least I will try the middle way, as Saint Paul 
advises, and select from each path as much of the best as I am able. 
(Iresor 81-82) 
As Christine indicates, the decision about what kind of life to lead is the 
princess's to make. Yet she assumes that the good princess's virtuous lifestyle 
combines contemplation and action; prayer and study are mixed with good 
deeds. The Iresor, following this model of the good life and this woman's 
personality, focuses on the appropriate activities for such a woman, though 
Christine liberally recommends various prayers. This compromise, and the 
behaviors which extend from it, construct a third, acceptable reputation for the 
good woman's lifestyle: along with active and contemplative lifestyles now 
belong this mixture of the two. 
Derived from Christine's depiction of the noble woman's lifestyle and 
personality, the reputation for the good princess's speech varies from private to 
public. I have already noted in my discussion of Bizzell and Herzberg's 
selections that Christine advocates very private uses of speech, even silence 
when necessary. Yet Christine primarily discusses women's public use of 
persuasive speech, especially when used to resolve a public need. For 
instance, the good princess is directed to be an advocate for peace, which is 
not surprising given that Christine lived in a violent time. Women were 
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instructed to intervene in both the troubles between their husbands and their 
subjects or between their husbands and other rulers. When a princess is called 
upon to make peace between her husband's most lowly subject and him, she is 
directed to listen to the subject's concerns with patience: 
Through charity, this great lady will be the advocate of peace between 
the prince, her husband (or her son, if she is a widow), and her people, 
those to whom she has a duty to offer her assistance. If the prince, 
because of poor advice or for any other reason, should be tempted to 
harm his subjects, they will know their lady to be full of kindness, pity, and 
charity. They will come to her, humbly petitioning her to intercede for 
them before the prince. Poor and unable to request it themselves, they 
will merit the lady's clemency. (Tresor 84) 
The good woman becomes a mediator and advocate, which adds that role to 
her reputation. Her established virtue earns the trust of her people and justifies 
her ethos in her petition to her husband. Though her rhetoric would be 
practiced in private with her lord, the justification and need are both public. 
More public still are the times when a woman sues for peace to her lord's 
council, especially when she mediates between her lord and a neighboring 
prince, or between her lord and his nobles. She is expected to be motivated by 
her horror of war and is directed to use her knowledge of her lord's men and of 
rhetoric in order to preserve the peace: 
If any neighboring or foreign prince wars for any grievance against her 
lord, or if her lord wages war against another, the good lady will weigh 
the odds carefully. She will balance the great ills, infinite cruelties, 
losses, deaths, and destruction to property and people against the war's 
outcome, which is usually unpredictable. She will seriously consider 
whether she can preserve the honor of her lord and yet prevent the war. 
Working wisely and calling on God's aid, she will strive to maintain 
peace. So also, if any prince of the realm or the country, or any baron, 
knight, or powerful subject should hold a grudge against her lord, or if he 
is involved in any such quarrel and she foresees that her lord to take a 
prisoner or make a battle would lead to trouble in the land, she will strive 
77 
toward peace.... Mindful of such terrible possibilities, the good lady will 
strive to avoid destruction of her people, making peace and urging her 
lord (the prince) and his council to consider the potential harm inherent in 
any martial adventure. Furthermore, she must remind him that every 
good prince should avoid shedding blood, especially that of his 
subjects....Thus, always saving both her own honor and her lord's, the 
good lady will not rest until she has spoken..., alternately soothing and 
reproving them....Woman by nature is more gentle and circumspect. 
Therefore, if she has sufficient will and wisdom she can provide the best 
possible means to pacify men....The gentle tongue (which means the 
soft word) bends and breaks harshness. ITresor 85-86) 
This feminine use of speech closely resembles a man's use of rhetoric; it is 
public, spoken to equals, and deliberative, though its use reflects her nature as 
gentle and circumspect. For Christine, women's gender leads them to advocate 
for peace, and yet those gentle natures do not preclude them from the public 
forum. Noble women are directed to speak to their lords, their subjects, or to any 
man who may help prevent war: "the wise lady will be such a good mediator by 
her prudent conduct and her knowledge that she will succeed in appeasing all 
factions" (Tresor 121). The characteristics of the good princess's ethos 
emphasizes precisely the opposite readings suggested by Bizzell and 
Herzberg's selections, for these princesses are active, public mediators 
between warring parties who persuade rulers and deliberate about profound 
social issues. 
Christine's depictions of women's public speech does focus on the noble 
women, yet, as Dulac thoroughly discussed in her article, Christine also closely 
explains a governess's ethos with her young, royal charge. When a governess 
teaches her mistress, she is directed to 
...not appear to be giving examples, only recounting adventures. By 
telling these stories well, she will touch her mistress' heart, as well as that 
of others who may be hearing her who have gathered around her to 
listen. ITresor 127) 
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By pleasing the princess, the governess simultaneously wins her trust, gains 
influence over her, and teaches virtue: these acts, which establishes the 
governess as personally liked by the princess, are influential with her. Yet the 
governess's influence, despite her good reputation, will likely have limits. For 
instance, the princes may stray into an illicit love affair which the governess may 
not be able to prevent with kindness. In such a situation, the governess is 
directed to take her leave of the princess, moving far enough away to protect 
her own reputation. The governess is then directed to send a chastising letter to 
the princess. Part of the letter, which Christine includes in full, argues that the 
princess should 
Realize that my great affection and my desire for your honor's continuity 
and your renown's excellence move me to caution you. My lady, I have 
heard rumors concerning your conduct which grieve me to the bottom of 
my heart. I fear the loss of your good name. (Iresor 140) 
The governess's ethos in the letter is derived from the sincerity of her affection 
and her concern for the princess, and that ethos permits her to chastise the 
princess. Not only does Christine again emphasize the importance of a good 
reputation for both the rhetor and the ruler, she indicates that a social inferior 
can speak sternly to her social superior if the lower class woman has a good 
reputation. 
Christine discusses the specific techniques for developing and using 
feminine ethos, and she directs the discussion, like her comments on virtue and 
reputation, to the upper class, though many of the techniques can be used by 
members of the lower classes. These particular kinds of personal reputations 
are potentially available to any woman: women can be known for leading an 
active or contemplative lives, for speaking persuasively in public and private, 
and for acting as advocates, mediators, petitioners, and teachers. Christine 
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discusses specific techniques for establishing ethos under five loose topics: 
negative examples, the good princess's associates, her treatment of her 
servants, her responses to her enemies, and her presentation of particular 
virtues through appropriate behaviors. 
One warning Christine gives against an evil woman's unethical use of 
rhetoric occurs during the internal debate of the tempted princess at the 
beginning of the text. Temptation argues that the princess, to convince people to 
obey her will, should 
Therefore, amass treasure to carry out your intentions. Money is 
women's best friend and the surest means to any possible end. Who 
would dare disobey you when you freely distribute gifts? Even if you give 
only a little, people still will serve you willingly in the hope of receiving 
more later. After all, you would have the reputation for great wealth. Only 
the dead fail to reach out with both hands. Dispense for gain, no matter 
who may be harmed or displeased by it. You know you can do this every 
well if you put mind to it. Who cares what others may say? Talkers 
cannot harm you....Nobody has a good life beyond what she provides for 
herself. (Tresor 72-73) 
Willard's translation of the Tresor highlights the pun on a "good" life—as 
pleasurable or as virtuous--in the princess's thoughts about buying a good 
reputation. The evil princess's selfishness justifies her greed and pride and 
structures the ethos she creates for herself. As with the good princess, Christine 
assumes a direct relationship between one's ethos and one's ethics: she also 
assumes that corruption cannot be hidden for long. The evil princess 
purchases affection and must ignore the talk against her; in contrast, the good 
princess's behaviors inspire trust, affection, and good will, which is supported 
by the talk about her. The negative example here is, to a degree, obvious: a 
good reputation, and so a good ethos, is earned, not bought. Yet the negative 
example reflects one problem Christine had in the querelle: marginalized 
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speakers can not control, ultimately, their ethos because it reflects not only their 
actions, but their audience's assumptions. With the evil princess, the gossip 
about her prevents her from being truly perceived as trustworthy, despite 
temptation's assertion that this princess need not concern herself with other's 
gossip. For Christine, a good reputation necessitates positive, honest 
appraisals of the rhetor by other good people. 
Not surprisingly, Christine speaks at length about the necessity for the 
noble lady to associate with good people, including making friends and having 
ethical ladies-in-waiting and servants. Her friends are needed for their support 
and good will, while her morally upstanding entourage will reflect well on her. 
When Christine discusses the people the noble lady should befriend, she 
indicates the specific benefits she may derive from those associations. The 
bourgeoisie, for instance, may loan her money when she needs it: 
Occasionally she ought to call to her presence the most important 
citizens of her lord's cities and towns, as well as certain important 
merchants and even some of the most respected artisans. Receiving 
them well, she must pragmatically cultivate their good will so that if even 
she is in difficulty they will support her. If she should find herself in need 
of money, for example, she could request the merchants' help, which 
would be forthcoming willingly and benevolently. (Tresor 110) 
By ingratiating herself with these men she can rely on them to support her. In 
the same manner, she will win the good will of her lord's barons, which may 
prevent rebellions and could be a military resource if a rebellion occurs (Tresor 
121). She will also carefully cultivate the clergy: 
This...teaching requires her to be in the good standing and good graces 
of the clergy, the religious orders, the counselors, the monks, the doctors, 
the bourgeoisie, and even the people....[T]hey will praise her in sermons 
and other public discourses, so that their voices can be a necessary 
shield and defense against the murmurs and false reports of her jealous 
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defamers. Perhaps their words might silence the gossips; consequently, 
she would be in better repute with her husband as well as with the 
common folk. Hearing their lady well spoken of, the more powerful 
among them might sustain her if she should ever need their help. 
(7resor 107-108) 
As aides to gaining and maintaining the good will of her husband and her 
people, the clergy can shape and defend her reputation. Unlike her 
associations with other groups, she will win the clergy's support by following its 
advice. The result of the princess's kind and caring associates, according to 
Christine, will be to secure her people's affection, which is the surest defense: 
"There is no city or fortress so well defended, so strong and powerful, as one 
protected by the love and good will of loyal subjects" (Tresor 18V Interestingly, 
these particular techniques of building a good reputation-friendliness and 
taking advise--are the same techniques for securing one's authority. 
Yet the trust of the citizenry would be shattered if the good princess's 
associates at court were less than virtuous. Her entourage reflect on her, and 
so they should be ethical and able to assist her in her own good deeds (Tresor 
87). Her almoner and herself will, for instance, minister to the emotional and 
financial needs of the poor and ill {Tresor 88). Her ladies especially will protect 
their own honor as a means of protecting hers (Tresor 155): 
Her ladies should conduct themselves with decorum among knights, 
squires, and other men. They should speak simply and quietly, without 
coquetry and effrontery, as they amuse themselves in dancing and 
diversions. Certainly they should not be foolish, bold, or loud in their 
speech, countenance, or laughter....Above all, [the lady-in-waiting] will 
strive to protect her own honor in both word and deed, even more behind 
her lady's back than in her presence. Thus she will promote her lady's 
good name.. ..The more she employs the sort of distant dignity so 
becoming to a woman, the greater respect men will show her. 
(Tresor 112-113. 151. 157) 
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With quiet dignity, the ladies-in-waiting will earn men's respect and that respect 
will then be reflected back onto the good princess. Like the governess, these 
ladies may even protect the princess's honor more than she does herself: 
[T]he good, loyal lady, demoiselle, or other courtier, wishing to preserve a 
good conscience and loving the welfare and honor of her mistress, will 
act in this manner if she sees her lady's honor diminished or 
endangered: If she does not dare to speak with her directly or admonish 
her for her own good, she will go only to her mistress's confessor. There, 
secretly, in confession, she can tell what is being said about her mistress, 
the peril in which she is placing herself, and the harm which might come 
of it. Then she will beg the confessor for God's sake to point out all this to 
her mistress and not say anything more about it. (Tresor 166) 
Also, like the good wife, who has her husband's confessor admonish him for 
her, the princess's good ladies will ask the confessor to admonish her, which 
will prevent bickering among them (Tresor 167 ff). If the good princess is 
threatened with immediate loss of her good name: 
[T]he good servant will protect her from all perils and defend he as if she 
were her own child. One lady was saved from being discovered in a 
compromising situation by her maid-in-waiting, who, when she realized 
the danger, immediately set fire to the grange so that everyone, thus 
distracted, would run in that direction and her mistress could escape from 
her awkward predicament. (Tresor 154) 
These women earn and maintain honor, protecting the mistress's reputation 
and assisting her in her work to maintain the trust of her people, even when the 
lady may not deserve that protection. Christine's discussion about a princess's 
relationship with her servants resembles her recommendations to lower class 
women concerning their treatment of their retainers. A baroness, for instance, is 
instructed to act consistently with her men-at-arms, while a housewife is 
instructed to not shout at her servants (Tresor 170,189 respectively). By 
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establishing good relationship with good people, women earn the trust of their 
servants and their neighbors and so influence them. 
If a lady retaliates against her enemies, she is likely to lose her good 
name. So Christine suggests specific techniques for handling one's enemies: 
...if the princess knows that particular powerful people do not wish her 
well or would harm her if they could (such as removing her from the love 
and grace of her lord, who possibly might believe their malicious 
blandishment and flatteries), or that these connivers gladly would slander 
her through false reports of barons, vassals, or commoners, then she 
should appear not to notice and not to consider these people her 
enemies. Rather, by showing them an unsuspecting and cheerful 
countenance, she will lead them to believe that she esteems them and 
never could judge them otherwise, for she apparently trusts them more 
than others. This appearance must be so well controlled and so 
discreetly and cleverly acted that no one will perceive it is all pretense. 
(Tresor 105) 
Of all of Christine's suggested techniques, this dissimulation is the most 
potentially unethical: she barely justifies it as a means of peace-keeping and 
self-preservation. With a woman's enemies, pretense and dissimulation are 
justified, in Christine's mind, so long as the goal is to win their good will, so long 
as the dissimulation maintains the peace in the the court and community, and 
so long as it prevents false reports from troubling her marriage. 
The good princess will behave virtuously whenever possible. In the main, 
her life will pivot around two particular points. One is the morals she will 
observe and abide by, and the other is the style of life which will direct 
her. Two moral considerations are especially necessary for women who 
desire honor, for without them it is unattainable: namely Sobriety and 
Chastity. (Tresor91) 
For instance, a sober woman will avoid ostentatious clothing as "frivolous" 
(Tresor 91 -92). Her ethos, as a merciful, authoritative, sober and 
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compassionate woman, is established through her actions: "People's intentions 
cannot be judged except by their acts, which when good, give evidence of good 
thought and personal virtue; the opposite is likewise true" (Tresor 101). 
Reputation is shaped by a woman's good behaviors for her actions indicate her 
character. One of these behaviors is careful listening: a woman who sits in 
council is instructed to listen carefully to her counselors, and the baroness is 
instructed to listen to her husband's men when they tell of their valor in battle 
(Tresor 95-96.100-101 respectively). Yet most of the specific behaviors 
Christine discusses relate to Christian, instead of social, virtues. Princesses, 
who must accept homage, for instance, are warned to be humble: similarly, 
the active lady leaving the chapel will personally, with humility and 
devotion, give alms with her own hands, showing by her actions that she 
does not despise the poor. Any requests for mercy or aid she will listen 
to kindly, reply graciously, and immediately attend to those which can be 
fulfilled. By so doing, she will enhance not only the gift but her own 
reputation. (Tresor95) 
These behaviors indicate both her humility and mercy, of course, yet they 
confirm her just use of her authority as well: she can and does attend to the 
problems raised by her people. Such attentiveness will strengthen the people's 
loyalty to her and her lord. 
Like the classical works on delivery, Christine recognizes the effects of 
gestures and vocal quality on an audience: 
Though the dignity of her position requires this noble princess to receive 
homage from others, she will not take undue pleasure when it is 
rendered to her. She will avoid it whenever possible. Her manner, her 
bearing, and her speech will be gentle and kindly, her face friendly, her 
eyes lowered. Returning greetings to all who greet her, she will be so 
humane and courteous that her words will be pleasing to God and to all 
the world. (Tresor 83) 
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Her gestures and bearing indicate the sincerity of her humility, while her 
friendliness encourage her people's trust. Her prudence and sobriety will 
fashion many of her gestures and much of her speech: 
Prudence and Sobriety teach a lady well-ordered speech and wise 
eloquence. She never will be coy, but will speak well-considered words, 
soft and rather low-pitched, uttered with a pleasant face and without 
excessive motion of the hands or body, nor facial grimaces. She will 
avoid excessive or uncalled-for laughter. Refraining from speaking ill of 
others, she will not blame, but rather will encourage goodness. Gladly 
she will keep in check vague and dishonest words, nor will she permit 
others to speak them to her. Her humor will also be discreet. In the midst 
of her entourage, the princess will speak a virtuous language of good 
example, so that those who listen to her directly, as well as those who 
hear later reports, will perceive that her words come from her goodness, 
wisdom, and honesty. Never speaking ungraciously to her companions 
or servants, nor quarreling or speaking viciously, instead she will instruct 
her household retainers and friends gently, correcting their short­
comings softly, politely, threatening to expel them if they do not reform, 
punishing them in a quiet voice without being needlessly unkind. Crude 
brutality from the mouth of a lady or, indeed, any woman turns more 
against herself than against the one to whom it is addressed, moreover, 
her commands must be reasonable for the time and place, as well as 
suitable for the person receiving them, each according to his own proper 
duty. (Tresor 92-93) 
The specific rhetorical techniques here will be applied by the good woman 
speaker at need and in accordance with her personality and limitations. Using 
these techniques, Christine asserts that good women speakers can , in effect, 
enter the Cite, that they can appropriate Christine's redefined stereotypes of the 
good woman as the basis for their own ethos. 
The three defenses of women I have discussed in these three chapters-
the defense of women against literary misogyny in the querelle, the redefinition 
and defense of worthy women's ontological status in the Cite, and the defense 
of, and instructions in, women's speech in the Tresor--all indicate that women's 
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ethos appeals are constructed by them in tandem with their community. 
Repeatedly, Christine's thoughts about a woman's persuasive speech is 
impinged upon by the stereotypes an audience will have about a woman 
speaker. Yet the interactions among stereotypes, reputation, and style as part 
of Christine's ethos may be limited solely to Christine's work. In the second 
section of this dissertation I will consider ethos in the somewhat similar 
rhetorical situation of Renaissance Englishwomen's defenses of women, 
discussing first the relationship between ethos and stereotype, then reputation, 




ETHOS AND STEREOTYPES IN EARLY MODERN WOMEN'S PAMPHLETS 
Across the channel, and over a hundred and fifty years later, another 
woman wrote in defense of women. Jane Anger, in her Protection for Women 
(1587), responded to the conventions of literary misogyny in the, now lost, Boke 
His Surfeit. Anger's text exhibits no direct influences from the continental 
querelle des femmes, which Joan Kelly argues was an outgrowth from the 
querelie de la Rose, nor does Anger's text show any influence from the Cite des 
dames, even though that text had been translated and printed in England early 
in the century. Despite the popularity of Christine's unusual defense of women 
as women, Anger received no benefit from Christine's work: even though the 
ground had been cultivated by Christine, Anger's work effectively clears virgin 
land. As Gerda Lerner has shown in her exhaustive history of Western 
European women's thought about women, Anger's circumstance was not 
unusual. Repeatedly women thinkers, speakers, and writers were unaware of 
their intellectual foremothers and were perceived by their contemporaries as 
either unique or rare exceptions, and so were seen as generally irrelevant to 
the man's world of scholarship, philosophy and literary art. Even when more 
than one such woman lived at the same time, the pair would be dismissed as 
flukes, though often the dismissal would be couched as flattery. 
Given the masculinist culture of scholarship, it is not surprising that 
Anger's own work was either lost or ignored by the time of the next polemical 
debate about women. In this next battle, however, more than one female voice 
spoke in defense of women. Rachel Speght, Ester Sowernam, and Constantia 
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Munda refuted, rejected and righteously railed against Joseph Swetnam's 
Arraignment of Lewd, Idle, Froward and Inconstant Women (1617), and all of 
them wrote, in quick succession, against him. Sowernam and Munda do have 
the benefit of Speght's work, yet none of them refer to either Anger or Christine. 
Though each of these rhetorical situations differed--even Anger's and Speght's 
situations are separated by thirty years and the death of the ruling, female 
monarch--they resemble each other in being, effectively, the "first" defense of 
women by women because their predecessors were forgotten. I selected these 
Renaissance texts precisely because their authors resemble Christine in their 
lack of a precedent, and so they all garner similar expectations in their 
audiences. In each case their written defense are, effectively, an unheard-of 
breach of gender decorum. Speght's work was beneficial to Sowernam and 
Munda, and they draw heavily on their predecessor, yet the rapid succession of 
these texts allowed for little adjustment in their audience's expectations. Other 
defenses of women by women in polemical prose followed these texts, as, for 
example, the satirical treatise by Mary Tattle-well and Joan Hit-him-home. Yet 
this later text draws on the Swetnam controversy: a precedent had been 
established, which fundamentally changed the rhetorical situation. 
Even as I assert that Anger, Sowernam, and Munda wrote as women, I 
find I must qualify the claim. Although the historical record identifies Rachel 
Speght, there are no records which directly establish the identities of the other 
three authors. Given the endemic misogyny, modern critics have not been 
surprised that these writers signed their pamphlets with pseudonyms, in order to 
obscure their identities. Though all these names are gender-marked as female, 
the identity of Anger, Sowernam, and Munda is uncertain. Because of the 
obscurity of these writer's real selves, as Diane Purkiss argues: 
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[W]e recognize in these texts... the processing of woman as a theatrical 
role or masquerade which can never be equated with an essential 
woman or audible authorial voice but which, rather, troubles the very 
existence of such a self-identical figure. These are texts which cannot 
be put easily into.. .categories of authentic voicing; instead, they are 
texts where the metaphors used to naturalize the gender systems of 
early modern England are both assaulted and upheld. (Purkiss 69) 
Recognizing that we are limited in our knowledge of the actual lives of these 
"women" writers, my study in this chapter of Renaissance expectations of 
women will assess the stereotypes that the discourse community held about 
women generally, and, from that context, I will derive the expectations of these 
female writers's ethos positions.i 
Those community stereotypes which are potentially relevant to these 
pamphlets are derived from both the court and the bourgeois. As Pamela 
Benson Joseph, in her study of women in Renaissance humanist philosophy 
and thought, argues, a reading of these popular texts as primarily humanist or 
courtly would be inaccurate: 
In England in the years between the publication of Elyot's Defense 
(1540) and the death of Elizabeth (1603), humanist thought about 
womankind is clearly evident in the serious analysis of the relations 
between the sexes in marriage manuals, in the numerous long and 
densely argued tracts that were written in defense of Elizabeth's rule, 
and in translations of Continental works as Capella's Delia Eccellenza 
and Agrippa's De nobilitate. It is almost entirely absent from the debate 
about women as it appears in original works in English writers for the 
popular press....[Tjhese native English works do not challenge the 
traditional valuation of women on the basis of their sexual purity; 
they employ the rhetorical methods of paradox; nor do they engage in a 
serious analysis of woman's social role as defined by the classical 
authorities Plato, Aristotle, the pseudo-Aristotelian Economics, and 
Xenophon. (Benson 205-206) 
1 Because I read these "women" from their gendered speaking position, I will regularly refer to 
them as women. 
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Benson notes several differences between popular and courtly defenses of 
women. Yet she uses those differences to bifurcate the two discourse 
communities. This bifurcation assumes that the Renaissance pamphlet readers 
were not also participants in the discourse community of the court. Though 
much of the courtly literature was circulated in manuscript, and so was not likely 
to reach the lower classes, the pamphlet writers still appealed to the members 
of the court (Clark 22); the court and the bourgeoisie shared other, similar 
expectations about the nature of women (Dunn 31; Henderson and McManus 
113); and Middleton, as well as other playwrights, critiqued the "activity and 
boldness" of "middle class" women (Wright 466). A relatively tenuous 
connection did exist between the court and the middle class discourse 
communities. Nevertheless, as Clark explains, the "new mass" of pamphlet 
literature "testifies to the existence of tastes and values significantly different 
from those catered to by writers like Sidney and Spenser, tastes and values 
which appeared for the first time in this period" (Clark 22). One such different 
taste is for women writing polemics, which "hard-headed businessmen would 
print...[indicating] that they were popular with the reading public" (Travitsky 254). 
So the court and the pamphleteers existed in partially overlapping discourse 
communities, neither fully the same or completely different. As such, the 
expectations of women in the court may resemble the expectations of this 
middle-class "new kind of reader" for whom the pamphleteers wrote (Clark 22), 
yet the expectations of woman delineated by Renaissance humanism and court 
poetry only partially accounts for the expectations of women held by bourgeois 
readers. 
These new readers were literate but not necessarily sophisticated (Clark 
18), and the works they read reflected that lack of sophistication by being 
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riddled with stock subjects, stereotypes, and commonplace arguments. 
Criticizing stock subjects, such as social climbers, foreigners, atheists, and 
women, was common (Clark 177). Whether the pamphleteers depicted women 
positively or negatively, the pamphlets were fundamentally conservative. They 
reinforced already accepted stereotypes of women (Benson 206), whether 
derived from antiquity (Henderson and McManus 24) or from medieval 
complaints (Rutherford 177). The debate about women was also conventional: 
though the debate occurred in various genres intended for various audiences, 
the writers repeated many of the same themes, figures, tropes, motifs, and 
citations (Jordon 2; Clark 37). Even the terms "pamphlet" and "book" were 
conventionally both a designation of size and of quality: "'Pamphlet' was often 
an unflattering term; a writer used it of his own productions in a spirit of humility 
or obsequiousness, of the work of others when he wished to scorn or belittle" 
(Clark 23). The repetition of old jokes (Henderson and McManus 47) and well-
recognized authorities, as a "rhetoric of citation" (Purkiss 72), endowed the 
pamphlet writers with credibility by appealing to their audience's sense of 
humor or by appealing to the authority of the work cited. As a conservative and 
conventional genre, the pamphlet form determined the appropriate range of 
rhetoric and thought used in it. Not surprisingly, when the debate about women 
occurs in the pamphlets, the possible definitions of women's social, political or 
legal status are not fundamentally challenged, and so are not "feminist" in the 
modern sense. Instead, these pamphlets were more like epideictic writings, 
which are persuasive, as Aristotle explains, primarily because they affirm the 
community's beliefs (Aristotle, 1.9,1366A 20-35). The "virtues," then, that women 
pamphleteers could appropriate for their ethos were constrained in the 
pamphlet form to the stereotypes of the "good" woman. 
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Unfortunately for a woman writer, one of those stereotypical virtues 
associated with the good woman was silence (Neely 214; Jones 187): others 
were piety (Henderson and McManus 49, 65; Bornstein x-xi), obedience (Neely 
214; Jordon 22, 32, 45-46; Jones 187; Bornstein x-xi), and chastity (Henderson 
and McManus 49, 65; Neely 214; Jones 187; Kelly 21). These women 
pamphleteers defended their speech by arguing that their particular rhetorical 
circumstance justified their breach of gender decorum. In each case, the 
women pamphleteers argued that the attacks on women were virulent or 
offensive enough to justify any woman's angry response; as Jane Anger says, 
"Shall such surfeiters rails on our kindness, you [women] stand still and say 
naught...?" (Anger 32).2 By voicing surprise at the failure of women to voice 
outrage, Anger performs several rhetorical moves at the same time: she affirms 
other women's anger, she justifies her own writing as an expression of many 
women's (silenced) responses, and she questions the virtue of silence as an 
expectation of women's behavior in such circumstances. Yet all of these 
women pamphleteers also affirmed silence as a rhetorical ornament for women-
-even Jane Anger, who argues most strenuously among these writers for the 
virtue of women's speech, still speaks of "our honest bashfulness" (Anger 33) as 
an appropriate and innate female virtue. These writers also comment on the 
other stereotypical virtues of the "good" woman: Rachel Speght depicts and 
redefines wifely obedience (Speght 72); Ester Sowernam enumerates several 
holy and pious women (Sowernam 96-97); and Constantia Munda affirms the 
goodness of "chaste and modest virgins" (Munda 134). So, usually, these 
writers accept and reiterate women's conventional social virtues, which affirms 
several of the audience's expectations about women. 
2 All citations to the pamphlets are from Shephard's edition of them, in which he modernized the 
texts. 
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Nevertheless, these women affirmed women as innately "good." Their 
challenges to the negative definition of their ontological status were often 
formed as either a "fable," as Aristotle described such evidence (II. 20,1393b5-
30), or as resistant readings of the Bible's misogynistic claims. Anger uses the 
fable: she tells of two "wise" men of Gotham--a name that connotated folly 
(Shepherd 49)--and humorously exposes these wise men as half-wits. One 
wise man howls bitterly, for instance, upon begin offered a kercher from his 
confused, though supposedly still wise, friend (Anger 40). The brief parable 
ends with the two men seeking out the assistance of one of the many wise 
women that they know (Anger 40). Anger follows this fable with another of 
Aristotle's forms of evidence, a maxim: she says that an "old parable" is that "the 
wit of a woman is a great matter," implying that the "greatness" is in the quality of 
women's wit, not its mysteriousness to men (Anger 41). Aristotle notes that the 
fable and the maxim are particularly appropriate when addressing a popular 
audience, and maxims are especially persuasive because they require little 
thought and usually affirm some observation that the audience already believes 
(II 21,1395b1-20). Though Anger's maxim does not affirm an already accepted 
belief, its construction as an "old saying" attempts to persuade the audience to 
accept the maxim as an already accepted truth. As such, the fable and maxim 
undermine the ontological status of "good" women, depicting them as innately 
wise. 
Yet, as Aristotle notes, an argument from fables is not as powerful as one 
derived from accepted past "facts" (II 20, 1394a1-10). Though Biblical evidence 
was challenged in the period as not necessarily "factual," it still retained much of 
the power of culturally accepted "fact." On this alone, Rachel Speght's 
Protestant rereading of the Biblical evidence of women's inferior ontological 
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status challenges the cultural constructions of "women" far more deeply than 
Jane Anger's fable does (Shepherd 59; Lewalski 165). Speght's rhetoric, like 
her argument, is delineated from Protestant beliefs, especially her ethos as a 
pious, young, virginal woman. As Lewalski depicts Speght: 
[She].. .offer[s] an especially effective rejoinder to Swetnam in the 
rhetorical category of ethical proof: the creation of a suitable persona. 
She presents herself as the living refutation of Swetnam's charges 
against women: religious, learned, eminently rational, engagingly 
modest, unassuming, justifiably angry yet defending wronged women 
and their Creator. (Lewalski 162) 
Speght attempts to enact the ontological status that she argues is appropriate 
for, and typical of, "good" women. Speght's ethos is also derived in part from 
her use of her sources. Much of Speght's response to Swetnam relies on 
Biblical material, Saint's lives, and Christian doctrine for evidence from which to 
critique and reject Renaissance misogyny. The genres of religious devotions, 
confessions, and meditations were commonly accepted for women's study and 
women's writing (Henderson and McManus 62). 
Nevertheless, the persona she creates was not necessarily the one her 
audience perceived in her. Cis von Heertum has found several annotations on 
a copy of Speght's pamphlet from which he notes that her argument and her 
act of writing undermined her ethos appeal for at least one member of her 
readers. Looking at the copy at Yale University (Pressmark Ih Sp 33617 M), 
Heertum discovered several hostile annotations, all in a handwriting 
contemporaneous with Speght's publishing in 1617 (Heertum 492). The 
annotator is anonymous, but the writer quotes Latin which suggests a member 
of the more learned classes (Heertum 492). The annotations are particularly 
virulent in their attacks on Speght's chastity and silence: for instance, the 
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annotator complains of her wanting a husband, of her "fighting for her Cunt-rie, 
for a puddinge as soone," and of her speaking "like a mayd, not like a Virgin" 
(Heertum 493). The annotator particularly complains of her railing: "you had 
forgott [that] you are a preist daughter, for instead of preaching you rayle right 
downe," and "she cannot choose but rayle doe what she can" (Heertum 493). 
These annotations question Speght's propriety by asserting that she is not truly 
chaste or appropriately silent, which indicates that Speght's attempt to recreate 
her ontological status and simultaneously enact the ethos of that new status 
failed completely to persuade this reader. Such reactions, as with this reader, 
likely prevented Speght's audience from hearing her words, which silenced her 
before she speaks simply because she speaks.3 
Nevertheless, as Lewalski indicates, Speght does attempt to enact the 
ethos of a "good woman" while she attempts to redefine the ontological status of 
women. Speght attempts to enact several good scholarly practices, along with 
the various pious virtues, which suggests an ethos of a studious woman. For 
instance, she presents herself as reasonable by carefully organizing her text. 
The structure of Speght's argument implicitly critiques the disjointed, if lively, 
structure of Swetnam's Arraignment while it presents her argument as carefully 
reasoned. Her treatise is as tightly structured as the structure of the classical 
oration: its pattern of sign posting positions and then developing those positions 
recalls the relationship between the partition of an argument and the following 
confirmation. Yet Speght's argument is not like the standard oration because 
3 This serious response to Speght's pamphlet also deeply undermines the central thesis of Linda 
Woodbridge's Women of the English Renaissance in which she argues that the debate about 
women was not a real debate but a series of witty and humorous texts intended and received as 
simply entertainment. Not only does the sincere tone of several sections of these women's 
pamphlets indicate a legitimate debate, this annotator's sincere and anonymous response to both 
Speght and to her quotes of Swetnam indicates that neither text was perceived as part of a well-
recognized series of humorous pamphlets. 
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she presents her refutation section prior to her confirmation. Speght refutes the 
theological evidence for women's inferior ontological status before presenting 
the Biblical evidence of women as potentially good. Though this structure is 
somewhat less conventional, as Gerda Lerner explains, such beginnings were 
common among early pro-women writings because the patriarchal arguments 
were deeply inculcated into the ideology of the readers (Lerner 138). Only after 
Speght eliminates the four significant misogynistic readings of the Bible does 
she then appropriate the Bible to redefine women's worth. Speght concludes 
the body of her pamphlet with a reading of the ethics of husband/wife power 
relations, in which applies the ontological status she has constructed for women 
to the circumstances of real, married woman. As an epilogue to her pamphlet 
she critiques several examples of Swetnam's failed grammar, style, argument 
and evidence, depicting him as a "blasphemer" who should "die the death" 
(Speght 78). 
The central arguments of Speght's pamphlet deconstructs the ideology of 
women's inferiority, reconstructs women's ontological status through an 
applications of Aristotelian causality, and then applies the new construction to 
the ethical questions of behavior in marriage. Her evidence is mainly Biblical, 
reflecting her redefinition of an "orthodox" Protestant construction of the 
hierarchy of gender. Her defenses of women's worth are often equally attacks 
on men's superior ontological status. In her defense of women she considers 
four arguments: Eve's, and hence all women's, culpability for causing the Fall; 
Adam's culpability for the fall; Paul's injunction against sexual intercourse; and 
Solomon's compliant that he could find not one good woman among a 
thousand (Speght 65-66). Speght repeats the events of the Creation-fall story, 
but removes the "damaging significances" from those events (Lewalski 166). 
97 
For instance, Speght accepts the notion that Satan tempted Eve instead of 
Adam because she was the "weaker vessel" (Speght 66). But Speght empties 
the image of a weak vessel of its slight against women by comparing that vessel 
to "a crystal glass [which] sooner receives a crack than a strong stone pot" 
(Speght 66). Women's weakness is accepted, but shifted into a sign of her 
greater purity and refinement. More importantly, she shifts the significance of the 
punishments Adam and Eve receive for their transgression, arguing that the 
more damning punishment is given to the man because his was the greater sin: 
"...the punishment of her transgression being particular to her own sex and to 
none but the female kind: but for the sin of man the whole earth was cursed" 
(Speght 66). The responsibility for the fall becomes the man's, a position she 
reiterates a few lines later: 
Then (and not afore) it is said that they saw it [their sin], as if sin were 
imperfect and unable to bring a deprivation of a blessing received, or 
death on all mankind, til man (in whom lay the active power of 
transgression) had transgressed. (Speght 67) 
By redeeming Eve, Speght redeems the sex (Beilin xxi). Speght's liberalizing 
reconstruction of the Renaissance gender hierarchy opens up a space for 
women to have distinctly feminine and respectable virtues. 
Speght's other three defenses of women in this treatise all shift the 
Bible's statements about the nature of women into situated statements about 
women and men in historical time. This argument significantly challenges the 
relationship between the claims of an authority and the truth asserted by that 
authority: 
As long as an authority was held to speak the absolute truth, to invoke 
him was sufficient to establish the truth of Tightness of a given position 
or practice, and no feminist could conceive of forms of society that might 
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be alternatives to patriarchy...But when such authorities came to be 
regarded as historically contingent and relevant only to the particular 
situations they addressed (as they increasingly did during the late 
fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries), then feminists could propose to 
legitimate nontraditional views of woman which vitiated patriarchal 
norms. (Jordan 34) 
Speght, for instance, sees the common reading of St. Paul's injunction against 
sexual intercourse as misguided: Speght argues that Paul was only speaking to 
the Corinthians in their struggles (Speght 67-68). She incorporates other 
Biblical evidence to argue that sexual intercourse is not essentially evil, and so 
proves that the injunction was only temporary (Speght 68). Though this 
argument seems to critique only one reading of one passage of the Bible, the 
reading that is critiqued is extraordinarily influential. By making this reading, 
she implicitly undermines the authority of the Church Fathers who created the 
original reading, and she opens a space for her to make her own, pro-woman, 
reading of the Bible. 
Only after Speght removes the presumption of women's evil nature does 
she define women's "excellences" (Speght 68), cataloging those excellences 
using Aristotle's notion of the four causes: efficient, material, formal, and final. 
Women's efficient cause is God; her material cause is the refined body of man-
in-Paradise from whom she was made; her formal cause is like man's, whose 
face can look to heaven; and her final cause is to glorify God through all of her 
body, and to help men in their services to God (Speght 68-69). This argument 
moves the definition of women's virtue from service to men-from worshiping 
God in man-to virtue in herself, and it moves her spirituality from a mediated 
one through men to a direct relationship between herself and her God as she is 
to use her own voice, tongue, hands, and feet in God's service (Speght 69). 
Though the evidence for these causes is mainly Biblical, the structure of the 
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argument appeals to Aristotelian logic A Though she may not have been 
perceived by the annotator of the Yale copy as rational or religious, the extent of 
her use of reasoning, clear structure, and Biblical evidence attempts to create 
for herself the ethos of a good, rational, spiritual woman, who "through the 
down-to-earth, knowledgeable voice of the bourgeois,...argues as teacher and 
preacher to strengthen women and correct men" (Beilin 258). This ethos enacts 
a refutation of the Biblical injunction against women preaching and teaching (1 
Tim. 2:11-12, and see MacLean 18). Because, as Beilin explains, Speght 
"aims to praise God through his work, woman; to encourage women to live up to 
their divinely ordained purpose; and to castigate those who have fallen away 
from the nature of true womanhood" (Beilin 258), the expectations of women 
and the ethos Speght attempts to create for herself as a woman enact and affirm 
each other. 
Both Speght and Sowernam use Christianity to redefine women's nature 
and function, calling on Christians to see misogyny as blasphemy (Speght 78; 
Sowernam 91). They effectively split Christianity and Christian culture from the 
courtly and implicitly pagan culture. Sowernam uses this split to call on 
Christians to think critically about misogyny as an expression of irreverent, 
unchristian patriarchy. For instance, she says 
.. .now let the Christian reader please to consider how dishonestly the 
author dealth, who, undertaking a particular, prosecuteth and 
persecuteth a general: under the cloak and colour of lewd, idle and 
froward women to rage and rail against women in general. 
(Sowernam 92) 
4 This serious response to Speght's pamphlet also deeply undermines the central thesis of Linda 
Woodbridge's Women of the English Renaissance in which she argues that the debate about 
women was not a real debate but a series of witty and humorous texts intended and received as 
simply entertainment. Not only does the sincere tone of several sections of these women's 
pamphlets indicate a legitimate debate, this annotator's sincere and anonymous response to both 
Speght and to her quotes of Swetnam indicates that neither text was perceived as part of a well-
recognized series of humorous pamphlets. 
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This Christian reader is presented as rational and calm in comparison to 
Swetnam, and Sowernam appeals to this reader, as a good Christian, to 
question calmly and rationally the common, negative expectations of women. 
She appeals to the beliefs of the audience, yet her questioning of patriarchy as 
a pagan phenomenon in a Christian culture appeals more to the bourgeois, 
religious audience, than to the humanist court. The argument is an implicit 
insult, for it assumes that the courtly culture was more a classically pagan one 
than a Christian one. Sowernam manipulates the expectations derived from the 
different discourse communities in which her work circulated, playing the 
middle-class values off of the court's humanism. 
Nevertheless, three of these women pamphleteers challenge the 
conventional arguments concerning the "good" woman stereotype, and all of 
these women appropriate, in part, the stereotypes of women's vices, to 
undermine the limitations on their ethos that derived from the conventional 
virtues. Generally, women writers, when not condemned outright, were seen as 
either the ontological type of the "virile woman" or as the "shrew," depending 
primarily on whether the speaker about the woman writer was being generous. 
This ethical judgment of such writers is noted by Grafton and Jardine in their 
study of the Nogarola sisters: 
'Virile' argumentative ability and 'Amazon-like' independence from men 
may make nice points in arguing for the appropriateness of female 
humanistic education. But they can all too readily be seen in a 'real-life' 
context as a socially indecorous absence of modesty and due deference, 
if not as a real social threat-the proverbial husband-beating shrew. 
(Grafton and Jardine 39) 
The "shrew" and the "virile woman," though they denote distinct female types, 
actually delineate the same masculine behaviors in a particular woman. 
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Significantly, the terms not only connote different moral assessments of women 
who develop the "masculine" skills of reasoning and speaking, they indicate 
such women's sexual status as well. As Henderson and McManus, and others, 
point out, the "shrew" or the "scold" is commonly "a married woman who 
controls, nags, and expresses contempt for her husband" (51).5 The "virile" 
woman, when the term was used as praise, usually indicated a virgin, as 
Grafton and Jardine noted about the Nogarola sisters. For instance, when 
Ginevre Nogarola married, she demurely disappeared from Italy's intellectual 
circles (36). Of all the ontological types, the "virile woman's" speech was 
ideologically constructed as potentially reasonable, and so potentially 
persuasive. Yet appropriating the virile woman "type" as a speaking position 
was only a possible solution to the audience's expectations of the 
unacceptability of the woman speaker, for such a woman speaker could easily 
be seen as an unreasonable and dangerous shrew. Because women's best 
rhetorical ornament was defined as their silence, the audience's expectations 
were challenged by these women's very act of writing. These women's public 
pamphlets, which used invective rhetoric to defend women and refutet men, 
indicate that these women may have failed in their analysis of their rhetorical 
situation. Their risky use of invective in their pamphlets critiqued particular 
writers as representatives of the tradition of misogyny and the audience for 
accepting that misogyny. This mockery could easily support patriarchy because 
5 I am here forced to comment on Shakespeare's Kate in Taming of the Shrew. If what I have 
learned is true, I see a possible rereading of Kate, and of Petruchio. For Kate is not married, and is 
more the virginal virago then a true "shrew" or "scold". The sexual predator in the play who begins 
the play complaining about money, and who constantly nags and abuses his partner, is Petruchio. 
I wonder if the ready identification of Kate as the shrew is accurate, because the many ways 
Petruchio exhibits shrew-like behavior, and because he has to be "tamed" into the more accepted 
"masculine" role of patriarch. Though that reading is admittedly far-fetched, I will say that the play 
seems to question the nature of the "shrew" enough to be more a satire on the shrew than a 
straight-forward depiction of it. 
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it may seem to justify men's rejection of women's anger and women's concerns 
(Henderson and McManus 52). All of these pamphleteers speak in anger at 
the risk of being typed as a "shrew" or "scold." As a type, the shrew was mocked 
by anti-women pamphleteers; such mockery undermined the authority of 
assertive women. For instance, by using anger and by appropriating the 
behaviors and words of the scold type, Anger 
discover[s] positive meanings in conventional negative phrases, rather 
than by inventing her own terms of praise (or taking over humanist 
ones)...Through her redefinition of such phrases, Anger takes away from 
antifeminist men the power to define what woman is, but she rejects only 
the negative vision of woman offered by tradition, not the positive ideal. 
(Benson 227) 
Anger condemns men as the source of various evils in women's lives and she 
praises women as superior to men-for Anger, hostility between the sexes is far 
better than the continuing abuse women receive from men (Anger 42). Yet 
there is no historical evidences that these challenges to the audiences's 
expectations persuaded the audience to see women differently. The "feminism" 
failed and the pamphlets fell into obscurity. None of these women's pamphlets 
were reprinted within the first hundred and fifty years after their original printing, 
yet Swetnam's misogynistic pamphlet went through several editions over the 
next hundred years. 
One explanation for these women's risky use of invective rhetoric, as 
Linda Woodbridge posits, derives not from the pamphlets's relationship to 
serious rhetorical genres, but to the literary genre of the debate about women in 
England. This debate genre is highly playful: its attacks against women often 
are little more than a collection of sexist or misogynistic jokes. To a degree, 
these women writers were responding to the invective of the debate genre with 
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a collection of misandrous jokes. Nevertheless, within their extraordinary 
marginalizations (as rejecting the community's beliefs, as presenting women 
writing, as mocking, instead of merely emulating, the accepted genres) these 
women's invective rhetoric occasionally allowed for persuasive or subversive 
speech. For instance, Anger says that she "would call in question that which 
now hath ever been questionless" concerning the relative worth of men and 
women (Anger 32). Effectively, she is arguing for a deep questioning of 
patriarchy. 
By splicing poetry into their work these women indicate that they speak 
not just to the readers and writers of prose, but to the readers and writers of 
poetry as well. Poetry was, of course, a highly respected form of literary 
expression, if only because poetry was more used and read by members of the 
court while prose was the form for the fringe, hack pamphleteers and for the 
more middle class readership. As such, the critique of poetry and the use of 
poetry for invective are underhand critiques of the powerful users of poetry--the 
court. Much of this poetry directly attacks the male literary hacks and their 
misogynistic sources. Sowernam, in the most playful of these poems, with its 
rollicking, mocking rhythm, critiques Swetnam: 
An idle companion was raging of late, 
Who in fury 'gainst women expresseth his hate... 
Any answer may serve an impudent liar 
Any mangy scabbed horse doth fit a scaled squire 
(Sowernam 115) 
But not all of the poetry's playfulness is so evident from its rhythm. Jane Anger 
often directs her invective against men's speech-one line of one of her poems 
claims that "Vile are men's lusts, false are their lying lips besmeared with 
flattery" (Anger 42). Munda's occasional invective is, at least, as harsh as the 
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quote above, and much more typical of the kinds of invective in these 
pamphlets. Munda attacks Swetnam, his audience, and his sources: 
...Could the strain 
Of that your barren, idle, dunghill brain, 
As from a chemic limbeck, so distil 
Your poisoned drops of hemlock: and so fill 
The itching ears of silly swains and rude 
Truth-not discerning rustic multitude 
With sottish lies, with bald and ribald lies 
Patched out of English writers.... 
(Munda 128) 
As hyperbole, this poem mocks the tradition of hyperbolic comments on women, 
including the, then standard, etymological joke of "women" as derived from 
"woe to man." These negative hyperboles confront the convention of the 
hyperbolic praise of women in courtly poetry by using the figure to critique men. 
Munda also uses the poetic convention of curses in her closing poem. After 
long series of small curses she condemns Swetnam's hack-writing: 
...May thy rude quill 
Be always mercenary, and write still 
That which no man will read, unless to see 
Thine ignorance, and then laugh at thee. (Munda 162) 
These pamphleteers's mocking poetry simultaneously writes against some 
poetic conventions and through poetry and its literary conventions. Such writing 
destabilizes artistic speech as potentially seen as superior to prose. This 
destabilizing of the culture's reification of poetry allows these women to deeply 
critique the literary misogyny in men's writings. 
These writers's invective extends to men's ethos and the effects of men's 
misogyny on their rhetoric. Munda depicts men's writing about women as a 
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dynamic relationship among the appropriated sources, the writer's 
incompetence, and the readers's acceptance of sin: 
[W]oman...is generally become the subject of every pendantical goose-
quill. Every fantastic poetaster, which thinks he hath licked the vomit of 
his Coryphaeus and can but patch a hobbling verse together, will strive 
to represent unseemly figments imputed to our sex (a pleasing theme to 
the vulgar) on the public theater: teaching the worser sort, that are more 
prone to luxury, a compendious way to learn to be sinful. (Munda 160) 
For Munda, men write, men read men's writings, and men copy men's writing 
about women, which makes women objects for "public" display and which trains 
more men to the sinful use (or abuse) of women. The "vomit" image here 
indicates this relationship: for to vomit one must first ingest, possibly even 
whole, something rotted or diseased. When contemporary writers take in the 
"rot" of earlier writers misogyny they just spew it forth again. This vomiting 
image is also used by Sowernam, who says that "...our adversary [Joseph 
Swetnam] hath vomited out against women, and not what he hath objected but 
what other authors of more import than Joseph Swetnam have charged against 
women..." (Sowernam 106). Munda's and Sowernam's use of the vomiting 
metaphor effectively captures the mental state of the writer who unthinkingly 
borrows from the misogynistic literary tradition, for it shows that thinking clearly 
and critically is not remotely possible after ingesting the rot of misogyny. As 
Munda and Sowernam present these sources and the writers who cite them, 
these men's reasoning seem diseased and unreliable, which undermines an 
audience's expectations of men's writings as inherently superior to women's 
texts. 
These women also mock these misogynistic writer's thoughtlessness in 
their use of their contemporary sources and in their excessive use of tropes and 
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figures. Munda has several passages complaining of plagiarism, mainly 
arguing that the heavy borrowings do little more than further obscure the 
writers's arguments. For instance, Munda complains that Swetnam's 
"indiscretion is as great in the laying together and compiling of your stolen ware 
as [is] your blockishness in stealing, for your sentences hang together like sand 
without lime" (Munda 142). For Munda, Swetnam's splicings of stolen material 
into his tract results in confusion. Anger noted similar confusion caused by 
men's overuse of "rhetoric"--meaning tropes and figures. Men, Anger argues, 
"run so into rhetoric as oftentimes they overrun the bounds of their own wits, and 
go they know not whither. If they have stretched their invention so hard..there 
remains but one help, which is, to write of us women" (Anger 32). So, not only 
is men's anti-women reasoning diseased, their misogynistic writings are a 
jumble. 
Women are perceived as a relatively easy topic by men with confused 
and diseased imaginations. Such writings against women, for Anger, do not 
convince Anger that women are inherently evil, but instead they convince her to 
expect men's writings to be consistently false: 
Fie on the falsehood of men, whose minds go oft a madding and whose 
tongues cannot so soon be wagging, but straight they fall a-tattling! Was 
there ever so abused, so slandered, so railed upon, or so wickedly 
handled as are we women? (Anger 32) 
Because these writings are "false," men's ethos, as writers's, is seens as being 
comprised of three "qualities": "lust, deceit, and malice." (Anger 32). This 
redefinition of men's ethos, as lustful and malicious, in Anger's pamphlet 
echoes the standard expectations of women's ethos, but redirects those 
expectations on to men's writings. Anger argues that all women should seem to 
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trust men, but should actually believe nothing they say. 
[T]herefore think well of as many as you may, love them that you have 
cause, hear everything that they say (and afford them nods which make 
themselves noddies) but believe very little thereof or nothing at all, and 
hate all those who shall speak anything in the dispraise of our sex. 
(Anger 43) 
The similar depictions of many men's ethos in parts of Sowernam, Munda and 
Anger-that misogynists's reasons are sick, their writings are a mess, and their 
sources inaccurate-function to undermine men's ethos as accepted authorities 
by creating a new and different set of expectations of men as authors. 
Within such questionings of men's authority, not surprisingly, there are a 
few indirect comments on patriarchy. For instance, Sowernam appropriates a 
theological argument for women's inferior status as evidence for questioning 
men's ontological status. Sowernam turns the argument that women are 
inherently "crooked" into an attack on men: 
[If I] admit that this author's [Joseph Swetnam's] doctrine be true, that 
woman receiveth her froward and crooked disposition from the rib, 
woman may then conclude upon that axiom of philosophy...that which 
giveth a quality to a thing, doth more abound in that quality[:]...so, if a 
woman receiveth her crookedness from the rib, and consequently from 
the man, how doth men excel in crookedness, who hath more of those 
crooked ribs? See how this vain, furious, idle author furnisheth woman 
with an argument against himself and others of his sex? (Sowernam 92) 
Sowernam mocks men who make this misogynistic argument. Similarly, Anger 
implicitly critiques the numerous conduct books which define women's 
appropriate gender roles by using the rhetoric of such texts as a brief "conduct" 
manual for men: 
Every honest man ought to shun that which...detracteth both healthe 
and safety from his own person, and strive to bridle his slanderous 
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tongue. Then must he be modest and show his modesty by his virtuous 
and civil behaviors; and not display his beastliness through his wicked 
and filthy words. For lying lips and deceitful tongues are abominable 
before God.... (Anger 38) 
Using the limitations this culture placed on women, Anger indicates the 
hypocrisy of those constrictions. These rare statements in Anger's and 
Sowernam's pamphlets place men in the speaking position socially mandated 
as women's place. Within such a speaking position, men are as silenced as 
women, which indicates that the constraints are not truly inherent to women's 
essence but are a social construct. By getting angry, these women show that 
the "shrew" position benefits the speaker because the shrew's words are less 
constrained than the good woman's words. The influence of women's 
ontological status in the culture, as it shapes those stereotypes and the 
audience's expectations based on those stereotypes, essentializes women as 
Woman and constructs women as one dimensional, as either a good or bad. In 
the next chapter I will discuss how these women use the reputation of the 
pamphlet form, in conjunction with the stereotypes of the shrew and virile 
woman, to construct for themselves personal reputations that are more complex 
than a mere stereotype, and hence to construct for themselves an ethos appeal 




ETHOS AND REPUTATION IN EARLY MODERN WOMEN'S PAMPHLETS 
When Ester Sowernam speaks of Rachel Speght and her work, she 
describes Speght as "a Minister's daughter," "as a maiden," and as "tender...of 
years" (Sowernam 87). Sowernam says that she only "ran over" her 
predecessor's pamphlet (87), but her assessment of Speght's overall ethos is 
generally accurate. Speght's persona, as the demure, virginal, and 
fundamentally obedient young woman, allows her to seem to speak as the 
ontological type of the "good" woman. Nevertheless, when a woman published 
her work, she was usually seen as "symbolically violating] feminine modesty by 
exposing private thoughts to the world" (Goreau 15) and was regarded as 
verbally "loose," an attribute which "paralleled big spending" (Jones 55). The 
particular reputation that the woman writer or speaker fashions for herself plays 
a significant role in establishing her ethos as acceptable to a particular 
audience and to the community generally. Only Rachel Speght, of all the 
women pamphleteers under consideration here, could have been personally 
known to members of her primary audience, the middle-class readers of 
London. The other three writers were almost certainly personally unknown to 
their audience--two of the writers used pseudonyms to obscure their identities 
and the third writer, Jane Anger, was either one of several women who had that 
name or was another pseudonymous writer. In this chapter, I will look the 
dynamics of these women's fashioning of their personal reputations; yet first I 
will discuss the particular reputation connoted by the virile woman stereotype 
that these pamphleteers attempt to appropriate. 
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Neither the virile woman or the shrew were fundamentally "civic" 
speaking positions, nor did the position compel a public or a male audience to 
listen, though such speakers were seen as potentially very engaging. As 
Grafton and Jardine explain about the Nogarola sisters, the prospect of these 
women using their learning to engage in civic discourse was couched by their 
humanist colleagues as legendary. 
Here the virtue of the Nogarola sisters is characterized in two ways, 
neither of them 'civic': first, the sisters are indubitable virgins (Ginevre in 
fact fades from the scene when she marries); secondly, they are 
represented as sisters in spirit to various magnificent women of classical 
antiquity. Humanists-male humanists-praising the Nogarola sisters 
liken them routinely to Sapho, Cornellia, Aspasia, Portia....The strategy of 
all such compliments is the same: they shift the focus of praise away from 
the engaged and civic (women speaking publicly), making figurative 
purity and iconic Amazon valour the object of attention. 
(Grafton and Jardine 36) 
By turning the Nogarola sisters into living legends, the humanists silenced 
these women-generally legends do not engage in current intellectual debate or 
speak in the contemporary public forum. Where such historical references to 
great women could undermine misogynistic stereotypes, as I discussed in 
chapter five, such references when applied to "real" women allowed men to 
dismiss them with a feather-light touch. 
More significantly, the "virile woman" problematized the Renaissance 
bifurcation of gender roles. By affirming women's appropriation of masculine 
behaviors in the abstract, patriarchal writers celebrated masculine gender roles. 
But when living women practiced those behaviors, they undermined patriarchal 
power structures because the practice indicated that sex need not constrain a 
person to various roles, including those masculine leadership roles which 
justified the patriarchal culture. The virile woman excelled in "rationality, 
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courage, and physical strength" (Jordan 137), and troubled the "masculine" 
nature of these gender roles by proving that these characteristics are not 
inherently connected to biological sex. The Renaissance humanist men were 
aware of the gender trouble caused when a woman excelled in the male 
province of humanist education. For instance, Quirini, when asked his opinion 
of the practical and moral value of educating women, responded in praise of 
humanist education generally, but questioned whether such education in a 
woman would be becoming, or even moral (Grafton and Jardine 33). By 
equivocating, Quirini continued the promotion of a humanist, rhetorical, and 
civic education as a means to develop a student's virtues, while still prohibiting 
such education for women. 
As important in Renaissance culture as morality is, for women gender 
decorum-being "becoming" or having an excellent reputation-significantly 
shaped much of their social and economic lives. In the polis, human action is 
"limited by certain accepted notions of decorum which define what constitutes 
proper speech [and behavior]" (Hampton 19). Within the context of 
Renaissance gender decorum a woman was expected both to actually fashion 
herself as some version of the "good woman type" and to consistently and 
continuously "seem" to be "good" as well. 
The woman existed supposedly to marry, to give birth, and to keep quiet. 
Her marriage prospects were assessed on the basis of her reputation 
(not all fathers could afford to tempt suitors with huge dowries). A woman 
would not get far in the marriage market if she was said to be a witch or a 
whore. Notice that it is the woman who is spoken about; she herself was 
not meant to be a speaker. The woman who did speak out, who cursed 
or yelled or argued with men, was said to be a scold or a shrew and 
regarded as little better than a whore. So a woman's 'value', which in fact 
meant her social place and, eventually, her sense of herself, derived 
from what the 'world' said about her. Her reputation depended rather 
more upon other people's verbal assessments of her than her own 
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capabilities. (Shepherd 11-12) 
To be seen as a "shrew," or worse, could lead to ostracism, "justified" abuse to 
"tame" such a woman, or the grueling poverty generally experienced by 
unmarried women. 
Women were not only written upon by the oral text of the community's 
gossip about them, as Shepherd argues, their reputations could easily effect 
their self-esteem. Unlike the notion of "self-fashioning" that Greenblatt argues is 
common among the Renaissance men--where men shaped their public selves 
to accommodate the expectations of their community-Renaissance women's 
"self-fashioning" was neither unidirectional nor delineated by a public/private 
split. A woman's reputation could shape her as much, or even more than, she 
shaped it. Many of the conduct books, printed lectures, homilies, and, 
especially, satires which were aimed at women readers and which discussed 
those women who transgressed gender decorum, presented women as little 
more than what they seemed to be, and subtly encouraged women to equate 
their self-esteem with their reputations (see Jones 40). 
The power of reputation is not lost on the women pamphleteers, or on 
their twentieth century critics. For instance, Benson discusses Jane Anger's act 
of writing in the context of the reputation writing could give to Anger. Benson 
posits that Anger constructs a "good reputation" for herself by justifying her 
writing as the expression of anger and by apologizing for the resulting 
vehemence in her words. As Anger says, and Benson quotes: 
Shall surfeiters rail on our kindness, you stand still and say naught: and 
shall not anger stretch the veins of her brains, the strings of her fingers, 
and the lists of her modesty to answer their surfeitings? Yes truly. And 
herein I conjure all you to aid and assist me in defense of my willingness, 
which shall make me rest at your commands. 
113 
(Anger 32; also Benson 226) 
Anger's depiction of her writing, as pushing the limits of her "modesty," and her 
justification of her writing, as caused by anger, opens a space for her to use 
vehement speech while allowing her to claim that she is a "good" woman. As 
Benson describes this implicit argument: 
Self-defense...is an implicit component of all defenses, but while male 
authors defend their right to speak on such a subject, Anger defends her 
right to speak at all. Her defense is not her wisdom or even her 
experience, but her anger, which drives her to this act, which is at the 
limits of modesty. (Benson 227) 
Anger implicitly claims that she is not a shrew through her admission of the 
power of her modesty, which here stands for the whole system of female gender 
decorum, to bind her actions. Benson sees this implied argument as anger 
redeeming Anger "morally because it portrays her writing as unpremeditated 
and her bashfulness as overcome by passion but still active in her--she must 
apologize and ask understanding for what she has done" (226). Anger's 
justification for her writing is not only a moral one, it is also rhetorical. She is 
attempting to create for herself the reputation of the rational, strong, 
courageous, virile woman. 
Nevertheless, Anger's ethos could be read as shrewish if we assume the 
author is not sincere in her words. As several modern critics have noted, the 
shrew's reputation could have a number of uses. For instance, the shrew could 
be seen as a vehicle for social and political criticism (Purkiss 84) and as a 
literary device for depicting a sexual predator (Grafton and Jardine 41). But 
commonly, shrews were worthy only of mockery which 
sought to maintain patriarchy by demonstrating to women that loud and 
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aggressive behavior was unacceptable and by communicating to men 
that they need not take the demands of such women seriously. 
(Henderson and McManus 52) 
Where the virile woman could be dismissed with a feather-light touch, the shrew 
was often silenced with a sledgehammer. 
The culturally mandated condemnation of women thinkers resulted in the 
deep seated taboo against women as writers. Even within the limited arena of 
religious testifying, as Jones notes from a study of early seventeenth century 
conduct books, a backlash against women writers was developing (40). In 
probably more direct response to the "shrew" type, the contemporary marriage 
manuals "monitorfed] women's speech indoors and out, on the assumption that 
natural female garrulity must be carefully controlled in the interests of the 
domestic unit" (Jones 59). Generally, then, there were two obstacles to a 
woman becoming a writer: 1) education 2) societal norms: 
The sense of intellectual inferiority or illegitimacy that a superficial 
education could create constituted the most obvious impediment to 
literary ambition for a woman of the seventeenth century. There was, 
however, a much more subtle and complex inhibition that women 
repeatedly mentioned as a reason they hesitated to publish their work: 
feminine modesty. (Goreau 9) 
The taboo against women writers, in conjunction with the humility women were 
"naturally" expected to emulate and their lack of sufficient education, could 
easily have silenced many women. The taboo itself was not without bite for, as 
Goreau notes, critics of women's works were likely to mock, jeer, flout and 
verbally lacerate these women (Goreau 17-18). Goreau sees women writers's 
repeated denials of responsibility for their works, like Jane Anger's claim that 
"anger" is responsible for her words, as a response to such attacks (Goreau 17-
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18). 
Yet, as I discussed in my introduction, the humility topos--the feminine 
apologia for writing-is more than a response to the harsh attacks women 
receive when they break the decorum of feminine silence, it is also an attempt to 
construct one's personal reputation as humble or modest despite the breach of 
the gender role. Munda, for instance, attempts to both protect herself from attack 
and to construct her personal reputation in her use of the humility topos: 
Though feminine modesty hath confined our rarest and ripest wits, we 
acknowledge it our greatest ornament....Being too much provoketh by 
arraignments, baitings and rancorous impeachments of the reputation of 
our whole sex [I believe the]....opportunity of speaking [when] slipped by 
silence is as bad as importunity upheld by babbling Know therefore 
that we [women] will cancel your [Swetnam's] accusations, traverse your 
bills, and come upon you for false indictment--and think not 'tis our 
waspishness that shall sting you. (Munda 132) 
Like Anger, Munda justifies her vehemence as the expression of valid, ethical 
fury against the railer Swetnam. Yet, here, the concurrence of the humility 
topos--the celebration of it in the "rarest and ripest wits" of womankind--with the 
attack on slander indicates the connection between these rhetorical moves: 
both are active bids to control the talk that shaped these women's lives. 
If the humility topos is actually an assertive creation of one's own 
reputation, then the common assumption that these authors used pseudonyms 
out of humility also needs to be reconsidered. Both Henderson and McManus, 
and Beilin, have concluded that these pamphleteers used pseudonyms to 
protect their reputations against public censure and to express sincere modesty. 
Beilin specifically assumes that the pseudonyms are an expression of the 
women's "anxiety" over the possiblity that they may be humiliated (248). 
Henderson and McManus show fully the logic embedded in this argument: 
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The fact that the women...used pseudonyms although most of the men 
in the controversy published either anonymously or under their own 
names also indicates the daring required at this time for a woman to 
published anything but works of a strictly devotional nature....When even 
ordinary women of the time saw the publication of a book by a woman as 
a symptom of mental instability, it is no wonder that women used 
pseudonyms. (Henderson and McManus 23) 
Certainly, concluding that the writers used pseudonyms as a reaction to 
excessively cruel critiques and as a protection of their "modest" reputations is 
reasonable; I do not contest this conclusion, but I find that it is only partial. It 
fails to recognize that these women writers have, simply in the act of writing, 
challenged the accepted notions of women and have acted, instead of reacted, 
to the railers against them. Simply the fact that they wrote is evidence that the 
use of both the humility topos and the pseudonyms needs to be read as an 
intentional, and rhetorical, action instead of as a reaction. 
Margaret Ezell notes that readings of sixteenth and seventeenth century 
women's pseudonyms, like Henderson and McManus's and Beilin's, are "based 
on a sense of the ways in which nineteenth century women used the 
convention" (Ezell 35) and that such readings of "earlier women writers cast a 
pitying glance on the practice of using pseudonyms" (Ezell 35). Ezell reminds 
the reader of the need to understand these women within the context of their 
own historical time instead of reading them from the norms of nineteenth and 
twentieth century culture. Unlike more recent women writers, who used 
pseudonyms to hide their sex in reaction to cultural pressures, Ezell argues that 
Renaissance women writers did not so disguise themselves: 
Pseudonyms and anonymous publication are seen [by modern critics 
reading ahistorically] as protective strategies because they effectively 
hide the author's sex and enable her to simultaneously preserve her 
"modesty" while receiving a fair hearing. However, in the sixteenth and 
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seventeenth centuries, unlike in the nineteenth century, we do not find 
women using pseudonyms to hide their sex. The pseudonyms chosen--
Orinda, Astrea, Ardelia, Ephelia, Corinna-clearly signal the writer's sex. 
Nor was the use of this type of pseudonym a marginal literary practice-
we have Poliarchus (Sir Charles Cottrell), Philaretus (Robert Boyle), 
Thyrsis (Rochester), and Damon (a favorite of several men, including the 
sober John Locke). The use of a pseudonym did serve to create a 
literary persona, but in the Renaissance and seventeenth century, one 
finds these names are gender specific. (Ezell 36) 
In the pamphlets, the use of pseudonyms are also gender specific (Thomas Tel-
troth, Joan Hit-him-home) and widely used, often to create a persona (Adam 
Foule-weather) or to indicate subject matter (Simon Smel-knave) (Clark 29). 
The pseudonyms may have provided some protection, but they primarily 
delineated the writer's reputation. 
Though I see pseudonyms as I see the humility topos--as intentional 
rhetorical devises for creating the personal reputation appropriate to a 
successful ethos-Purkiss, using observations similar to my own, argues that 
these pseudonyms indicate that the implied authors of these texts are ironic 
constructs instead of sincere female voices. Though I must apologize for what 
will be an extremely long quote, I wish to present Purkiss's argument fully 
because it challenges two of my more significant premises-that the actual 
authors of these texts are fundamentally sincere, though often joking on the 
surface, and that the gendered signatures indicate the gender of the implied 
author. Purkiss would not agree with me, and would argue that my position is 
an ahistorical reading: 
I would like to consider the function of female pseudonyms in the context 
of a popular culture which sometimes placed gender indeterminacy in its 
festive repertoire, and to suggest that the pamphlets provide several 
clues to the kind of female voice figured in them. Read beside names 
like "Mary Stiff" and "Virgin Want," names like "Jane Anger" and "Ester 
Sowernam" seem to point less towards a substantive female author too 
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modest to put her name in print than to the texts themselves, placing 
them not as the product of particular people but as operative parts of a 
particular strand of symbolism which had become a textual game. Often 
read by feminist critics as tropes of modesty, the specificity of these 
pseudonyms rather foregrounds female unruliness. The pseudonyms 
create a speaking position for the respondents not outside but at the 
centre of the woman debate's citations, from allegories ('Constantia' and 
'Prudentia') to Biblical heroines ('Ester') and scold and unruly women of 
the lower orders ('Jane Anger', 'Joan Sharp', 'Mary Tattle-well'). These 
names are themselves part of a rhetoric of citation, indicating not 
individuality but the circulation of names in culture, not proper names but 
improper stories. Products of the woman-debate genre, the names also 
attach the speaking voices of the pamphlets firmly to particular debating 
roles, often the role of the respondent. "Sowernam," for example, is 
simply the opposite of Swe(e)tnam, sour (like scolds and shrews) where 
he is sweet....[T]he names under which the pamphlets appear mean that 
though they purport to be by women, the reader is invited to see this as a 
penetrable screen identity, a theatrical performance of femininity which 
indicates a joke at women's expense. The names do not clearly illustrate 
female agency; rather, they illustrate the taking-up of the position of a 
disorderly woman for the purpose of signifying disorder of some kind, 
domestic or political. (Purkiss 84) 
I agree with several of Purkiss's observations: the pseudonyms represent more 
than an expression of modesty; the shrew type is invoked, though possibly 
unwillingly, by these pamphleteers; the names chosen by these writers function 
as a rhetoric of citation to other writers in the genre or to other stories; the use of 
pseudonyms are theatrical to an extent; and certainly these texts are 
responding to earlier attacks. Nevertheless, I do not agree with several of her 
other conclusions, or with the duality which she sees as separating the "serious" 
defenses of women from the joking around that occurred in much of the woman 
debate, or with her final silencing of the "women," as marked by these 
signatures, as little more than allegories for domestic or political disorder. 
Though I do not deny that the woman-debate genre included a good bit 
of joking around and theatricality, and that some of the pseudonyms proclaim 
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unruly behavior, I question whether Purkiss's position successfully accounts for 
the pseudonymous writers under consideration in this dissertation: neither the 
names Constantia Munda (Moral Constancy) or Ester Sowernam indicate the 
kind of satire, as, say, "Mary Tattle-well" does. I agree that "Jane Anger" might 
indicate merely female unruliness and satire: except that her name may be as 
real as Rachel Speght's.i Simon Shepherd found three currently living Jane 
Angers, and another three Joan Angers whose Christian name was often 
signed as Jane, residing in and around London (Shepherd 30). Shepherd also 
argues that "Jane" is not "one of the Christian names commonly associated with 
aggressive female types (compare Moll, Meg, Kate, Frank)" (Shepherd 30). I 
agree with Purkiss that the use of pseudonyms plays along with the satiric 
conventions in the genre, but I do not read these pseudonyms, if pseudonyms 
all these names be, as completely eliding a sincere or serious female implied 
author. Also, though I agree that the pseudonyms represent "penetrable screen 
identities," and even invite considerations of the ethos of the implied authors, I 
seriously doubt that they indicate solely allusions to domestic and political 
unruliness, and are not references to female identity and status. 
More significantly, I believe that Purkiss allows herself to assume a false 
dichotomy by reading the implied authors of these pamphlets as either sincere 
women writers or playful constructs for domestic and political satire. Purkiss, 
like Woodbridge before her, cannot account for such writers as Speght, who 
seriously participated in a genre which they see as widely understood as 
merely a sophisticated game. Instead, Purkiss and Woodbridge either ignore 
1 Linda Woodbridge, in a seminal book on the Renaissance woman debate, argued that much of 
the debate was an elaborate game, mainly comprised of sophisticated and not so sophisticated 
jokes. Unfortunately, Woodbridge failed to recognize the possibility that underneath the joking 
around there could be a serious debate about women. Since her work it has been impossible to 
read the pamphlets without an awareness of the humor involved. 
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evidence that the Swetnam debate was read as seriously arguing about 
women's status~as Speght's work indicates--or argue that readers such as 
Speght just did not get the joke. Unlike Purkiss and Woodbridge, I believe that 
an overlapping of sorts exists between the ethos of the serious author and that 
of the rhetorical, playful voice. As Beilin posits, the evidence from both the 
serious and playful speech in these works indicates an awareness of the 
conventions of the genre and a serious attempt to critique the anti-women 
assumptions embedded in many of those conventions: 
[M]ore likely, "Jane Anger" was a useful and appropriate persona to 
begin the task [of rebutting attacks on women], just as "Constantia 
Munda" was an appropriate pseudonym for the defender of women's 
fortitude under oppression. Once more, it is important to understand the 
choice of genre....[T]he formal controversy over women had developed 
as an elaborate rhetorical game, a series of conventional arguments for 
or against women....Rachel Speght, Ester Sowernam, [and] Constantia 
Munda...took up the old genre specifically to undermine the game and to 
discredit the perpetrators. (Beilin 249) 
Beilin, unlike Woodbridge and Purkiss, recognizes that these writers could 
participate in the jokes of the genre but to serious and sincere intent. As their 
awareness of the game indicates, these women polemicists construct a 
reputation for themselves not only from the ontological type of the virile woman 
that they attempt to emulate, but from the conventions in and reputation of the 
discourse they choose to appropriate. Unlike Henderson and McManus and 
others who read the Renaissance woman debate primarily through its topical 
appeals, critics like Shepherd and Beilin recognize the rhetoric involved in 
these pamphlets's form. 
Woodbridge, for instance, basis her argument about the pamphlets on 
changing the reputation conferred on the authors by the pamphlet form. 
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Woodbridge reads the entire genre as involved in a literary game, and as a 
series of sophisticated jokes, so any evidence indicating that these writers were 
sincere undermines her perspective. Not surprisingly, Woodbridge insists on 
redefining these "pamphlets" as not truly "pamphlets" at all: 
It is customary to refer to a number of documents in these...controversies 
as pamphlets and to the Swetnam controversy in particular as a 
"pamphlet war." Pamphlet, however, is an insidious term: it denotes 
merely a literary work bound in a particular way, but since it connotes 
hasty composition, ephemerality, a popular and undiscriminating 
readership, and hack work, it is prejudicial to the serious consideration of 
these works. (Renaissance authors more often call their opponents's 
work pamphlets than their own.) The term is misleading, too, in its 
conjured image of inflammatory rhetoric (usually in prose) and fervor-
approaching zealotry--for a cause: I want to argue for considerable 
aesthetic detachment and a sense of play in the formal controversy, 
which especially in Tudor times was often conducted in poetry: its 
authors should not be envisioned as pamphleteers. (Woodbridge 7) 
Though both Woodbridge and I agree on the appropriate application of the 
denotation of "pamphlet" to indicate the physical form of these works, I also find 
that the connotation of "pamphlet" is applicable to these polemics. Woodbridge 
rejects any reading that these works are "hasty in composition," "ephemeral," 
"popular," and "hack work:" simultaneously, she denies the potential for sincerity 
in these works by rejecting the "inflammatory" nature of their rhetoric or the 
"fervor" of their appeals, favoring instead a reading of the "aesthetic 
detachment" she sees as infusing them. Yet her argument for aesthetic 
detachment and considered composition is not readily supported by the texts: 
Sowernam never fully completes the argument she sets out, Munda complains 
of having to work hastily, and Speght asks forgiveness for not answering 
Swetnam's charges against widows. The texts are often little more than hack 
work: Munda's first few sentences are barely understandable and Anger's 
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allegory is barely decipherable. Not only are the texts plagued with evidence of 
hasty composition, they were truly occasional, ephemeral pieces: unlike 
Swetnam's often reprinted diatribe, the defenders's texts were each printed 
once in the century. Woodbridge's final claim is that the rhetoric of the works is 
more aesthetic than inflammatory, yet I have already freely quoted these 
writers's use of inflammatory rhetoric and vehement arguments, and I will be 
including several more such quotes. 
More fundamental to Woodbridge's reading of the texts is her notion of 
the primary audience for these texts. She insists on seeing the topic of the 
debate about women as uniting the middle class pamphlets with the similar 
debate then occurring in Renaissance literary circles: she see the "debate about 
women" as a formal quality instead of as a topical one. By confusing a topic 
with a form, she bridges the class and context gaps separating the mainly 
middle class pamphlets from courtier poetry, and so insists that the pamphlets 
were written with the same "aesthetic detachment" she sees as informing the 
courtly work. Yet the court's primary mode of exchanging written material was in 
sharing manuscripts, with only occasional collection of works being printed in 
the author's lifetime. The pamphlets, however, were printed material, primarily 
in prose instead of the more courtly poetry, prepared for sale at the booksellers 
and, so, were marked for mass consumption by middle class readers. 
Woodbridge does not recognize the primary audience the pamphlets appeal to 
through their medium and their mode of distribution; she instead argues that 
"we are not in the presence of Renaissance Attitudes Toward Women[;] we are 
in the presence of art" (Woodbridge 45). Despite Woodbridge's attempt to 
redeem the pamphlet war by calling it a "formal controversy" and by claiming 
that the participants were artists, she fails to delineate the formal appeals 
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accurately and confuses topical appeals with formal ones. 
I suspect both an interest in delineating the characteristics of these 
pamphleteers's reputations and the malleability between topical and generic 
conventions lead some modern feminists to examine "defense of women" as the 
topic appears in several Renaissance genres. Wellington, for instance, looks at 
pro- and anti-feminist thought in Renaissance poetry, especially in the 
Petrarchan traditions (Wellington 2ff). Jordan recognizes that her categorization 
of the Renaissance topic "defense of women" does not prove the existence of a 
unified genre, but is instead a creation of the selection process she imposes on 
her primary sources: 
Many are straightforward "defenses of women;" some are didactic works, 
devoted to celebrating and at the same time circumscribing the nature of 
"women;" and, more problematic, a few are overtly misogynistic diatribes 
that by portraying the sturdy reliance of their objects of scorn often 
transform blame into a kind of grudging or implied praise. In toto, they 
cover (that is, I have chosen to see feminist argument in) a range of 
genres: histories, conduct books, treatises on governments, letters, 
popular and courtly dialogues, and prose romances. (Jordan 12) 
Jordan's sensitivity to the arbitrary nature of her choices for sorting her primary 
sources, though admirable, indicates a significant difference between the 
nature of a genre and the nature of a topic. Where a topic is amorphous in the 
form it can be expressed in, a genre is often defined primarily through its formal 
conventions. The less a particular work includes the formal conventions of a 
particular genre, the less likely that the work will be categorized as belonging to 
that genre. The result of this definition of a genre is that shared topical appeals 
do not necessarily result in similar generic designations, nor can such shared 
topical appeals alone be considered as solid evidence for a designating a work 
as belonging to a paticular genre. 
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Yet several significant feminist scholars of the Renaissance, like 
Woodbridge, Benson, and Ferguson, have confused the topical similarities of 
the "defense of women" with the generic nature of these works, which results in 
misreadings about the reputation the pamphlet form may confer on the writer. 
For instance, Benson notes that humanist thought occurs in some of the 
continental marriage manuals and in many of the defenses of Elizabeth's rule. 
Yet Benson repeatedly expresses surprise when she fails to find humanist 
thought in the popular defenses of women. She assesses the genre of the 
popular, polemical defense of women against the standards of humanist 
thought, which she believes was the Renaissance cornerstone for liberating 
ideas about women. Not surprisingly, the polemics strike her as reactionary: 
[Humanist thought] is almost entirely absent from the debate about 
women as it appears in original works by English writers for the popular 
press....[T]hese native English works do not challenge the traditional 
valuation of women on the basis of their sexual purity; nor do they 
employ the rhetorical methods of paradox; nor do they engage in a 
serious analysis of women's social role....Both the satire and the 
sentimentality suggest that the desire to reform morals back to 
standards that have been abandoned is the occasion for these works, 
rather than the humanist desire to rethink social structures and their 
components. Under cover of titles that suggest the new, they defend the 
old. They represent a resistance movement.... (Benson 205) 
The "new" for Benson is humanism, and humanist thought becomes for Benson 
a genre marker for pro-woman writings. Yet the pamphlet form generally 
followed the interests of its primary audience, the middle-class. Humanist 
thought was primarily a courtly and continental phenomenon, and those works 
which included humanist thought marked themselves as appealing to the 
courtier readership more than to the middle-class. Though humanist thinkers 
and middle-class writers may share similar interests, that similarity is not formal, 
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but topical, and so is not evidence for a genre which spans the conventional 
courtly writings and bourgeoisie ones. 
Ferguson, like Benson, presumes that a shared topic indicates a shared 
genre, and so includes the popular "defenses of women" into an overarching 
genre of "feminist polemics." This genre, however, shares more with the topical 
characteristics of feminist thought than it shares the formal qualities of a 
polemic. For instance, her forth subcategory of the "feminist polemics," which 
she calls "polemics of the heart," focuses on the private writings of women about 
their affection for other women: 
The fourth category of feminist polemic I see present includes works 
about relationships and daily living that celebrates love and friendship 
between women....Unlike the other polemic categories, personal polemic 
has several unique characteristics. Reactive, sustained and intermittent 
polemic all attack misogyny, educational deprivation, marital tyranny 
(and allied matters) and clearly target an audience that opposes 
maltreatment of women. Such polemic is overly propagandistic and 
didactic and either implicitly or explicitly agitates for an end to 
disadvantage or abuse. In personal polemic, writings about love and 
friendship attack or subvert patriarchal domination quite differently, 
through affirming women in their support and love of one another. 
Although some were intended for publication, the forms of secret polemic 
tend to be of a more personal nature-letters, diaries, memories, closet 
dramas, and private love poems. (Ferguson 31) 
Ferguson's notion of a "personal" polemic, which primarily celebrates love and 
friendship, resembles more the modern feminist topics of female connectivity 
and the love shared among women than it resembles the form of the polemic. 
"Reactive," "sustained," and "intermittent" feminist polemic each are defined as 
public expressions of feminist anger: through rebutting an attack ("reactive"), 
arguing for a "change in women's condition" ("sustained") or calling for social 
change in the text of another kind of piece ("intermittent") (Ferguson 28-30). 
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Each of these polemic forms includes some of the conventions associated with 
the polemic, especially the public nature of such writings. Nevertheless, 
Ferguson has obscured the nature of the polemical defenses which do exist in 
the period by including these diaries, personal letters, and private poetry as a 
subcategory. Like Benson's search for humanist thought in the popular 
pamphlets, Ferguson does not delineate the topic from the form, and so she 
creates for her study a "genre" that does not share formal conventions. She then 
presumes that the genre she delineates is unified and recognized by these 
authors as a distinct genre. Her attempt to construct a broad category of 
"feminist polemics" suggests that the pro-women writers were numerous, and 
that such writers would have a reputation more for their political and social 
statements-like modern feminists--and less for their actual writing. Certainly, 
the women pamphleteers's pro-women arguments shaped their reputations, yet 
still they were primarily writers, not political activists who belong to a movement, 
as Ferguson's categories implicitly suggest. 
Though Ferguson fails to recognize the difference between the shared 
topical appeals in these works and the formal conventions used to present 
those topics, her notion of "reactive polemic" does accurately depict the 
pamphlets I am considering here: 
Usually fierce in tone and intensity, feminist response returned blow for 
blow, rebuffed arguments, and structured into their responses the need 
for rebuttal. The feminist writers adopted independent, no-nonsense 
stances and challenged not only the offending male writer but the 
behavior of men in general. (Ferguson 31) 
Other than Ferguson's assertion that these women structured their works to 
encourage response, which represents an argument about the author's 
intention that can never be satisfactorily proven, this description is valid for 
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these pamphlets. Her description of the tone, as a suggestion of the implied 
author's personality, highlights the connection between ethos and genre. Yet 
her descriptions, though valid, are marred by her misreadings of the pamphlet 
genre as a form. 
Much of Woodbridge's description of the tracts themselves includes more 
shrewd readings of the pamphlets, yet her argument that they are both artistic 
works and sophisticated jokes, instead of serious polemics and sincere 
defenses, again misconstrues both the nature of the audience primarily 
appealed to by the pamphlets and the relationship between the topical appeal 
of the "defense of women" and the genre used to present that topic. 
Nevertheless, she does accurately depict several of these pamphlets's shared 
features: 
All [of the works of the formal controversy] foster a sense of genuine 
debate....All works of the formal controversy address the nature of woman 
in general....All works of the formal controversy use exempla--historical 
and/or literary examples, usually biblical and classical in origin, of good 
women....All formal controversies argue their case theoretically, relying 
heavily on abstractions....The characteristic literary modes of the formal 
controversy are the classical oration and the dialogue. The former 
employs a single persona, the latter two or more speakers. 
(Woodbridge 14) 
All of these characteristics occur, to some extent, in these women's pamphlets. 
Yet Woodbridge inaccurately claims that "all formal works deal exclusively with 
the nature of Woman," which is not accurate for these pamphlets: Anger closely 
reads and critiques Boke his Surfeit, railing especially against the court poets 
who slander women for not returning their affections; Speght discusses the 
ethics of wife beating; Sowernam merrily "arraigns" Swetnam for his 
Arraignment, and Munda partially develops an ethic for men's treatment of their 
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mothers. These writers do not slavishly constrain themselves to issues of 
women's ontological status, and the development of that topic as a primary 
focus does not function as a formal convention despite Woodbridge's argument 
that this topic links the items of the genre of the "formal controversy" together. 
Yet these texts are among the ones she most heavily relies on to establish that 
genre. Without that topical tie, the pamphlet's other characteristics easily 
associate them with several other kinds of pamphlets: marriage manuals, 
Mother's advise books, religious tracts, and others. The personal reputations 
that she implicitly presumes for these writers resemble the reputations of the 
court poets, like Marlowe or Donne, because she implicitly assumes that their 
artistic detachment is almost ironic. As with Ferguson and Benson, I find that 
the genre that Woodbridge is attempting to delineate is too amorphous to truly 
function as a genre. Instead, I accept Wright's and Clark's categorization of 
these pamphlets under the broader headings of "defense" and "polemic," 
indicating similar formal and conventional features within these texts without 
raising the question of their connections as a genre through a shared topic. I 
read these writer's personal reputations as constructed in and by the pamphlet 
form, through Clark's and Wright's histories of the form, and I do not presume 
that the pro-women pamphlets were part of a larger pro-women genre. 
In making the distinction between the audiences appealed to in courtly 
poetry and middle-class prose, I do not wish to bifurcate art from society, or 
rhetoric from aesthetics, or the courtier class from the bourgeoisie, as 
Woodbridge implicitly does. More useful, I believe, is an awareness that the 
Renaissance society, like any other, was a mishmash of culture, experience, 
individual interests and societal pressures. In such a flotsam, I believe that a 
more accurate way of speaking of such abstracts as "art" would be to argue that 
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a particular object or idea will likely appeal more to one specific kind of 
audience than to another--for instance, sonnets would appeal more to the 
courtiers, and could then be used to attract the interest of such a readership and 
could be used to indicate the author's reputation as a courtier. Woodbridge's 
implied argument, that when we are in the presence of art we cannot also be in 
the presence of Renaissance attitudes towards women, oversimplifies the 
flexibility of both art and attitudes, and fails to recognize that qualities of both art 
and serious debate can be used to appeal to an audience. Simultaneously, if a 
particular topic or form appeals more to a certain kind of audience, then it 
follows that a predominate use of that topic or form indicates an appeal to that 
kind of audience: for instance, printed editions of sermons in the Renaissance 
usually appealed to a middle-class, often Puritan, audiences, even though 
poetry may be discussed in those sermons. Finally, the inclusion of a topic or 
form which consistently appealed to a particular audience can be read as an 
appeal to that audience, even if that topic or form is couched in another genre 
that would not normally appeal to that audience. For instance, all of the 
pamphlets I consider in this dissertation include poetry, and so can be seen as 
also appealing to a courtier readership as well as to middle-class readers. 
Finally, Woodbridge's argument that the pamphlet writers's disliked the 
term "pamphlet" for its negative connotations fails to make her point that these 
pamphlet writers see their own work as artistic. Instead, the term "pamphlet," 
when used to belittle an opponent, belongs to a common pamphleteer 
convention in which authors write scathing critiques of their competition and 
audience (Shepherd 11). For instance, Munda attacks Swetnam for his 
plagiarism: 
Lord! how you have cudgeled your brains in gleaning multitudes of 
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similes, as 'twere, in the field of many writers, and threshed them together 
in the flour of your own devisor--and all to make a poor confused 
mescelline: whereas thine own barren soiled soul is not able to yield the 
least congruity of speech. 'Tis worthy laughter what pains you have taken 
in turning over Parismus, what use you make of the Knight of the Sun, 
what collections out of Euphues, Amadis a Gaul, and the rest of Don 
Quixote's library, sometimes exact tracing of Aesopical fables and 
Valerius Maximus, with the like school-boys' books. So that if these 
pamphleteers would severally pluck a crow of you,...let every bird take 
his own feather and you would be as naked as Aesop's jay. (Munda 141) 
Not only does Swetnam's plagiarism indicate a lack of originality, his sources 
are merely school boys's books and pamphlets: such a use of the term 
"pamphlet" does not necessarily indicate that the writer sees her own work as 
more artistic than other pamphlets, instead it undermines the opponents's 
reading for being immature. 
Attacks on other pamphleteers and humble apologies for the quality of 
one's own works are usually a response to the pamphlet form's reputation and 
the effects that reputation has on the writer's own reputation, as Clark argues. 
Pamphleteering was an occupation of low status and a bad reputation. 
Many of those engaged in it, especially university graduates and others 
who regarded or presented themselves as gentlemen, either tried to 
claim superiority for their own work or deliberately demeaned what they 
were currently writing and boasted of better things to come. (Clark 27) 
Clark's argument, that such boasts were both a response to the bad reputation 
associated with pamphleteering and an attempt to control one's personal 
reputation, recognizes that such claims are a rhetorical devise and are not 
indicative of an attempt to present the work as art. Generally, the pamphlet form 
created expectations in the audience about the kind of person who would write 
in that form, and so the form limited the kinds of ethos appeals available to 
2 I do not here mean to suggest the humility topos, simply the common, ungendered apologia for 
the quality of one's work. 
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pamphlet writers. 
The pamphlet form is highly conventional, even antithetical to much 
original work, and those conventions infuse the women polemists's works. 
Many of these conventions limited further the kinds of reputation an author 
could construct for herself in the genre. For instance, as Clark points out, 
dedications were conventionally paired, one humble, the other mocking either 
an "ignorant patron" or the "humble reader" (Clark 26-27). All four of these 
women's polemics include such dedications, with only Munda playing enough 
with the convention that she used poetry instead of prose and allegory instead 
of a plain style. Misread, the more humble dedications could be, and have 
been, construed as variants on the humility topos, while the mocking 
dedications have been seen as analogous to modern feminist anger. 
Nevertheless, the pamphleteers's own reputations are partially constructed by 
these conventions-the conventional tone of anger or mockery infused their 
reputation by limiting their tone. Certainly the convention does not prevent these 
dedications from sincerely expressing those emotions, but using the 
dedications for such purposes is affirmed by the convention, instead of being a 
challenge to it. The result of such interlacing of convention and content, here 
and elsewhere, is a series of potentially serious statements that can be seen as 
truly sincere only after the conventions that shapes them are acknowledged. 
The conventions indicate that mocking should occur in one of the dedications: 
all of the women writers choose to mock railers on women, especially Swetnam, 
which suggests that sincere anger is playfully presented through the 
appropriation of the convention. Similarly, when they use the convention of 
entertainingly vehement rhetoric these women are usually at their most vicious, 
which suggests a playful use of convention to express a "sincere" point. Such 
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playfulness as well as the potential for sincerity complicates their 
characteristics, which shapes their personal reputations as more extensive than 
even the virile woman or shrew stereotypes. 
The women pamphleteers also play with the convention of arguing from 
authority in order to construct their reputations. The pamphlet form relied 
heavily on authoritative arguments: 
[t]he pamphleteers believed stoutly in the value of authority and 
precedents, and had little confidence in the judgment of the individual; 
many pamphlets proved their points simply by listing a vast number of 
authorities who agreed with them, along with traditional examples. 
(Clark 161) 
Instead of relying primarily on authority, including compiling lists of such 
authorities, the women pamphleteers relied more heavily on retelling their 
observations: Anger, for instance, describes several of her observations of 
human behavior, including female credulity (35), the greediness of gluttons 
(37), and the bitter words of rejected lovers (41). Like Christine's works, these 
women writers include arguments from authority, yet many of their own 
arguments appealed to lived experience, which indicates that a different 
epistemology is underpinning these works compared to more conventional 
Renaissance pamphlets. Conventionally the arguments from authority, and the 
resulting conservatism in the beliefs expressed, limited the pamphlets to 
reaffirming the culture instead of truly critiquing it (Jordan 2-3; Clark 37; Benson 
205). These pamphleteers's arguments from experience are still limited by the 
culture that shaped those experiences, but these women do not, in their implied 
epistemology, beg the question of the validity of the culture's authority, as often 
occurs with arguments from highly influential authorities. Like Christine, the 
argument from experience validates their ethos by justifying their arguments 
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from lived experience. By giving themselves the reputation of extensive 
experience, they present their arguments as believable. 
Yet these pamphlets were not serious philosophical treatises; instead 
they primarily appealed to their audiences through their topics, vying with each 
other in "the flotsam of evanescent books and pamphlets issued by Elizabethan 
printers" (Wright 450). Like much of our tabloid press and yellow journalism, the 
pamphlets combined sensationalism and readily corroborated news (Wright 
436): 
Dim and vague as was most of this news, it shows an alertness on the 
part of the average citizen towards world affairs. The news-books added 
one more item to the increasing variety of reading matter which attracted 
the eyes of busy tradesmen hurrying through St. Paul's. The ephemeral 
journalism of Shakespeare's time was nearly as varied, and almost as 
abundant in proportion to the number of readers, as similar literature is 
today. (Wright 436) 
To succeed, the pamphlets had to be more eye-catching than aestheticly 
pleasing, and so the reputations constructed in them do not need to be 
consistent as much as they needed to be interesting. The topics ranged from 
repentance pamphlets, which were usually presented as the heavily moralizing 
last words of men about to go to the gallows (Wright 437 & 438), to travel tales 
of far off wonders (Wright 444), to "a whole literature" dedicated to the life of 
rogues (Wright 439) and prostitutes (Wright 441). Equally numerous were 
collections of jest books and warnings to the ungodly (Wright 459 & 463), most 
of which were derived from the oral culture or repeated from classical sources 
(Wright 463). These pamphleteers's personal reputations varied according to 
the author's purpose and the topics discussed. The most didactic authors wrote 
...formal defense[s] or attack[s] on a specific subject or point of view, 
mounted with the aid of the forms and terminology of rhetoric. This form 
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is used in a less fragmentary way and seems to bear a less arbitrary 
relationship to content then, say, the underworld devices or the dialogue. 
But nevertheless it is, like the other, a chosen rather than a necessary 
structure, and the kind of material it is used to present is essentially the 
same, although more clearly defined. The subjects discussed in this way 
are various, but all of them lend themselves to polemical 
treatment....Such pamphlets draw attention to their formal organization, 
with headed chapters, numbered and subdivided, the citation of 
authorities, marginal notes calling attention to point of rule or indicating a 
transition to another section, and all the paraphernalia of learning. 
Rather than beguile, exhort, or terrify their readers out of vicious practices 
and anti-social behavior these authors choose to argue, reason and if 
necessary baffle with logic. (Clark 158-159) 
Among the defense/attack polemical pamphleteers Clark discusses are those 
dealing with the value of women, and the women writers considered here all 
exhibit several of the genre markers Clark lists above: all use headed chapters, 
Sowernam using the most with eight distinct chapters; all present sometimes 
baffling logic, using syllogistic reasoning to prove either a particular point or to 
structure a section; Speght copiously cites Biblical sources, especially in her 
marginalia, while Munda cites several classical sources, often quoting in Latin. 
For all of the similarities between these women's pamphlets and the 
genre of polemical or didactic defense, they also resemble the attack genre, 
especially its qualities of satire and criticism. As Clark describes this genre, it 
includes attacks on a wide range of subjects, and attacking women was a stock 
subject: 
The second category of stock subjects for criticism or abuse consist of 
groups identified by traits other than profession, such as women, social 
upstarts, foreigners, atheists, and puritans....[B]y far the most prominent 
was women....[DJespite an increasing awareness of women as social 
beings and the growth of the ideal of monogamy, it was the vicious 
nature of women that dominated popular writing. (Clark 177) 
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Texts like Swetnam's critique of women were often little more than a 
conventional list of authorities who denigrated women as a sex and, as in 
Swetnam's text, an attempt at satire by haphazardly compiling ribald jokes and 
misogynistic commonplaces. Yet the "learned" defense, though often 
employing satire, should not be confused with the "satires" they answered. 
Shepherd, for instance, describes the women's works as satires. Some of the 
satires were rhetorically vehement polemics bewailing women's evil nature, 
and, as such, they are fitting counterpoints to these pamphleters's defenses of 
women. However, neither Boke his Surfeit, from the evidence we have from 
Anger's quotes, or Swetnam's Arraignment, exhibit any great learning. The 
dominate themes of the attacks were "women as related to men" and "women in 
society" (Clark 182-183). Both Boke his Surfeit and the Arraignment developed 
these themes, combining, at best, an attempt at satire with a compilation of 
jokes. This malleability between the compilation of jokes and more biting satire 
is reflected in the women's texts, which often combine serious defense with wit. 
As such, these women's reputations as witty defenders of women is 
complicated by the satire used, indicating a willingness to stoop to the methods 
of their often less than virtuous opponents. 
To show how the reputations of these authors were particularly shaped 
by the pamphlet form, I will discuss Sowernam's pamphlet as it uses a range of 
topical and formal features. Ester Sowernam's pamphlet was the second in the 
series of three responses written against Swetnam. She comments on 
Speght's work to set herself apart from her while also borrowing from Speght's 
work, which creates connections between herself and the earlier writer. 
Sowernam borrows both from Speght's imagery, appropriating her image of 
Swetnam "vomiting" forth his text, and from her structure, including an 
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ontological defense of women built on many of the same biblical exempla that 
Speght used. Yet where Speght's structure is clear, if bipartied, Sowernam's is 
convoluted and incomplete. Her opening dedication functions like the narratio 
of an oration, introducing both the two primary themes of the pamphlet and her 
persona as the narrator: 
Right honorable, and all others of our sex, upon my repair to London this 
Michealmas Term-being at supper amongst friends, where the number 
of each sex were equal-as nothing is more usual for table talk, there fell 
out a discourse concerning women, some defending others objecting 
against our sex. (Sowernam 87) 
Though the reference to Michealmas Term may mean that this writer is a lawyer, 
and so male, the setting emphasizes less the author's sex and more the 
atmosphere of congenial discussion amongst friends, presenting the women as, 
at least numerically, equal to the men. Sowernam also identifies her theme as 
the defense of women. During this tale of the table talk, Swetnam's text is 
mentioned, and the narrator asks one of the men to loan her a copy. Her 
opinion of the work is far from congenial: "For where the author pretended to 
write against lewd, idle and unconstant women, he doth most impudently rage 
and rail generally against all the whole sex of women" (Sowernam 87). Here 
the second major theme is introduced, her critique of Swetham. This 
presentation of her themes also functions to begin to construct her personal 
reputation; she depicts herself through her narrator as a hostess, as a member 
of the upper bourgeoisie, and as an innocent who accidentally discovers 
Swetnam's text. The narrator's personality is presented as convivial and 
congenial, far from the shrew who intentionally aggravates people. Though she 
does not present herself as a virgin, she later attempts to appropriate part of the 
"virile woman" type as the basis of her own reputation: for instance she uses 
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sophisticated logic and indicates her broad learning. 
The conclusion of this dedication resembles a partitio of sorts, though not 
one which accurately or fully outlines the pamphlet: 
In this my Apology, right honorable, right worshipful, and all others of our 
sex, I do in the first part of it plainly and resolutely deliver the worthiness 
and worth of women, both in respect of their creation as in the work of 
redemption. Next I show in examples out of both the Testaments what 
blessed and happy choice hath been made of women, as gracious 
instruments to derive God's blessings and benefits to mankind. In my 
second part I do deliver of what estimate women have been valued in all 
ancient and modern times, which I prove by authorities, customs and 
daily experiences. Lastly, I do answer all material objections which have 
or can be alleged against our sex; in which also I do arraign such kind of 
men which correspond to the humour and disposition of the author: 
lewd, idle, furious and beastly disposed persons. (Sowernam 87-88) 
Like Speght, Sowernam's first section is a defense of women's ontological 
value based on a reading of the Creation story, on several statements from 
throughout the Bible, and on two lists of great women. The first such list of great 
women is derived from the Bible and the other one is derived from classical and 
British mythology and history. 
Yet even as she begins her first section, she digresses, writing a chapter 
attacking both Swetnam's arguments and his person for having written so 
"monstrous" and "misshapen" a pamphlet. Like the first dedication, this 
digression functions, in many ways, to construct her reputation as someone who 
is not likely to respond in an unjust rage becuase it presents, at length, Anger's 
succinct claim that women's vehemence is justified when provoked. I doubt that 
Sowernam knew of Anger's pamphlet because her arguments do not echo 
Anger's rhetoric. Where Anger plays on her name to justify her anger, 
Sowernam uses religion: "I am not only provoked by this author to defend 
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women, but I am more violently urged to defend divine Majesty, in the work of 
his creation" (Sowernam 91). Sowernam situates her defense of women as a 
defense of God, appropriating Speght's rhetorical move. Both Speght and 
Sowernam attempt to prove that Swetnam's misogynistic misquotations of the 
Bible are blasphemous, yet where Speght presents that blasphemy as 
occurring throughout Swetnam's pamphlet, Sowernam proves it through a 
thorough reading of only Swetnam's first page. By thoroughly critiquing 
Swetnam, Sowernam adds to the personal reputation she presents in the first 
dedication: not only is she middle class, like her readers, and friendly, she is 
presented as moral for engaging in a holy work. 
Where Speght attempts to unproblematically appropriate the stereotype 
of the "good" woman, which makes the holiness of her work more believable, if 
not more cloying, Sowernam mitigates the tone of the holy project with her 
sophisticated and learned wit. For instance, Sowernam responds to Swetnam's 
use of the misogynistic commonplace that women are crooked because they 
were made from a crooked rib by turning the logic of that argument back onto 
itself, and not once, but twice: 
Woman was made of a crooked rib, so she is crooked of conditions. 
Joseph Swetnam was made as Adam of clay and dust, so he is of a dirty 
and muddy disposition. The inferences are both alike in either: woman is 
no more crooked in respect to the one, but he is blasphemous in respect 
of the other.... Admit that this author's doctrine be true, that woman 
receiveyth her forward and crooked disposition from the rib, woman may 
then conclude upon that axiom in philosophy, Quicquid efficit tale, illud 
est magis tale: that which giveth quality to a thing, doth more abound in 
that quality--as fire which heateth is itself more hot....[S]o, if woman 
received her crookedness from the rib, and consequently from the man, 
how doth man excel in crookedness, who hath more of those crooked 
ribs? See how this vain, furious, and idle author furnisheth woman 
with a argument against himself and others of his sex. (Sowernam 91-92) 
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Though she claims to be motivated by a desire to defend divine glory and to 
repudiate Swetnam's blasphemy, Sowernam includes a number of these witty, 
learned, satires scattered throughout her work. The resulting characteristics of 
her implied author's personality is more fully realized than Speght's, for she not 
only redefines the stereotypes of the "good" woman, and appropriates parts of 
those new stereotypes, she adds depth to the personality she presents. Her 
reputation derives from the audience's expectations based on who she seems 
to be, instead of on what she is. Because she hides her identity behind a 
pseudonym, this personality represents her personal reputation. She speaks 
ironically, satirically, even sarcastically, which suggests a somewhat shrewish 
reputation, though her learning and motives would suggest the virile woman 
type. Sowernam constructs her reputation as a sometimes snide, sometimes 
sincere, and always learned writer. 
Having digressed into the attack on Swetnam, Sowernam offers another 
partitio, seeming to outline the contents of the rest of the first section, though she 
actually fulfills all of this outline in her second chapter. She uses this partitio 
posting to, yet again, justify her writing: 
Now having examined what collections Joseph Swetnam had wrestled 
out of scripture to dishonour and abuse all women, I am resolved, before 
I answer further particulars made by him against our sex, to collect and 
note out of scriptures: first, what incomparable and most excellent 
prerogatives God hath bestowed upon women, in honour of them and 
their creation; secondly, what choice God hath made of women, in using 
them as instruments to work his most gracious and glorious designs for 
the benefit of mankind, both during the law of nature and of Moses: 
thirdly, what excellent and divine graces have been bestowed upon our 
sex, in the law of grace and the work of redemption: with a conclusion, 
that to manifest the worthiness of women they have been chosen to 
perform and publish the most happy and joyful benefits which ever came 
to mankind. (Sowernam 92) 
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Her repeated justifications mitigate the audience's potential reading of her as 
merely a shrew. She covers the material she sets out for the first section both 
by copiously citing the Bible and by conveniently ignoring the evidence and 
arguments against her position. In order to complete this "section," she includes 
two lists as two separate chapters. These lists appropriate the pamphlet 
convention of listing arguments from authority. As an example of her probably 
hasty composition of the piece, the fourth chapter, her second list, is actually 
one of two distinct chapters designated as "fourth." I will call the first of these 
two chapters "4a" and the second "4b," though I do not mean to suggest that 
one is merely a direct extension of the other. 
This first section's structure is organized as a series of reasonable 
associations from one idea or argument to the next. Sowernam does not 
emulate Speght's use of a clear structure, which suggests a personality more 
confident in her ability to present wide-ranging ideas and less regimented in her 
thinking. Sowernam's personality seems inspired, if unruly: she begins with a 
digression, followed by a part of her confirmation, though artificially limited to 
evidence from the Bible and Christian tradition. Then she presents two lists 
which do little more than function as a series of references, and which, as 
evidence, rely heavily on the audience's willingness to deduce the significance 
of those citations and to be persuaded by those citations. Such a list is in many 
ways not truly a rhetorical device, for it does not argue for a position as much as 
it simply presents the evidence for that position. The end of 4a includes a 
summation of her major points of the first section and repeats the Christian 
focus of her evidence to that point, but it neither functions as a transition to a 
refutation section or as a peroration concluding the first section. Though the 
connections all make intuitive sense as she moves from one idea to the next, as 
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informal reasoning or as a rhetorical structure the section leaves much to be 
desired in basic organization, which indicates both hack work and a less than 
careful writer. 
Her transition to the second part of the pamphlet is introduced by yet 
another epistle, the third such letter. In this epistle she announces that she will 
"solace myself with a little liberty" (Sowernam 98), and chapter 4b promptly 
surveys evidence of women's value in classical and British history and thought, 
shrugging off the "holy work" tone. Presenting a very truncated history of 
women, Sowernam simultaneously displays her learning and offers several 
secular arguments for the value of women. In this chapter she also rails against 
men who seduce and slander women, and she presents arguments for 
women's superiority over men. Finally, this oddly organized chapter concludes 
with a seemingly simple transition to the next chapter which proves to be a 
complex manipulation of metaphor and allegory: 
When they [men who seduce women] have done all and gotten their 
purpose, then they discover all the woman's shame and employ such an 
author as this (to whose Arraignment I do make haste) to rail upon her 
and the whole sex. (Sowernam 103) 
As a compliant against some men's betrayal of some women's hearts and 
privacy, the sentence makes sense. The complexity is in the image of the 
narrator/implied author making haste. The phrase seems simply metaphorical, 
a comment that the author is making an abrupt transition from one section to 
another. But much of the rest of the pamphlet depicts a fictional arraignment of 
Swetnam--with judges, a jury and all-turning the metaphor into a bit of fiction. 
The writer does hasten through the transition, but simultaneously she 
considerably distances herself from the narrator, who hastens physically to the 
142 
arraignment. This distance, which continues through the next few chapters, acts 
as a buffer between the narrator, who will read to the court the indictment 
against Swetnam and who will speak to all of his substantive charges against 
women, and the implied author, who is constructed favorably in the earlier 
chapters and epistles. Even though the narrator presents material which 
functions as another attack on Swetnam and his text, and which completes the 
close reading that Sowernam began in the first chapter, the implied author is 
not the character speaking this part of the text. 
Specifically, chapter five presents the characters in this odd version of a 
closet drama, primarily the Judges Reason and Experience, the Jury comprised 
of Swetnam's five senses and the seven deadly sins, and Swetnam's council, 
his Conscience. Chapter six is the reading of the Indictment, and chapter seven 
is a refutation to the material charges that Swetnam laid on women, spoken 
while Swetnam stands mute to the charges raised against him. These chapters 
include compilations of several of the conventional topoi in women's favor, 
more of Sowernam's witty, learned logic, and her habitual associative 
reasoning. For instance, just after she cites Plato's inclusion of women in the 
government of his republic, Sowernam argues: 
Daily experience and the common course of nature doth tell us that 
women were by men in [ancient] times highly valued, and in worth by 
men themselves preferred and held better than themselves. I will not say 
that women are better than men, but I will say men are not so wise as I 
would wish them to be, to woo us in such fashion as they do; except they 
should hold and account of us as their betters....Suitors do ever in their 
suits confess a more worthiness in the person to whom they sue. These 
kind of suits are from nature, which cannot deceive them: nature doth tell 
them what women are and custom doth approve what nature doth direct. 
Aristotle saith "Omnia appetunt bonum" (everything by nature doth seek 
after that which is good). Nature doth carry meri with violence to seek 
and sue after women. Some will answer and seek to elude this maxim 
with a distinction: that bonum is duplex-at/x verum, aut apparens, that 
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goodness or the thing which is good is either truly good or but apparently 
good. So they may say women are but apparently good. But the 
heathen orator, and the divine philosopher too, affirm if we follow the true 
direction of nature we shall never be deceived. Nature in her vehement 
motions is not deceived. It is natural, they will say, for the male to follow 
the female. So it is as natural for the female to be better than the male, 
as appeareth to be true in observation of the hawks: the spar-hawk is of 
more esteem than the musket; the goshawk is more excellent than the 
tercel....The like men are bound to acknowledge women.... 
(Sowernam 101-102) 
Within this example, Sowernam moves from the authority of Plato, to reasoning 
from maxims, to the authority of observation, and from women as leaders, to 
men's treatment of them as suitors, to the natural superiority of women. Her 
tendency to follow her associations, though often witty in itself, suggests that 
she is disjointed in her reasoning, a weakness which is confirmed in her odd, 
and probably hasty, structure. In Sowernam's first partitio, she claimed that she 
would respond to all material charges laid against women, yet she constrains 
herself to the charges that Swetnam refers to in his text and so never completes 
the outline she originally presented. At the end of the seventh chapter, she 
abruptly announces that she is called away and cannot complete the work 
(Sowernam 98). Yet the hastiness and heavy use of association becomes an 
appropriate persona for her to present given the pamphlet form-pamphlets 
were not supposed to be labored over. The form was occasional, and 
excessive work on it suggested a person with nothing better to do. 
By writing disjointedly she finally indicates, as she did in the tale of the 
table talk, that she is a busy woman with many friends and more important 
concerns. She claims for herself a position of respect, as having lowered 
herself to write the pamphlet. This rhetorical move, which was conventional in 
the form, asserts the importance and honor of the author. Sowernam creates a 
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personal reputation that is strong willed, witty, learned, respectable, vocal, and 
Christian. By readily arguing from both the authority of the Bible and the 
classical tradition, she positions herself at the intersection between the courtly 
humanist and the middle class reader while constructing herself as both the 
shrew and virile woman. She intentionally places herself at a cusp of 
respectability, a cusp that she announces on her title page. Hull explains this 
cusp: 
Buried in Swetnam's books is a reference to 'all you unmarried wantons' 
who have 'thus unluckily made your selves neither maidens, widdowes, 
nor wives, but more vile then filthy channeli-durt, fit to be swept out of the 
heart and suburbes for your Countrey' (sig. E2). Interestingly, the 
Sowernam pseudonym is described on the title page of Ester hath 
Hang'd Haman as 'neither Maide, Wife nor Widdowe, yet really all, and 
therefore experienced to defend all.' The supposedly straightforward 
response to Swetnam may well be just another chapter in a tongue-in-
cheek satire serial. (115-116) 
Sowernam uses satire to assert her ethos as complex, challenging the one 
dimensional stereotype of "good" women as silent, ignorant and obedient. 
Sowernam speaks clearly, she is educated enough to do so, she knows the 
words of her opponents's work and can use them against him, and she is willing 
to scandalize her readers (possibly, if not probably, because scandal sells), 
while depicting her work as a defense of God through a defense of God's 
creation. Sowernam creates a complex reputation for herself which includes 
both characteristics of the shrew and the virile woman, which undermines her 
audience's expectations of herself as just a stereotypical woman. She attempts 
to change her audience's expectations of her by using the genre and her 
rhetoric to present herself as more fully human than a mere type. In the next 
chapter, I will discuss specific stylistic techniques used by these women to 
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construct for themselves viable, non-stereotyped, ethos positions which present 




ETHOS AND STYLE IN EARLY MODERN WOMEN'S PAMPHLETS 
These pamphleteers use several stylistic techniques, yet they especially 
use close analyses of other authors' texts to undermine the stereotypical 
expectations of them as naturally incompetent. For instance, Sowernam, by 
precisely depicting Swetnam's style and argument, proves that she knows what 
she is talking about, which earns for herself the right to discuss his work and his 
ideas. Her act of reading his writing becomes a rhetorical move used to 
persuade the audience into accepting her arguments against Swetnam. These 
pamphleteers consistently and closely read other's texts using several 
techniques to assess the matter and the manner of their opponents's texts, and 
they all consider both minute details and overall themes and premises. Rachel 
Speght, for instance, ranges from commenting of Swetnam's grammatical 
mistakes to invalidating his logic by analyzing his fallacious syllogisms. These 
women's defenses of women also rely heavily on their readings of their male 
opponents for their subject matter and as a means for attacking the overall 
patriarchy. Because these texts are comprised of close readings of another's 
text as vehicles for presenting their own arguments and ethos appeals, they 
ultimately require the modern reader to ask about the nature of their reading 
practices. In this chapter I will present what can be inferred about the nature of 
the early modern woman reader and the characteristics of the women 
pamphleteers's reading practices. Yet before I can look closely at two 
representative pamphlets, Anger's and Munda's, I will first explain what we 
know about women as readers in the early modern era, and I will quickly cover 
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what other scholar have thought about these women's styles. 
Many modern critics seriously question whether Renaissance women 
could even read, let alone write, except for well-acknowledged cases of famous 
female patrons and aristocratic women. Certainly, many of the women who had 
access to printed material, either through their own reading or through listening 
as others read to them, could not necessarily also write. As Hull discusses in 
her analysis of Renaissance female readers, most of the books written for 
women before 1640 were written by men (Hull 4). What scant evidence 
remains of a female readership has to be inferred primarily from documents 
attesting to or justifying women's education and from suggestions by authors or 
printers that a female audience is intended for their texts. Even with this 
evidence, the likelihood of a significant female reading audience in the early 
modern era is still often disputed, when this female readership is not ignored 
outright, and little has been done to piece together the possible reading 
practices of these readers. Several good studies are available on the 
aristocratic patrons of poets, yet the aristocratic women belonged to a restricted 
social and economic class whose reading practices are not particularly relevant 
to my study. Some modern scholars have explored whether middle class 
women could read by hunting for evidence of women's education and by 
searching for evidence that texts appealed to middle class women as readers. 
The resulting picture is of women who may have been lucky enough to have 
been taught to read beyond the most basic primers and who may, if their duties 
permitted, have used that ability as adults. These two happenstances of 
teaching and time are evinced, for instance, by Rachel Speght. 
From the evidence, like Juan Luis Vives' 1523 treatise, and from the 
example of Margaret More Roper and others, many scholars argue that 
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classical humanism generally affirmed and promoted some education for 
women, including education for upper class, non-aristocratic, women. Vives 
argued that the young, upper-class woman "should also study, to the full extent 
of her ability, grammar and rhetoric, scripture, the Church Fathers, and the 
classical writers such as Plato, Plutarch, Livy, Cicero, and Seneca" (quoted in 
Dunn 19). Unfortunately, the classical humanist notion of women's education 
did not last much beyond the mid and late 1500's, nor did it extend to the 
education of most middle class women. Much more relevant to middle class 
women were the boarding schools for girls that began to open in the late 1500's 
and early 1600's. Though, as Goreau points out, there is some evidence that 
some girls in the mid 1500's were allowed to go to grammar schools for a few 
years (Goreau 5), most girls got what little education they received from tutors at 
home (Goreau 6). The boarding schools, or "academies," for girls educated 
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women in the practical skills needed for housekeeping and the frivolities 
needed for attracting a suitor. These girls were taught "...housewifery, cookery, 
fine embroidery, black work, white work, work in colors, and various sorts of 
other 'work' in silver, straw, glass, wax, and gum..." and "...instruction in 
singing, violin, lute, harpsichord, and organ, as well as country dancing..." 
(Goreau 6). Of these schools, only one emphasized scholarship: 
Of all the "female academies," only Mrs. Bathsua Makin's school seems 
to have attempted a more serious academic program....The young ladies 
who attended her school on Tottenham High Road in London studied 
grammar and rhetoric, logic, languages-especially Greek and Hebrew... 
-as well as mathematics, geography, music, painting and poetry, among 
other subjects. (Goreau 6-7) 
Makin's school was established after the time of the pamphlets I am considering 
here, though Makin's own ability to read and teach indicates the potential 
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success of the home tutors. The evidence for women's education in the late 
1500's and early 1600's-specifically, the evidence that these authors could be 
seen as educated-is even more scant. Nevertheless, as Dunn notes, Richard 
Mulcaster, master of the Merchant Tailors School in London, advocated 
women's education in reading, writing, Latin, Greek, philosophy and rhetoric, as 
well as in a trade, in a piece written for a middle class audience (17-18). Dunn 
also discovered records in the Stationer's Company that indicated that there 
were women booksellers and printers at the time, most of whom inherited their 
trades from their husbands (Dunn 22). Women, Dunn explains, 
were admitted to some guilds on an equal footing with men; they served 
as shop managers and assistants, or aided their husbands in the conduct 
of small business; and after the deaths of their husbands they frequently 
continued to run the shop or business alone. (Dunn 22) 
The currently common assumption that early modern, middle class 
women had no opportunities to learn to read is much too broad. Certainly, 
within the Renaissance education system, training in reading was likely to be 
erratic at best. Like much of the populace, the bulk of the readers were scarcely 
above the functionally literate. Yet evidence for the existence of middle class 
women readers has also been derived from the texts that were addressed to 
them. Hull's book, which is primarily an annotated bibliography of Renaissance 
texts written for women, uses the evidence of the extant literature to prove not 
only the existence of a female reading public, but even the existence of books 
which catered to these women. Lucas's text assesses the romance genre's 
prescriptive presentation of the women, its repression of women's behavior, its 
liberation of women's imagination, and its affirmation of their self-esteems. 
Where Hull's study proves the existence of competent women readers, Lucas's 
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work indicates the sophisticated ways that they are constrained by their reading. 
Hull contextualizes the history of Renaissance women's books within the 
broader history of print in England: 
A small but steady stream of books for a female audience began to 
appear on the English book market in the 1570's, approximately one 
hundred years after Caxton printed the first book in the English language. 
In the period from 1475 through 1640 at least 163 books in some 500 
editions were specifically directed to or printed for women readers. 
Eighty-five percent of them were published after 1570. The publication of 
this many books for women readers is persuasive evidence that a 
substantial number of women knew how to read English by the end of the 
sixteenth century, and that their needs and interests were being 
recognized by both writers and booksellers. The emergence of a female 
reading public with its own small but identifiable body of literature 
appears to be related to certain social and educational changes in 
fifteenth- and sixteenth-century England and to the changing economics 
of the book trade. These changes included the continuing growth of a 
middle class with some leisure for its women; increased opportunities for 
education, particularly reading instruction in English for both boys and 
girls; ...the rise of a professional class of writers dependent upon book 
buyers as well as the chancy largess of patrons; and the booksellers's 
need for new markets. (Hull 1) 
The existence of books for women indicates a female readership, and those 
books represent a significant percentage of the growing book trade. The 
evidence also indicates that these books, especially the romances, were 
intended for women to read privately. Though the earliest texts were often 
printed without any indication of an intended audience (Hull 9), later editions of 
these texts were often addressed specifically to women readers. The practice 
became particularly common for new editions in the late 1580's and the 1590's 
(Hull 10), and Hull concludes that the "authors and booksellers became 
increasingly conscious of women readers" (Hull 10). Some of the books 
addressed to women were these texts intended for general consumption. 
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Several of the other books for women were misogynistic texts that included 
dedications to women in order to couch the misogyny in more acceptable terms, 
as Swetnam so attempts to couch his own work. Finally, a few of the works 
dedicated to women were literary masterpieces dedicated to aristocratic 
women, especially to Elizabeth, like Spenser's Faerie Queene. The resulting 
collection of books for women is a compilation of rededicated texts, texts 
primarily aimed at misogynistic readers, fictions, literary works, religious tracts, 
pamphlets and guides to various housekeeping duties. The very range of these 
texts written with at least one woman reader in mind indicates a recognition of 
an audience with a variety of reading abilities, tastes and needs. Even after 
eliminating texts dedicated to powerful or influential female patrons and texts 
that were written primarily for men, the collection still indicates a readership with 
various interests and whose economic status ranges from the middle to upper 
classes. Though the number of women readers is debatable, their influence on 
the printing industry is relatively clear. These women readers were 
undoubtedly also reading the materials printed for men, and, if Speght's use of 
Latin is any indicator, many were able to read, at least partly, the Latin texts of 
the educated men as well. 
These women's reading practices undoubtedly resembled many of the 
men's reading practices, yet they probably also faced problems common to 
many later women readers: especially the assumption that women are by 
nature immoral and the ready acceptance of misogyny. The women 
pamphleteers refute the endemic misogyny, but, as Lucas discusses with her 
assessment of Elizabethan romances, writings for women did not encourage 
that rebellion. Just the opposite, the romances gave women a semblance of 
power while they subtly encouraged women's repression. This combination of 
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repression and liberation in the romances 
both reinforce patriarchal prescriptions for female behavior, and 
simultaneously offer women a version of themselves as far more 
independent, powerful and significant than they would have experienced 
themselves in any other area of their lives. (Lucas 1 -2) 
These texts open a space for these opposing forces by constructing 
"prescriptive and repressive...roles for the woman reader" in which the author 
constrains the range of the readers's responses while presenting women with 
positive, if patriarchal, role models which the women readers are encouraged to 
emulate (Lucas 4, 17). Despite these texts' repressive rhetoric, Lucas still finds 
the romances to be more freeing than domesticating: 
If the casual reader had been a woman living in the latter half of the 
sixteenth century...she might have found much good in [romances]: an 
opportunity to stretch her horizons-historically, geographically and 
mythologically-and to expand her sense of knowledge; a space where 
women can argue on the same terms as men, in which their powers of 
speech and rhetoric equal, if not surpass, those for men; a romance 
world, in which women's concerns are paramount, and where women's 
thoughts, feelings and actions are accorded a significance seldom 
granted them elsewhere. (Lucas 39) 
Like many modern texts, Renaissance works were often implicitly or explicitly 
repressive, while others were hollowly apologetic for their misogyny, or were 
liberating and affirming in an impossible fantasy that could never be realized. 
Though the rhetoric of these texts limits women's behavior, the texts themselves 
create a space that allows for freedom of thought and for mental escape into a 
fictive world which affirmed their abilities and concerns. As reading material, the 
romances allowed women to respond with some trust in the author, unlike many 
other Renaissance texts that immasculated women. 
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Yet many of the texts that were dedicated to women are infused with anti-
women biases: biases that the authors often apologized for in their dedications. 
Yet these apologies, as Schibanoff argues, are patently hollow: 
Authorial apologies to the female reader for antifeminist texts are, clearly 
enough, something other than heartfelt laments. They are attempts both 
to intimidate her and, borrowing Judith Fetterley's term, to immasculate 
her. They warn her that the written traditions of anti feminism have 
contemporary guardians and custodians who will not allow these texts to 
disappear. If the text is "fixed" in this fashion, then the only solution to the 
otherwise irremediable problem of the hostile text is for the female reader 
to change herself: she must read not as a woman, but as a man, for male 
readers, according to the topos, are neither offended nor troubled by 
literary misogyny. (Schibanoff 85) 
As an immasculated reader, a woman could agree with the misogyny in a text 
by denying her own gender. As now, this method of capitulating derives from 
an attempt to read as a man. Though the particular behaviors imposed on 
women in the Renaissance differ from our own, the women readers's responses 
to misogyny were generally limited to these versions of resisting or capitulating 
to the text. The options for Renaissance women readers were limited, but a 
more true resistance was viable, as evinced in the pamphleteers's texts. To truly 
reject the constructions of women readers's selves offered up in such texts, the 
women pamphleteers present extremely close readings of their opponents's 
words. Their close yet resistant readings allow them to refute the assumptions 
behind the arguments their opponents's present. 
Much of the modern study of gendered reading practices is limited to 
studies of the reading practices of students and to feminist literary critics' use of 
reader-response criticism (Flynn 267). Little work has been done on non-
literary, adult reading techniques, and there are even fewer studies of the traces 
of the gendered reading practices of historical women. Schibanoff has 
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discussed the connections between early women's writings and Fetterly's 
construction of the "immasculated" woman reader, and she sees the art of 
reading as a woman as the "intellectual and literate act of re-reading" 
(Schibanoff 101). Louise Rosenblatt's discussion of the reader also illuminates 
these pamphleteers's practice of close reading, for she argues that reading is 
active, which she depicts as a "'transactional' relationship with the text" (ix). 
Though Rosenblatt's interest is in aesthetic reading, as in the reading of poetry, 
she defines the nature of nonaesthetic reading in comparison to it: 
The distinction between aesthetic and nonaesthetic reading, then, 
derives ultimately from what the reader does, the stance that he adopts 
and the activities he carries out in relation to the text. At the extreme 
efferent [non-aesthetic] end of the spectrum, the reader disengages his 
attention as much as possible from the personal and qualitative elements 
in his response to the verbal symbols; concentrates on what the symbols 
designate, what type may be contributing to the end result that he seeks-
the information, the concepts, the guides to action, that will be left with 
him when the reading is over. (Rosenblatt 27) 
The women pamphleteers use this efferent, transactional reading practice: they 
read the text in dialogue with it, focusing on the meanings they are left with from 
the text. Yet they use the active reading process as they reread the text as 
women as a means of avoiding the trap of immasculation in their resistant 
readings. 
Not surprising, their close, active readings of Swetnam focus on 
redefining the constructions of women which he relies on. For instance, 
Swetnam asserts that any woman who rejects his presentation of women must 
be guilty of being vile herself. Such women, he goes on to argue, should be 
silent in order to hide their guilt. He then says that any woman who is not vile 
should also be silent for the matter does not concern her. In either case, all 
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women must accept his construction of them and his limitation on their behavior. 
Munda, addressing Swetnam, will have none of it: 
[Y]ou surmise that, inveighing against poor illiterate women, we might fret 
and bite the lip at you; we might repine to see ourselves baited and 
tossed in a blanket, but never durst in open view of the vulgar either 
disclose your blasphemous and derogative slanders or maintain the 
untainted purity of our glorious sex. Nay, you'll put gags in our mouths 
and conjure us all to silence; you will first abuse us, then bind us to the 
peace. We must be tongue-tied, lest in starting up to find fault we prove 
ourselves guilty of those horrible accusations. (Munda 137) 
By closely reading Swetnam, and then by presenting the hypocrisy buried in his 
premises, Munda opens a space for her own resistance. By actively reading 
against his text, she can then speak for herself. 
These women did not just read as women, they read as people in their 
period, and, as Crane has argued, early modern readers read materials, in part, 
for quotes and arguments that they could repeat in their own works. By looking 
at the function of the commonplace book in Renaissance England, Crane has 
reconstructed another way that Renaissance reader read: 
During this period, the twin discursive practices of "gathering" these 
textual fragments and "framing" or forming, arranging, and assimilating 
them created for English humanists a central mode of transaction with 
classical antiquity and provided an influential model for authorial practice 
and for authoritative self-fashioning. Gathering and framing were not just 
rhetorical strategies; they were basic discursive practices, formulated in 
response to the pressures and opportunities of the historical 
moment...and constitutive of social, economic, political and literary 
discourse. (Crane 3-4) 
The various bits of a text functioned, as Crane explains, as simultaneously part 
of the discourse in which they appeared and as potentialities-as suggestive 
references that have had meaning in other texts and could be used in even 
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more texts. Each commonplace, then, would call to mind other places where it 
has been used or more ways in which it could be used. As such, the 
commonplace functioned as more than our truism--as more than free floating 
bits of common knowledge or cliches. Instead, they represent a set of signs of 
one's education, breadth of knowledge, and, when used well, intellectual ability. 
As such, Renaissance readers read not only to understand a text, but to assess 
it and to borrow from it. The habit of gathering quotes and framing them in new 
ways discouraged passive or linear reading. Instead, readers would consider 
the possibilities for the commonplaces as much as they would consider the 
quotes in any particular context. The act of reading in the Renaissance is much 
more intertextually astute than is typical of many twentieth century readers. 
As Clark shows in her extensive study of the pamphlets, the early modern 
pamphlet writers were as comfortable with the commonplace as were educated 
men: 
... rhetoric had considerable bearing on the content of the pamphlets as 
well as on their arrangement, in that one of the chief means of expansion 
and amplification, and also one of the sources of invention...!,] was the 
commonplace.... (Clark 225) 
Though many Renaissance thinkers extensively used and reused 
commonplaces, the pamphlets were generally shaped as more than merely 
borrowings from a commonplace book-though Swetnam, and others, did write 
texts which consisted primarily of commonplaces. Clark discuss the 
relationship between the styles popular in the pamphlets and the various 
intellectual and social traditions these styles were derived from, in order to 
argue that learned commonplaces were often used as a marker of 
sophistication: 
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The conventions of popular writing demanded that the authors show 
themselves as aware of literary fashions, and many of the learned 
trappings of these pamphlets might well be ascribed, not to the reader's 
genuine interest in citations from Aristotle or Juvenal, but to the authors's 
desire to parade newly-acquired learning (Clark 243) 
Clark's study also serves as a primer of the stylistic conventions and 
traditions common in the pamphlets, and so it serves to contextualize the 
stylistic features in the four women's polemical tracks. Though the topics and 
the politics in the pamphlets were primarily conservative, the styles in these 
pamphlets were often quite inventive: 
Stylistically, they were the product of a unique combination of influences, 
some of them traditional, others in line with the most contemporary 
currents of thought, brought together to create a new mode of writing 
which has a vitality and appeal that an acquaintance with their subject-
matter only would never lead one to suspect. (Clark 224) 
As such, many of the pamphlet's styles indicate a general sophistication among 
the middle class readers. The stylistic conventions of the pamphlets relate to, 
but are not dominated by, Renaissance thought about rhetoric and stylistic 
conventions: 
The anti-Ciceronian movement in literary prose, the turn from connection, 
balance, conjunction, and long sentences constructed with carefully 
subordinated clauses, to aphorism, brevity and disjunction, had it 
analogies and parallels in popular prose, but there was no sudden 
transition....Undeniably the pamphlets showed a trend towards plainer 
writing, even though less lettered authors continued to have recourse to 
elaborate figures of speech, Ciceronian structures, and the devices of 
Euphism in their striving for effect. (Clark 231) 
As a group, the pamphlets have a tentative connection to the stylistic 
movements popular in the intellectual circles. In the women's texts, the 
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movement towards a plainer style is present, though only inconsistently 
practiced. The first of the texts, Anger's, is highly Euphuistic, and the last of the 
texts, Munda's, is often ornate. Yet in all of the pamphlets there are several 
short, pithy, witty comments. Of all the stylistic influences on these texts, Clark 
argues, the most significant was the oral tradition. She sees the influence of the 
oral tradition in the pamphleteers's "[heavy reliance] on customary usage, 
idioms and proverbs, punning and word play, requiring to be read aloud" (Clark 
243). This influence can be readily heard in one of Sowernam's poems, which, 
if read silently seems satirical, but, if read aloud, allowing the rollicking rhythm 
to dominate the voice, comes off as rather funny: 
An idle companion was raging of late, 
Who in fury 'gainst women expresseth his hate: 
He writeth a book, an Arraignment he calleth, 
In which against women he currently bawleth. 
He deserveth no answer but in ballad or rhyme 
Upon idle fantasies who would cast away time: 
Any answer may serve an impudent liar, 
Any mangy scabbed horse doth fit a scaled squire. 
(Sowernam 115) 
Sowernam's poem requires the reader to say the words aloud to hear the 
tonality of the mockery implicit in the rhythm. For Clark, this need to read the 
piece aloud follows naturally from the kinds of readers the pamphleteers were 
writing to: 
If we take into account the nature of the pamphleteers' audience, this 
requirement [to read the writing aloud] seems perfectly reasonable; they 
were, after all, more used to hearing than to reading, and in particular to 
hearing spoken poetry, or, at least, verse. (Clark 243) 
Clark characterized the pamphlets as having a "loose conversational flow" 
159 
while often engaging in a copious, ornamented rhetoric. 
The women's stylistic choices reflect more than sophistication; they 
function as a vehicle for solidifying their ethos appeals. Though the theory of 
rhetoric at the time would limit the notion of "rhetoric" to just those stylistic 
devices, as Clark argues, the practice in the pamphlets did not evince a 
separation between style and meaning: 
[t]he...confining of rhetoric to verbal techniques and to the schemata of 
words rather than of thought was important in the history of logic and 
rhetoric during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but had no direct 
effect on the pamphlets. (Clark 231). 
These women use their style to support their ethos, which is a common 
rhetorical move. But because the issue at hand, women's worth, impinges on 
their personal reputations, these pamphlets are also using style, especially the 
style of their reading, to support their pro-women arguments. Like men, they are 
stylistically skillful; like men, they can use the gathering and framing reading 
techniques; like men, they can read actively, and so not capitulate to the test. 
For instance, as Henderson and McManus and Shepherd discuss, these 
women's use of style, particularly of exempla and puns, is a vehicle for 
meaning. In Henderson and McManus's estimation, argument by example 
indicates both a cognitive habit and an appropriation of the oppositions's 
sources against that opposition. 
[Their] frequent use of argument by example testifies to the habit of 
moving immediately from the specific to the general...All [of these women] 
employed argument by example, assuming equally with the misogynists 
the validity of this type of proof but countering their examples with biblical 
and classical stories of virtuous women....Like their adversaries, the 
feminist writers appeal to classical and later authorities; Plato is a favorite 
classical authority, cited by Anger, Sowernam, and Munda, but Aristotle, 
Protagoras, Horace, and others also appear, along with later poets like 
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Ariosto. (Henderson and McManus 26, 35) 
Their style of using examples is complicated by their context, for it underscores 
their precarious ethos positions and the extent that the misogynistic 
assumptions are affirmed by the culture. Moving their arguments from the 
specific to the general is not surprising given the depth of misogyny at the time: 
arguing from the stereotypes of women would have predetermined the failure of 
their arguments, and, so, of their ethos positions. Though several stereotypes 
of women were common, none affirm the worth of thinking, vocal women as a 
group; even the virile woman is constructed as an extremely rare, and hence 
singular, exception. 
Similarly, Shepherd notes that these women's use of puns focus the 
reader on the language of the argument: "Puns perform a function similar to 
repetition-they make us aware of the words we are reading. They break our 
perhaps uncritical involvement in the argument and force us to notice the choice 
of language" (Shepherd 15). As with repeating words used by the opposition, a 
technique heavily employed by Sowernam, puns illuminate the way an 
argument is presented, and so make a reader conscious of the implications of 
other meanings, of other ways of looking at the ideas. All the women 
polemicists use puns-even though some of those puns are cliches, and often 
bad cliches, like Speght's reference to marriage and as a "merry-age." Puns 
illuminate the extent that misogyny, and women's degrading ontological status, 
are built into the language: like the way "whore" only refers to women. They also 
highlight the degree that the loaded language limited and constructed women's 
ethos positions. Though puns were very common at the time, and certainly are 
not an inherently feminine stylistic device, they still encourage a reader to 
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consider the limitations the language places on these women's arguments. 
One significant difference between the copious style generally practiced 
by the pamphleteers and the style present in these women polemicists's 
writings is the hyperbolic degree to which they often apply the techniques. The 
excessiveness of the Euphuisms in Anger, in effect out euphuizing Euphues, 
draws the readers's attention, again, to the language. It proclaims loudly these 
women's knowledge of particular tropes, which emphasizes the "art" of their 
labors and suggests that their rhetoric conveys meaning. Interestingly, Anger 
begins the body of her tract not with a comment on women or misogyny, but with 
a complaint about rhetoric: 
The desire that every man hath to show his true vein in writing is 
unspeakable, and their minds are so carried away with the manner as no 
care at all is had of the matter. They run so into rhetoric as oftentimes 
they overrun the bounds of their own wits, and go they know not whither. 
(Anger 32) 
For Anger, the intelligent use of rhetoric is part of what the "wit" conceives, and 
an uncontrolled use of rhetoric undercuts, even eliminates, an argument. The 
decision, then, to use style excessively in her own work functions as a statement 
about style and language. These women's use of excessive style calls attention 
to the particulars in language which constrain their positions and arguments. In 
response to this excessiveness, several modern critics have attempted to justify 
these polemicists's styles. 
Modern critics have attempted to justify Anger's style, though they vary in 
their readings from dismissive to celebratory. Wright simply repeats Anger's 
own justification: "[m]oved by the impudence of this tract, she is led to make an 
old-fashioned recital of man's iniquity and woman's virtues" (Wright 476). He 
presents her work as "old-fashioned" by drawing connections between her 
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words and the various medieval debates about women, which bypasses her 
anger and mitigates her stylistic excessiveness. Though Benson does not 
dismiss her work for being "old-fashioned" in purpose and style, she does 
dismiss her for using a radical style to promote conservative beliefs: 
Stylistically [Anger's Protection] shares more with the genre of 
antifeminist satire than with humanist defense. It is an experiment in the 
manipulation of a created voice, a sort of dramatic monologue spoken in 
the persona of an angry woman, just as much of Mulierum Pean is 
spoken in the voice of Venus, and just as antifeminist pieces, such as the 
Scholehouse, are spoken in the persona of an angry man. The 
unprecedented use of an angry female voice as author of the piece is the 
key to its attractiveness, its seeming radicalness, its ambiguity, 
and, finally, to its support of the status quo. Anger represents her act of 
speaking as a radical departure from traditional female behavior;...yet 
she does not represent her own speaking out as signaling the dawn of a 
new age, a time in which control of the female image will be or should be 
wrested from male hands. (Benson 224-225) 
Though Benson does argue that the voice of an angry female is unusual, she 
indicates that this persona is a reasonable artistic development given the 
existence of the angry male persona. For Benson, Anger's position is 
conservative because Anger's piece does not rely on humanist argument 
concerning women. Benson dismisses Anger's "radical" rhetoric because of 
Anger's seeming affirmation of the "status quo." 
Nevertheless, Anger's rhetoric is consistently seen as forceful and 
energetic, and Beilin sees that energy as shocking and entertaining. For 
instance, Beilin emphasizes Anger's abrupt departure from traditional female 
style: 
...[Anger's] style differs profoundly from the almost universal restraint of 
women's works that preceded hers, rather than being pious and 
disciplined, it conveys the fertility of a mind whizzing from idea to idea, 
excited, determined, willing to use any means to make the point....The 
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jingling of rhymes, parallel constructions, and climactic arrangement 
bespeak a writer who labors for a style to match the persona of Anger, a 
startlingly new character in the female canon. (Beilin 251) 
By identifying some of the particular stylistic features that Anger uses, Beilin 
recognizes the rhetorical impact of this voice: this implied author is highly 
emotional, carefully organized, intellectually resourceful, and adventurous. 
Beilin continues her assessment of Anger's style, considering the nature of her 
arguments: "Anger's own style is an entertaining mix of supposition, learned 
glosses of Latin tags, expostulation and "proofs" of woman's virtuous character 
and man's folly, intended to justify women rather than change their lot" (Beilin 
251). The use of commonplaces, manipulations of syllogistic reasoning, and 
suppositions, for Beilin, is entertaining, and it indicates a playfulness with the 
language that undermines the ways that language conveyed the misogynistic 
tradition. As such, Beilin celebrates Anger's style and her use of convention to 
open a new space for women's voices. Ferguson, who considers Anger's work 
as a polemic, is even more celebratory: 
In the first sustained reactive feminist polemic by a woman in English, 
Jane Anger vociferously demanded rights for women and registered 
serious opposition to the behavior of men (and apparently one in 
particular) toward women....Vehement and vitriolic in her tirade..., Anger 
resolutely responded to a particular detractor (and any others) who dared 
call women sexually inappeasable[, contemptuously scorning men who 
toyed with women....(Ferguson 10) 
Ferguson, primarily taken with the angry tone, indicates the degree of emotion 
suggested in the piece, and affirms this anger as feminist speech. 
Munda's "vociferous" tone is also much mentioned by the critics, though 
that tone strikes these critics differently. Beilin, who acknowledges that Munda 
"established her own credibility through a pious dedication to her mother, 'Lady 
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Prudentia Munda,'" (Beilin 263), sees Munda as fashioning a persona "who at 
first speaks loudly and clearly, sometimes bitterly, sometimes learnedly, and 
always with conviction" (Beilin 264). Beilin uses the term "vociferous" (Beilin 
265) to emphasize the anger in the piece, and she emphasizes its "rhetorical" 
purpose-as not being a "demand for change" (Beilin 265). She characterizes 
the tone as paradoxical (Beilin 265), which leaves unassessed the tone's 
significance. Henderson and McManus comment on Munda's frequent and witty 
use of invective and her ability to attack a wide range of Swetnam's 
characteristics in a signal passage (Henderson and McManus 36), but they, like 
Beilin, do not interpret the meaning conveyed through that tone. Woodbridge 
describes Munda's work as simply a "good rant" (Woodbridge 99). She 
particularly looks at the effects of Munda's style on her tone: 
Munda's very syntax suggests breathless rage; unwilling to interrupt the 
volcanic flow, she seldom comes to a full stop....The essay is peppered 
with neologisms: standard English proved inadequate to convey 
Munda's wrath....Munda's pugnacity leaps from every line. Sowernam 
had envisioned a courtroom, Speght a chivalric combat, Munda presents 
herself as a street scrapper, her confrontation with Swetnam as an open 
brawl; a gang of women will pounce on Swetnam and savage him. This 
is no debate: it is a mugging. (Woodbridge 100-101) 
Woodbridge follows this reading with a discussion of Speght's, Sowernam's 
and Munda's tones as they compare Swetnam to mythological or typical dogs. 
For Munda, Woodbridge notes, Swetnam "is an ordinary English mutt-curish, 
mangy, vomiting in the streets....[Munda], in contrast, is a woman of erudition: 
she reveals this through Latinate neologisms, classical allusions, 
and....syllogistic logic" (Woodbridge 101). Woodbridge's comments on the 
effect of Munda's style indicate the energy, intelligence and anger which 
characterizes Munda's changing emotions. Yet, like most of the critics, 
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Woodbridge dismisses one of the most consistent and developed rhetorical 
moves in these pamphlets: "Even Munda at times plays the literary critic. She is 
hampered by Speght's and Sowernam's thoroughness: But she adds 
objections to Swetnam's trite proverbs, mixed metaphors, and dismal doggerel" 
(Woodbridge 102). Woodbridge implies that Munda is simply adding more to 
those readings without considering the significance of those additions. 
Nevertheless, her depiction of Munda's tone, and the style used to present that 
tone, is generally accurate to the piece. 
These pamphleteers's styles indicate the range of emotions expressed 
by these implied authors: highlighting, contrasting and elaborating on the 
personality traits and reputations created through the use of genre. The angry, 
shrewish, excessive tone in these pamphlets is offset, to different degrees, by 
the skillful analyses and virile intelligence displayed in these women's close 
readings. Speght even allows herself several wry remarks, though those 
comments are deeply constrained by her ethos as the stereotypically "good" 
woman. Yet Speght's second part comments on Swetnam as if she were a red-
pen editor of his faulty logic, worse style, and inept grammar. Her style of active 
reading characterizes Swetnam as a crude fool, and at the same time her close 
reading and sharp tone reflects back on her ethos in order to present her 
character as somewhat more complex than the good young woman stereotype 
that she attempts to enact. Sowernam, like Speght, uses the style of close 
reading. She devotes her entire first chapter to that analysis, which functions as 
a tangent in her structure but which creates an ethos of precise knowledge and 
skillful evaluation. Also, Sowernam devotes the bulk of her second section to a 
transactional reading of Swetnam's words, framed satirically as Swetnam's 
arraignment. As Woodbridge implies, there appears little reason for Munda to 
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also comment on Swetnam's logic, rhetoric, and grammar, yet she also uses 
close reading techniques. Finally, Anger, who closely read the Boke his Surfeit, 
which never went to print, has even less apparent reason for analyzing a 
particular text. Yet to an extent that rivals Speght, Anger analyzes the Boke. 
Anger and Munda need not have used close readings to make their arguments, 
yet they do. The rest of this chapter will look at the style of their transactional, 
gendered readings, both as it indicates the reading practices used by these 
women and as it affirms and deepens their personal reputations. 
As I have already quoted, Jane Anger begins the body of her defense 
with a comment on rhetoric, which indicates her awareness of the meanings 
conveyed by style and which indicates that her text is both a defense of women 
and is an attack on misogynistic rhetoric. Though her two dedications indicate 
that her ultimate purposes are to reconstruct women's ontological status and to 
express the rage felt by women who cannot construct their own reputations, she 
makes these points through the vehicle of an attack against one specific writer's 
pamphlet. The abrupt transition between the two dedications to her comments 
about rhetoric and her close reading of the one pamphlet suggests that these 
issues-misogyny, status, reputation, rhetoric, and reading-are closely related 
for Anger, so closely that she does not explain that relationship to her readers. 
The dedications, as was conventional at the time, address two separate 
groups, present two separate tones, and serve two distinct purposes. Her first 
dedication, made to upper class women in a respectful tone, defines the 
characteristics of aristocratic women and implicitly questions the ontological 
status normally given to them. During this presentation of her intended reader, 
she indicates a dislike of obscure writing: 
I will not urge reasons because your wits are sharp and will soon 
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conceive my meaning, [nor] will I be tedious lest I prove too too 
troublesome, nor over-dark in my writing for fear of the name of a riddler. 
But, in a word, for my presumption I crave pardon because it was Anger 
that did write it: committing your protection, and myself, to the protection 
of your selves, and the judgment of the cause to the censures of your just 
minds.... (Anger 31-32) 
She depicts her women readers as sophisticated and intelligent, refuting the 
stereotypes of women as dim-witted or as merely nags. She refuses to 
obfuscate her material, which indicates that such writing deserves censure as 
more tedious than artistic. Unlike those men who she characterizes as 
distracted by their own rhetoric, she refuses to use excessive ornamentation. In 
her second dedication, to the middling sort of woman and to all men, she 
attacks men's slanders of women: 
Fie on the falsehood of men, whose minds go oft a-madding and whose 
tongues cannot so soon be waging, but straight they fall a-tattling! Was 
there ever so abused, so slandered, so railed upon, or so wickedly 
handled undeservedly, as are we women? (Anger 32) 
Her attack on male tattle-tales rejects the community's gossip as a legitmate 
influence on women's reputations, while her ranting style allows her to forcefully 
construct men in the female role of the gossip, which highlights the way the 
loaded language promotes the notion of the garrulous female by using the 
same terms to describe men. She does not attempt to completely restructure 
women's ethos-neither as their ontological status nor as their particular kinds of 
reputations-and she certainly is not attempting to create political, economic or 
legal change. Instead she is writing, as she titles it, a "protection," which 
includes advice to women on how to best protect themselves, analyses of how 
women are blamed for their maltreatment, and an assessment of Boke his 
Surfeit. 
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Her reading of the Boke is in some ways quite congenial to the author, 
particularly because this unknown author was a good writer, unlike Swetnam. 
She does condemn the genre of such surfeits generally, and this one in 
particular, because of the resulting loss of reputation for the particular women 
referred to in such texts. Yet she acknowledges his skillful use of rhetoric to hide 
the offensive material in pleasurable reading: 
Among the innumerable numbers of books to that purpose, of late--
unlooked for--the new Surfeit of an old Lover...came by chance to my 
hands: which, because as well women as men are desirous of novelties, 
I willingly read over. Neither did the ending thereof less please me than 
the beginning, for I was so carried away with the conceit of the Gent, as 
that I was quite out of the book before I thought I had been in the midst 
thereof-so pithy were his sentences, so pure his words and so pleasing 
his style. The chief matters therein contained were of two sorts: the one 
in the dispraise of man's folly, and the other invective against our sex; 
their folly proceeding of their own flattery joined with fancy, and our 
faults are through our folly, with which is some faith. (Anger 33) 
Much like Helen in Gorgias's Encomium of Heien, Anger finds herself befuddled 
by rhetoric. Unlike Gorgias's Helen, Anger recognizes that she is befuddled, 
and reads past the rhetoric to identify the text's thesis. She presents her own 
thesis, that the Boke is offensive, within this narrative about her reading. She 
happens on the book, and, like all voracious readers, reads it for its novelty: she 
praises the manner of the book, mentioning that his skill made it a fast read. 
Hard upon that praise, she summarizes and critiques his matter. Just before 
she narrates her reading she briefly and sharply critiques rhetoric, especially 
rhetoric used against women, and she analyses those circumstances in which 
men think that they have surfeited on love. She forcefully argues that the 
women involved in such situations are more offended against by men than 
willing to be with them. The text discusses the dangers of rhetoric for women, 
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and the sudden shift from the praise of the author's skill to a description of the 
subject results in an enactment of, and a resistance to, becoming an 
"immasculated" reader. Reading the text as a man, she could appreciate the 
rhetoric, yet recalling that she is a woman inspires her anger at his abuse of 
rhetoric to so befuddle her. 
Anger's reading, then, is self-reflective, and she also uses her reading to 
open spaces for her own thinking and voice. Throughout the text she indicates 
that she is responding to particular sections in the Boke, though sometimes she 
leaves off a discussion of a section of the Boke because she either has her own 
material to add or she does not want to reveal too much of the Boke, in order to 
allow the printer to make some profit. For example, she uses her reading of his 
writing as a template on which to write her own meanings when she moves from 
one section of the Boke to the next: 
Having made a long discourse of the gods, censure concerning love, he 
leaves them (and I them with him) and comes to the principal object and 
general foundation of love, which he affirmeth to be grounded on women. 
And now beginning to search his scroll, wherein are taunts against us, he 
beginneth and saith that we allure their hearts to us. Wherein he saith 
more truly than he is aware of: for we woo them with our virtues and they 
wed us with vanities; and men, being of wit sufficient to consider of the 
virtues which are in us women, are ravished with the delight of those 
dainties, which allure and draw the sense of them to serve us~whereby 
they become ravenous hawks, who do not only seize upon us but devour 
us. Our good towards them is the destruction of ourselves; we being well 
formed are by then foully deformed. (Anger 35) 
She follows this reading of his words with her own invective on how men ruin 
women, how they judge women on their beauty, and how they accuse women 
of nagging. In each case she turns the commonplaces into vehicles to praise 
women or blame men: she rewrites what she reads as she reads it. This stylistic 
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devise of presenting an active reader allows her to reject the text's attempt to 
constrain her into a particular set of gender roles, as the romances so 
constrained many readers. Nor is this process purely a rebellion, for such 
rebellious reading would result in 1) not finishing the Boke or2) rejecting his 
points outright. On several occasions, she concurs with his reading: for 
instance in reference to "slothful King Sardanapalus," she says that it is "truly 
set down in that Surfeif (Anger 34). By rejecting, accepting and modifying his 
arguments, she engages in a dialogue with the text on (almost) equal terms, 
despite his rhetoric or her gender roles: she successfully "resists" the text's 
limitations on her by maintaining her own independent thinking. 
She uses this reading style to not only open up a space for her own 
voice, but to correct and to satirize his arguments. One of her corrections shows 
that he needed to consider more fully the story from which one of the 
misogynistic commonplaces is derived: 
Yet it grieves me that faithful Deianira should be falsely accused of her 
husband Hercules' death, seeing she was utterly guiltless (even of 
thought) concerning any such crime. For had not the Centaur's 
falsehood exceeded the simplicity for her too too credulous heart, 
Hercules had not died so cruelly tormented nor the monster's treason 
been so unhappily executed. But we must bear with these faults, and 
with greater than these; especially seeing that he which set it down for a 
maxim was driven into a mad mood through a surfeit, which made him 
run quite beside his book and mistake his case: for where he accused 
Deianira falsely he would have condemned Hercules deservedly. 
(Anger 37) 
By reading beyond the commonplace, by presenting the rest of the story, she 
corrects the material she is reading in the Boke. The knowledge gained in her 
reading of the Hercules myth becomes a base on which to reconstruct his 
mistaken reading of the story and to critique the author for his "mad mood." Her 
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style allows her to indicate that she is a knowledgeable, decent woman, despite 
her shrewish anger. 
Anger relies on that base of trust in her knowledge and her decency 
when she uses her reading style to satirize the Boke. Her satiric technique is 
quite specific: she satirizes commonplaces about women's ontological status or 
behavior, as they are mentioned in the Boke, by replacing "women" with "men." 
The following are two examples: the first writes men's ontological status into six 
types usually conferred on women, the second satirizes the courtesy books 
which constrain women's behaviors by applying those rules to men: 
A) Euthydemus made six kind[s] of women, and I will approve that there 
are so many of men, which be: poor and rich, bad and good, foul and 
fair....Of these sorts there are none good, none rich or fair long. But if we 
do desire to have them good, we must always tie them to the manger and 
diet their greedy paunches, otherwise they will surfeit! What shall I say? 
Wealth makes them lavish, wit knavish, beauty effeminate, poverty 
deceitful and deformity ugly. (Anger 37) 
B) Tibullus, setting down a rule for women to follow, might have 
proportioned this platform for men to rest in. And might have said: Every 
honest man ought to shun that which detracteth both health and safety 
from his own person, and strive to bridle his slanderous tongue. Then 
must he be modest and show his modesty by his virtuous and civil 
behaviors; and not display his beastliness through his wicked and filthy 
words. For lying lips and deceitful tongues are abominable before God. 
(Anger 38) 
Like the quote in which she reads one text to comment on another, these quotes 
reread Euthydemus and Tibullus to satirize the Boke's reliance on them~as well 
as simply satirizing these two commonplaces as topoi. As a technique for 
developing an ethos, it shapes her reputation as a sophisticated reader who 
can readily use the reading techniques of gathering and framing for her own 
ends. For the last few pages of her text Anger allows herself, as Woodbridge 
would say, a "good rant," primarily against the fouled logic of vain and 
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lecherous suitors and who brag of their (non-)deeds. She generalizes the evil 
gossip of some men to the behavior of all men and rails on rashly and 
unreasonably, which may have wrecked her carefully constructed ethos. As 
invective, though, it is a bit of fun at men's expense: 
It is a wonder to see how men can flatter themselves with their own 
conceits. For let us look, they will straight affirm that we love: and if then 
lust pricketh them, they will swear love stingeth us; which imagination 
only is sufficient to make them essay the scaling of half a dozen of us in 
one night, when they will not stick to swear that if they should be denied 
of their requests death must needs follow. Is it any marvel that they 
surfeit, when they are so greedy?...Well, the onset given, if we retire for a 
vantage they will straight affirm that they have got the victory. Nay, some 
of them are so carried away with conceit that, shameless, they will blaze 
abroad among their companions that they have obtained the love of a 
woman, unto whom they never spake above once, if that....Their fawning 
is but flattery; their faith falsehood; their fair words allurements to 
destruction; and their large promises tokens of death, or of evils worse 
than death....There glozing tongues, the preface to the execution of their 
vile minds; and their pens, the bloody executioners of their barbarous 
manners. A little gall maketh a great deal of sweet sour: and a 
slanderous tongue poisoneth all the good parts in man. (Anger 42) 
Even though ranting is common in the pamphlets, Anger's rants, like the one 
above, tend to overwhelm her more sedate readings, and they may construct 
her reputation as more of a shrew than of a complex, individuated personality. 
Yet her stylistic technique of presenting active, transactional rereadings of the 
Boke repeatedly trouble any easy designation of her implied author as only a 
shrew. 
Munda, as Woodbridge claims, also rants well. She does attempt to 
present herself as learned, but unlike Anger, she demonstrates her knowledge 
along with her righteous railing against Swetnam. One of her rare calm 
moments occurs in her first dedication, to her "mother" the Lady Prudentia 
Munda. In this poem, which celebrates mothers and their work, she explains 
173 
that her own education resulted from her mother's diligence: "...Seeing you still / 
Are in perpetual labour with me, even until / The second birth of education 
perfect me.." (Munda 127). In her second dedication, which is another poem, 
she asserts Swetnam's ignorance based in part on the quality of works he 
quotes (Munda 128). One of her main themes of the pamphlet is her notion that 
the quality of one's sources for gathering quotes matters because that quality 
effects one's meaning and indicates one's sophistication. Swetnam cites the 
least sophisticated sources, and his incompetent patchwork of them repeatedly 
attracts her anger. She also recognizes that Swetnam is not unusual, and 
copiously attacks all such "foul-mouthed railers" (Munda 131) copiously: 
The itching desire of oppressing the press with many sottish and illiterate 
libels stuffed with all manner of ribaldry and sordid inventions-when 
every foul-mouthed malcontent may disgorge his Licambean poison in 
the face of all the world-hath broken out into such a dismal contagion in 
these our days, that every scandalous tongue and opprobrious wit, like 
the Italian mountebanks, will advance their peddling wares of detracting 
virulence in the public piazza of every stationer's shop. As printing, that 
was invented to be the storehouse of famous wits, the treasure of divine 
literature, the pandect admintainer of all sciences, is become the 
receptacle of every dissolute pamphlet-the nursery and hospital of every 
spurious and penurious brat which proceeds from base, phrentical, 
brain-sick babblers....[W]oman...is generally become the subject of 
every pedantical goose-quill. Every fantastic poetaster, which thinks he 
hath licked the vomit of his Coryphaeus and can but patch a hobbling 
verse together, will strive to represent unseemly figments imputed to our 
sex (as a pleasing theme to the vulgar) on the public theatre: teaching 
the worser sort, that are more prone to luxury, a compendious way to 
learn to be sinful. (Munda 130-131) 
Munda connects the attack on women to the incompetent gathering and framing 
employed by unsophisticated readers. For Munda, printing should be used only 
for ethical and artistic writing, and not for making the hobbling verse and 
unseemly fragments which were common in much of pamphlet literature, which 
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appealed only to the vulgar, and which encouraged sinfulness. 
Her own reading style is exhibited in her copious attacks on Swetnam 
and others of his ilk, and the very skill of her reading has generated serious 
questions about the gender of the author. For instance, Nancy Miller believes 
that Munda's ready use of Latin indicates that she must be a man and must 
have received a man's education. For instance, Munda argues that: 
[T]hough feminine modesty hath confined our rarest and ripest wits to 
silence, we acknowledge it our greatest ornament; but when necessity 
compels us, 'tis as great a fault and folly loquenda tacere, ut contra gravis 
est culpa tacenda I loqui. Being too much provoked by arraignments, 
baitings and rancorous impeachments of the reputation of our whole sex, 
stula est clemntia...periturae parcere cartae: opportunity of speaking 
slipped by silence is as bad as importunity upheld by babbling.... 
(Munda 132) 
As a construction of her personal reputation, Munda's simultaneous use of 
learning and anger places her irresolvably at the cusp between the virile 
woman and the shrew, if not troubling her gender by seeming male through her 
extensive knowledge of Latin. Munda, as exemplified in this quote, tends to 
layer the rhetorical and logical significances of her quotes: here she is justifies 
her breach the feminine decorum of silence. She attacks the "babbling" that 
"provoked" her, and she documents her own learning. Where Anger's use of 
learning moves her tirade into deliberation, Munda's use of it illuminates the 
differences between herself and Swetnam's abilities and heightens the 
emotional force of her considered anger. 
She retains this complex ethos throughout her work by balancing her 
angry tone with her skillful readings of both Swetnam and the classics. Her 
insults against Swetnam, as above, regularly undermine his arguments by 
referring to classical authors, and she focuses her comments on his style and 
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his citations. Usually she speaks generally, though she ends the pamphlet with 
a line-by-line assessment of his text, in which she excludes observations 
already made by Speght and Sowernam. Relatively rarely she agrees with 
Swetnam, and a few of her attacks on him are as single-minded as the following 
ad hominum attack: 
We have your confession under your own hand, where you say you 
'might have employed yourself to better use than in such an idle 
business'. True: (A fool speaks sometimes to the purpose). If you must 
needs be digiting your pen, the time had been far better spent if you had 
related to the world some stories of your travels with a gentleman 
learneder and wiser than yourself. So you might have beguiled the time 
and exposed your ridiculous wit to laughter. (Munda 135) 
By agreeing with him in order to disagree with him, she constructs herself as 
neither a shrew nor a virile woman, but as a believable personality who can 
consider both her own positions and her opponent's arguments. Similarly, by 
ranting while reading, she affirms her implied author's complex personality. 
This personality extends far past the stereotypes of women, and is more than 
even the two dimensional reputation that Sowernam and Anger construct for 
themselves. Munda presents us with an implied author who has a fully realized 
"self": she expresses a wide range of emotions-from honor and affection for her 
"mother," to these rants, to concern about the use of printing. These emotions 
are interwoven: for instance, she honors mothers in her respectful and 
affectionate dedication and in her defense of mothers against Swetnam's 
attack. Where the implied author seems fully developed, Swetnam is presented 
almost as the stereotype of the foolish and ignorant man. She finds his faulty 
logic more than just annoying, but downright funny: Swetnam attempt to use 
"bear-baiting" metaphor, which collapses ridiculously when he then denies 
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women--the bears-entry to the text/arena (Munda 142). Her critique of 
Swetnam makes him out as a stereotype, which highlights the complex 
personality of her own implied author, and it constructs Swetnam as no more 
than a one dimensional stereotype, which places him in the ethos position 
commonly reserved for women. 
For the pamphleteers, their transactional readings, their thorough 
presentation of those readings as a style device, and the ethos of their implied 
authors are intertwined. To convince their audience that they speak as more 
than just the essentialized notion of the Woman, and to convince them that they 
speak as individual women, they write their ideas against both their opposition's 
texts and the stereotypes that could be expected of them. Even more 
significantly, Munda presents herself as a complex personality who has 
overlapping motives, desires, and emotions, which constructs her persona as 
more complex than even the personal reputation that Sowernam delineates for 
herself: Munda becomes as believable as an implied author as many of the 
men's implied authors, though with much more work to do it. Her careful use of 
style especially presents herself as more than her audience's expectations of 
her based on her sex. Her awareness of the cultural constraints on her ethos as 
derived from her ontological status, the reputation of the pamphlet form, and her 
use of shrewish ranting, virile transactional reading, and a plethora of complex 
personal characteristics shape the dynamic relationship between herself and 
her audience which presents her ethos appeal. For Munda in particular, ethos 
is dynamic because she does not limit herself to either a one dimenisional 
stereotype of Woman as "good," as Speght does, or a two dimenisional 
reputation, as being somewhat shrewish and somewhat virile, as Sowernam 
and Anger do. For Munda, her ethos functions as a bridge between her 
177 
complex personality and her audiense's expectations of women, even though 
there is no evidence that her attempt to so cooperate with her audience in any 
way succeeded. For all of these women's attempts to present persuasive ethos 
appeals, these women's works fell into obscurity, failing against the endemic 




The particular ethos problems exhibited by the writings of these early 
modern women indicate extremely marginalized, if not nearly silenced, 
speakers. Marginalized speakers, like these Renaissance women, are 
constrained by being ideologically predefined as unacceptable public speakers 
within their community. Unlike most members of the social or economic elite, 
marginalized speakers had to defend themselves against the audiences's 
stereotypes of them. These stereotypes, as in the case of Renaissance women, 
can dominate one's ethos, which effectively silences a speaker. The 
Renaissance women attempt to speak anyway by either ignoring the audience's 
expectations of them, as with Christine in the querelle, or by answering those 
stereotyping expectations, as in the Cite and the pamphlets. 
For these women, ethos is a tripartite dynamic relationship among 
speech, speaker, and community; specifically it represents the influence of the 
audience's expectations, the speakers's personal reputations, and their styles. 
I use this definition of ethos throughout this dissertation, yet I discovered that 
even this breakdown of the ethos appeal is too limited, for it assumes that 
women had significant influence over their audience's expectations of them. I 
argue, then, that, for these women, the more effective ethos appeals 
dynamically connected them with their audience. The audience judged these 
women by the stereotypes about them, yet the women attempted to construct 
both their personal reputations and their style to present themselves as 
trustworthy, complex personalities, and so disprove those stereotypes. My 
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dissertation looks closely at two different, early debates about women in which 
women participated in order to explore in this notion of ethos. My intention has 
been to illuminate the ethos appeals available to these Renaissance women. 
Christine's opponents, for instance, perceived her as incompetent, if not 
sinful. Those expectations directly reflected the stereotypes about women in the 
misogynistic courtly and clerkly literatures. Christine made a rhetorical mistake 
in the querelle when she failed to establish her ethos as other than the 
stereotype of a woman. By failing to undermine her audience's expectations of 
her, Christine allows her enemies to define her. Christine seems blind during 
the querelle to the nature of her ontological status as a woman, and, after that 
debate, in the Cite des dames and the Tresor de la cite des dames, she 
reconstructs women's ontological status and guides women in appropriating 
that new ontological status. Together, the two books promote women's use of 
persuasion-first by creating cultural spaces for women's speech and then by 
establishing a rhetoric for that speech. These later texts, I believe, respond to 
Christine's experience in the querelle, and they attempt to correct women's 
problematical ethos positions, as exhibited by the Cols's easy dismissals of 
Christine's arguments as merely the words of a woman. These three defenses 
of women--the defense of women against literary misogyny in the querelle, the 
recreation and defense of worthy women's ontological status in the Cite, and 
the defense of, and instructions in, women's speech in the Tresor-all indicate 
that women's ethos appeals are constructed in tandem with their communities. 
The Renaissance Englishwomen's defenses of women exhibit similar 
ethos appeals, shaped by stereotype, reputation, and style. My study in the 
chapter of Renaissance expectations of women pamphleteers assesses the 
stereotypes that the discourse community held about women generally, and, 
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from that context, derives the audience's likely expectations of these female 
writers's ethos positions. Interestingly, three of the women challenge the 
conventional arguments concerning the "good" woman stereotype, and all of 
the women appropriate some of the stereotypically female of women's vices, 
which undermines the limitations on their ethos appeals as derived from 
conventional virtues. Generally, women writers, when not condemned outright, 
were seen as either the ontological type of the "virile woman" or as the "shrew," 
depending primarily on whether the speaker about the woman writer was being 
generous. The "shrew" and the "virile woman," though they connote distinct 
female types, actually delineated the same masculine skills of reasoning and 
speaking in a particular woman. The "virile woman's" speech was seen as 
potentially reasonable, and so as potentially persuasive. Yet appropriating the 
virile woman "type" as a speaking position was a dangerous solution to the 
audience's expectations of the unacceptability of the woman speaker, for such a 
woman speaker was easily seen as a shrew. Because women's best rhetorical 
ornament was defined as their silence, the audience's expectations was 
challenged by these women's very act of writing. By getting angry, these women 
show that the "shrew" position benefits the speaker because the shrew's words 
are less constrained than the "good" woman's words. Yet the "shrew" position, 
though more complex than the overarching notion of a "bad" woman, still limited 
these women's voices to the reputation expected of the "shrew." 
In response to those stereotypes, the pamphleteers use the reputation of 
the pamphlet form to construct for themselves personal reputations that are 
more complex than mere stereotypes, and hence to construct for themselves 
ethos appeals that are not limited to the audience's culturally constructed 
expectations of them. To present a successful reputation, they needed to shape 
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it more than their audience's expectations shaped it: the pamphleteers did so, 
primarily, through their styles. These styles indicate the range of emotions 
expressed by these implied authors: highlighting, contrasting and elaborating 
on the personality traits and reputations created through the use of the 
pamphlet form. The angry, shrewish, excessive tone in these pamphlets is 
offset, to different degrees, by the skillful analyses and virile intelligence 
displayed in these women's close readings. The women pamphleteers use an 
efferent, transactional reading practice: they read the text in dialogue with it, 
focusing on the meanings they are left with from the text. They use this active 
reading process as a means of avoiding the trap of immasculation in their 
resistant readings. By ranting while reading, these women, especially Munda, 
affirm their implied author's complex personalities. These personalities extend 
their ethosappeals beyond the stereotypes of women as an attempt to develop 
their reputations. They present us with implied authors who are complex 
selves, instead of one dimensional Women. As such, the authors's ethos 
appeals become a dynamic relationship between the author and the audience, 
as both shape the character of the speaker. 
In this study I have closely analyzed a particularly repressive rhetorical 
situation in order to develop a notion about the nature and function of ethos in 
such situations. The purpose of this dissertation has been, and remains, limited 
to the historical study of these women's ethos, hoping to see if the dynamics of 
the ethos appeal discovered through an analysis of Christine's work could be 
fruitfully used to analyze the works of women in a similar rhetorical situation. If 
any generalization is possible here, it may be that their ethos failed because 
their audience's expectations still successfully silenced them, despite their 
attempts to present themselves as reliable. Nevertheless, the possibilities for a 
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peroration to my study are deeply limited, for I have been showing what I 
discovered in my research, not arguing for a new theory. My primary conclusion 
is evinced by the dissertation's length: the analysis did prove fruitful for 
uncovering the significance of these women's rhetoric in their particular 
situations. I do not wish to too easily extrapolate my discoveries here into a 
theory of ethos. Certainly, this dissertation suggests the need for both further 
research in the various rhetorical situations that nearly silence a rhetor and for a 
theoretical analysis of that research once it is completed. One call for further 
research that I will hazard is a need to look at another, quite different, repressive 
rhetorical situation in order to see if a similar dynamic develops: for instance, a 
useful counterpoint to this study would be a study of first year college students 
who find themselves virtually silenced in the classroom. Only after completing a 
variety of such studies may it be reasonable to speculate about the theory of 
ethos suggested here. 
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